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THE HERMENEUTICS OF SOCIAL ACTION:
A STUDY IN THE CONVERGENCE OF
PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

by



DAVID ALLAN REHORICK

A THESIS
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

In recent times, there has been an increasing number of attempts to relate the phenomenological and sociological domains of inquiry. Such undertakings provide testimony to the broad and rather disparate impact that Edmund Husserl's explication and development of phenomenological philosophy has had on the development of the social sciences over the past seven decades. Yet, the conception of what is most often called "phenomenological sociology" is problematic. Many misunderstandings and consequent misuses of phenomenological concepts in sociological inquiry have largely been a product of an uncritical, metaphorical transfer of phenomenological concepts into sociological inquiry.

To examine the relation between the phenomenological and sociological domains of inquiry, it was relevant to trace both domains back to their origin in the Methodenstreit and subsequent crisis of European sciences. Thus, the approach taken here followed a purposive sequence. Although many social science traditions had their origin in the crisis of European sciences, only two traditions were examined here. The phenomenological tradition was traced from its inception in the writings of Edmund Husserl to Paul Ricoeur's more recent hermeneutic phenomenology. Too often, attempts to relate the phenomenological and sociological perspectives have focussed on Husserlian phenomenology, thus excluding post-Husserlian modifications. This study drew from Ricoeur's perspective the criteria for the analysis of the methodological positions of four eminent social action theorists--Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto,

Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. Hence, the study aimed to lay the historical groundwork necessary in order to explicate the contribution that phenomenology can make to sociology.

The results of the study indicate a general convergence between the phenomenological and social action traditions which is not phenomenological, but phenomenologically based. There are two possible results of applying the phenomenological method to sociology: a sociology that would be intrinsically phenomenological in its categories and claims, or a sociology that is based upon a metatheoretical position that is phenomenologically grounded. In the first instance we might say that the end product of applying a phenomenological approach to sociological analysis is a "phenomenological sociology," whereas in the latter case the result is a "phenomenologically based sociology." Our contention is that only the latter alternative is truly possible.

In addition, the study found a general convergence on action rather than ego as the focus of analysis for both phenomenology and sociology. However, this is not the foundation of a phenomenologically based sociology, but rather an indication that a phenomenologically based metapsychology is employed by Weber, Pareto, and Parsons.

Since neither phenomenological philosophy nor sociological theory has solved the question as to the nature of social existence, a phenomenologically based sociology would have to be grounded on a phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity and transubjectivity. It may well be that the categories of experience are conditioned by social factors beyond the realm of the individual's own experience.

conception that does not permit the solution of the problem of the external, independent existence of language, culture, and social order.

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

There are dangers which threaten anyone who enters the boundary region between philosophy and empirical human science. The danger lies not in the mix of subject matter as such. No objections can be raised against either a philosophical interpretation of empirical data or philosophical considerations enriched and clarified by empirical facts (Strasser, 1963: 301). The danger lies in losing sight of both shores; hence, Strasser qualified his statement by saying that the man of learning who enters this realm has to know what he is doing. He has to remain on guard. Nevertheless, this danger should not discourage research in the region between the philosophical and empirical human sciences. One need only be constantly aware of the danger in order to avoid it.

In the present inquiry, the region between philosophy and empirical human science is entered in a limited sense. Concern is with examining the relation between phenomenology and sociology. The Introduction to the investigation has two parts. Chapter 1 defines the purposes, significance, and scope and limitations of the study. Chapter 2 provides an historical grounding and departure for the analysis.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Only a philosophically founded theory of method can exorcise the pseudo-problems which today hinder research in the social sciences, and especially in sociology.

--Alfred Schuetz (1967: xxxi-xxxii)

PRELUDE

In recent times, there has been an increasing number of attempts to relate the phenomenological and sociological domains of inquiry. Such undertakings provide testimony to the broad and rather disparate impact that Edmund Husserl's explication and development of phenomenological philosophy has had on the development of the social sciences over the past seven decades. Husserl's efforts can be seen as his attempt to deal with the issues central to the "crisis of European sciences" that arose around the turn of the 20th century. In this sense, his work warrants comparison with that of Max Weber whose efforts can as well be seen as an attempt to deal with the issues arising from this same controversy. The writings of both men represent reactions to the situation that underlaid the Crisis. Weber's somewhat more moderate approach to these issues is probably better known to a larger segment of sociologists than is the radical departure taken by Husserl in framing his own response. Yet, Husserl's undertaking touched directly upon an age-old enigma concerned with the methodology of the study of human affairs--the question of the independence and/or interdependence of "philosophy" and "science" in setting out the superstructure of such an enterprise. Thus, the basis of a continuing concern among sociologists with the issues he raised might seem to be clearly recognizable.

Yet, on closer view, the reasons for an increasing interest at present by North American sociologists in what is most often called "phenomenological sociology" are themselves problematic. Based on the

views of Alvin Gouldner (1970), the growing interest in "phenomenological sociology" could be explained as a manifestation of the coming identity crisis in North American sociology. That is, phenomenological sociology could be viewed as one alternative to orthodox North American sociology. To support the contention that North American sociology is experiencing an identity crisis, one might take note of the growing interest in studying the "sociology of sociology" (Friedrichs, 1970; Tiryakian, 1971). On the other hand, one might explain the growing interest in "phenomenological sociology" as the result of recent recognition of the interests of European colleagues due to more rapid and extensive translations of the more formidable phenomenological investigations into the English language.¹ Or, perhaps, the explanation of the increasing interest in "phenomenological sociology" represents little more than generation-specific preferences among sociologists in defining their areas of competence and specialization within the sociological profession. As Stehr and Larson have suggested:

Given the emphasis on "recognition" within the profession young sociologists may choose new interest areas because of their view that "this is where it's at" or because there is less competition for recognition in a new area (1972: 6).

Whatever the reasons may be, the fact remains that many misunderstandings and consequent misuses of phenomenological concepts in sociological inquiry have largely been a product of two kinds of failings in setting out the discussion. First, there is a failure to recognize the intended significance of phenomenological concepts within the context of strict phenomenological inquiry. Second, there is a failure to recognize that the uncritical transfer of phenomenological concepts into sociological

inquiry cannot occur without an essential distortion of their original meaning.²

There are a variety of possible reasons for these two failings. First, there has been a lack of adequate translation (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of phenomenological literature into the English language.³ Second, the complexity of the phenomenological subject matter creates two difficulties: (a) a frequent failure to directly state what phenomenology is (the literature abounds with negative replies--phenomenology is not this, not that)⁴; and (b) the paradox of mundane word concepts, that is, a clear recognition of the inadequacy of language to convey the exact sense of what phenomenology is (Farber, 1968: 558-59). A third and most significant reason is a failure by many writers to grasp the "radicalness" of phenomenological philosophy. Common sense and non-phenomenological philosophy is rooted in what Husserl called the "natural attitude." From the phenomenological perspective, the "natural attitude" is an implicit metaphysical commitment which lies at the heart of our worldly experience. It constitutes the central metaphysical assumption of the natural and social sciences. The central task for phenomenology is to transcend the natural attitude of daily life in order to render it an object for philosophical scrutiny and in order to describe and account for its essential structures (Natanson, 1962: 5). The failure to recognize this central task for phenomenology has resulted in many misunderstandings. As Natanson succinctly states:

The central and ultimate difficulty in seeing what phenomenology is trying to do relates directly and inevitably to the rootage of all non-phenomenological attitudes in the natural standpoint. This I take to be the true basis for so much misunderstanding of phenomenology. It is not so much a matter

of this or that phenomenological idea, concept, or principle that is viewed in a wrong way as it is a failure to grasp the very style of phenomenological concern (1962: 6-7).

Although Natanson states that the main misunderstandings of phenomenology are not so much a matter of viewing phenomenological concepts incorrectly, the misunderstandings do manifest themselves in the literature as a metaphorical treatment of phenomenological concepts in a sociological analysis (Heap and Roth, 1972). Two examples are provided to illustrate the metaphorical use of some key phenomenological concepts.

The phenomenological concept of "intention" has been misunderstood and misrepresented by Tiryakian. Tiryakian (1965: 682) equates W. I. Thomas' notion of "attention" (i.e., the mental attitude which takes note of the outside world and manipulates it) with Edmund Husserl's notion of "intention."⁵ The notion of "intention" or "intentionality" is central to Husserl. Intentionality is the property of consciousness being consciousness of something (Husserl, 1931: 242). To grasp the importance of this conception, it is important to notice the Cartesian influence on Husserl. The Cartesian method of doubting provided the pattern for Husserl's pure phenomenology. According to Husserl, Descartes did not make a sufficiently radical distinction between the act of thinking and the object of thought. The technical term used by Husserl to designate the relationship between the act of thinking and the object of thought was intentionality. Intentionality occurs even before mind enters. Therefore, Tiryakian is incorrect in equating Thomas' "attention" with Husserl's "intention." Husserl's "intention" would be a precondition for the possibility of Thomas' "attention."

A second illustration of the metaphorical use of phenomenological concepts can be drawn from Bruyn's (1966, 1967) attempt to relate the perspectives of the participant observer and phenomenologist. In particular, Bruyn incorrectly applies the phenomenological concept of "essence" to the notion of social theory. Bruyn (1966: 94) assumes that there can be a phenomenological sociology derived from and parallel to Husserlian phenomenology and, furthermore, that "the work of the social phenomenologist becomes one of interpreting anew the meaning of essence in social theory." The failure to understand Husserl is clear since one cannot try to find "the meaning of 'essence' in social theory." An essence refers to pure generalities which put before our mind pure possibilities whose validity is independent of experience (Husserl, 1931, Section 1: Chapter 1). Essences are the most basic constituting entities--the "what it is." Essence has as its domain of reference the realm of possibilities which precedes that of actualities (Husserl, 1931: 213). Essences precede concepts. For every essence it is possible to match a concept. Therefore, Bruyn should not be looking for "the meaning of essence in social theory." If anything, Bruyn should be looking for the essence of the conception of "social theory." In conclusion, Bruyn makes a fundamental error by failing to distinguish between the participant observer who observes and the phenomenologist who sees (i.e., intuitively).⁶

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

There is clearly something wrong with recent approaches which attempt to relate phenomenology to sociology. The inquiry undertaken

here centers on determining what the problem is and what in particular the phenomenological approach can contribute to sociological analysis. In attempting to determine whatever contribution a phenomenological approach toward sociological analysis holds out, we might consider the alternative end results that might be thought to follow from such an effort. Here, I think we can talk about two possibilities: a sociology that is intrinsically phenomenological in its categories and claims, or a sociology that is based upon a metatheoretical position that is phenomenologically grounded. In the first instance, we might say that the end product of applying a phenomenological approach to sociological analysis is a "phenomenological sociology," whereas, in the latter case, the result is a "phenomenologically based sociology." Throughout my presentation here, I shall want to argue the thesis that only the latter alternative is truly possible, i.e., that the relevance of phenomenology to sociological analysis is within a metatheoretical vein rather than a substantive one. If we turn directly to the consideration of the kinds of particular contributions that a phenomenological approach could make to sociological analysis, perhaps the grounds for such an assertion can be illustrated.

Of several possible forms such contributions might take, my opinion is that two particular ones are most prominent. One of these relates to methods of description, the other to methods of conceptualization. While these two forms are not to be considered exhaustive, other possibilities have not been forwarded at this time. Let us consider the two cases.

First, phenomenology could inform sociological inquiry by contributing a distinctive method by which social phenomena can be described. The utility of such a contribution is illustrated in the area of ethnomethodological studies, which seek to reconstruct the way in which men interpret their own world in daily life (Garfinkel, 1967; Douglas, 1970; Psathas, 1968). Ethnomethodology draws extensively from the works of Alfred Schuetz (Schutz), especially in its application of his notion of "suspending belief in the natural attitude" so that the objective features of the social world are reduced to the observable elements of concrete, ongoing social situations. In particular, "ethnomethodology" refers to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life (Garfinkel, 1967: 11). Thus, ethnomethodology utilizes a basic method quite akin to a central feature of phenomenological method and its practice of this method might be further informed through greater familiarity with the latter approach. Yet, at present, ethnomethodology seeks to establish itself as a body of knowledge independent from the mainstream of phenomenology.

A second kind of contribution that a phenomenological perspective might yield concerns the possibility of its offering a method of conceptualization for empirical human sciences. Such a contribution can be illustrated through consideration of its relation to social action theory where the relation is probably more direct than in the previous example but, at present, less well documented. In particular, one can draw a useful parallel in this regard with respect to the development of

conceptual method among the social action theorists and the later phenomenologists.

The example just noted is particularly well-taken in another sense. It serves, as well, as an excellent instance of the major contention I wish to set out: that the relevance of phenomenology to sociological analysis lies in a methodological vein rather than a substantive one. And, by examining the interplay between phenomenology and the conceptualization of action in the writings of some of the acknowledged masters of sociological theory, one can dramatically illustrate the claimed relevance of phenomenology for sociological theory as a whole.

Hence, the main task for the study is to lay the historical groundwork necessary in order to launch more intensive and specific investigations into the question of how phenomenology might relate to sociology. The discussion contained in several of the chapters to follow represents a critical historical attempt to set out the parallel between the phenomenological and social action traditions.

Our approach in examining this relationship follows a purposive sequence. First, we begin by considering the context and issues generated during the so-called "crisis of European sciences," since the phenomenological and social action traditions have their origins there. The central question of the Crisis concerned the relation of values and science. In particular, question was raised as to the applicability of natural science methodologies to investigate man, society, and history. The result was the emergence of distinct methodologies for the investigation of the human or cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften).⁷ After discussing the main issues of the Crisis, it is then relevant to consider

the developments in phenomenology. Generally, attempts to discuss the relation between phenomenology and sociology have adopted a strict Husserlian perspective. There has been a tendency to exclude post-Husserlian modifications to phenomenology. Perhaps a useful relation between the phenomenological and sociological perspectives can be found by paying more attention to the critical appraisals and subsequent modifications to Husserl's program. This is neither to deny the importance of Husserlian phenomenology nor to ignore the fact that all phenomenology at some point is linked to Husserl. However, it is to express caution in a too dogmatic acceptance of Husserlian phenomenology. Moreover, post-Husserlian phenomenologies introduce hermeneutics as an integral and important methodological component. Thus, after a discussion of Husserl's program, the positions of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty are outlined. The review of post-Husserlian phenomenology terminates with a discussion of Paul Ricoeur's program, which is subsequently employed as the mode for analyzing several major positions within sociology. In particular, the programs of four eminent social action theorists (Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons) are analyzed. Following a presentation of the conclusions from the analysis, some current interests emerging from the interface between phenomenology and hermeneutics are briefly discussed.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

To say that the problem of "methodology" has occupied 20th century social scientists would indeed be an understatement. Rather, methodological issues have tended to preoccupy the attention of social

science investigators. Kaplan (1964: 24) has noted that social scientists tend to think that the most serious difficulties in behavioral sciences are methodological. Once these problems are solved, "progress" will be sure and rapid. However, the direction of this preoccupation has often been ill-founded. In the main, inconsistent use and imprecise clarification of what the term "methodology" signifies has resulted in ambiguity. In part, this ambiguity can be attributed to a failure to distinguish "methodology" from research techniques such as statistics, case study, interview, and so forth. Methodology takes upon itself the examination and critical analysis of the special ways in which the general structure of theory finds its application in particular scientific disciplines. This conception of methodology allows for variation not only from one discipline to another but also from one epoch to another in the history of the same discipline. At present, the general tendency is to conclude that there is no unique scientific method. On the contrary, the method of science is a mixture of logical construction and empirical observation; and, furthermore, this mixture varies from one discipline to another.

In many contemporary positions, this attitude is manifest in the advocacy of methodological and theoretical pluralism. For instance, the views of Sir Karl Popper aptly express this leaning (1964, 1968). Popper holds that the existence of partly overlapping, mutually inconsistent and yet empirically adequate theories is not only possible but also required. The kernel of Popper's position is an image of man intertwined with an ideal of an open, pluralistic society. An open, pluralistic society is the necessary condition for the survival of the criticist

frame of reference. In turn, the criticist frame is the base of an open, pluralistic society (Popper, 1968: 374-76). Thus, the relation between criticist frame and open, pluralistic society can be considered an instance of the "hermeneutic spiral"; that is, the improved dialogue within the criticist frame will make it possible to improve the relatively open society. Popper's main concern or mission seems to be that of enlightenment--the idea of self-liberation through knowledge by opting for the criticist frame (1968: 384). Through the enlightened consciousness of its members, Popper hopes that society as a whole would operate more in accordance with available scientific knowledge. The philosophy of history underlying this type of enlightenment is such that, according to it, history has no more "meaning" than nature has; thus, we have to assign the "meaning" to it. Popper's position has an affinity to both hermeneutic and dialectic viewpoints.

Yet, the basis for many general methodological concerns stems from a tendency to explicitly avoid or implicitly fail to recognize the relevance of philosophical issues, a failing common in many contemporary social sciences. For instance, the main focus of modern epistemology has been the question of the philosophical grounds for the validity of scientific propositions. However, social science researchers often ignore epistemological problems. When social scientists do explicitly acknowledge the relevance of epistemology, the issues of general methodology are usually interpreted in terms of opposing philosophical doctrines such as rationalism-empiricism, realism-idealism, subjectivism-objectivism, and monism-dualism (Kaufmann, 1944: 2). But, if the adherence to any pair of these polar types is taken without concern for

further objective justification, then the domain of social science seems to lack substantial foundation.

In lieu of these considerations, the significance of the present inquiry rests on the explicit attempt to examine what phenomenological philosophy can contribute to sociological inquiry. In particular, the study examines the relevance of phenomenological philosophy for clarifying the methodologies present in the works of four eminent sociological theorists--Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. For instance, Parsons has defined methodology as:

. . . the consideration of the general grounds for the validity of scientific propositions and systems of them. It is as such neither a strictly scientific nor a strictly philosophical discipline. It is, of course, a field where these systems are subjected to philosophical criticism touching the grounds of their validity, but equally it is a field where philosophical arguments advanced for or against the validity of such propositions are subject to criticism in the light of the evidence from science itself. While philosophy has implications for science it is not any less true that science has implications for philosophy (1968, p. 24).

However, Parsons does not advance his philosophical position beyond that of a "primitive" phenomenology. The present inquiry holds that phenomenological method as a mode of conceptualization can elucidate the conceptual problems of these four social action theorists. Nevertheless, a reciprocal clarification also exists; that is, social action programs can help to clarify phenomenological philosophy. In this manner, phenomenology and empirical human science exhibit a mutual influence upon one another.

The overall significance of the inquiry is aptly summarized in the two main theses that are put forth here. First, it is claimed that the interests of the phenomenological school in philosophy and the social

action tradition in sociology have been converging toward one another since the date of the crisis of European sciences. If this is indeed the case, then its importance to sociological analysis as a whole should be obvious. Yet, it seems not so at present. Hence, such an inquiry as this one can serve to bring that impact into view. Moreover, the second thesis, holding that the relevant contribution from phenomenology is of a metatheoretical character rather than a substantive character, serves to elucidate the form in which that impact is manifested in sociological analysis. Finally, the inquiry brings forward these issues with the current context of the intellectual interchange between these two perspectives implicitly represented in the works of two leading contemporary thinkers, Talcott Parsons and Paul Ricoeur.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS TO THE INQUIRY

For practical reasons, the scope of the research must be limited. Although the inquiry seeks a Gestalt, or view from the "catbird seat," all relevant influences and intellectual traditions cannot be examined. By limiting the choice of writers to be considered, the scope of the research can be brought into more manageable proportions. A number of considerations arise in conjunction with limiting the range of writers to be studied. First, our immediate concern is not with the "success" of these programs, but rather with the common elements of their selected methodological programs. Therefore, a detailed discussion of variations among the writers is not relevant. Second, the interest of this inquiry is not in the separate and discrete propositions to be found in the works of these men but in a single body of systematic methodological

reasoning, the development of which can be traced through a critical analysis of the writings of this group and certain of their predecessors. They can be treated together not because they constitute a "school" in the usual sense but because they have all, in different ways, contributed to methodological development. Thus, the choice has been limited to a small number of more eminent writers. Third, with respect to the texts of the writers themselves, an encyclopedic completeness in examination will not be attempted. Selections from the texts serve to delimit the structure of the writers' theories as a whole and to sufficiently establish the points at issue. Fourth, the inquiry is meant to be a monographic study of a particular problem in the history of social thought commencing with the Methodenstreit.⁸ As such, it does not profess to be the history of philosophical and social thought arising in Europe during the past century. Finally, the study is conceived to be a systematic whole concerned with ideas which are interrelated and permeate the whole study. A "fact" cited, or a statement made, should be taken not only in its immediate intrinsic meaning but also in relation to the total structure of which it forms a part.⁹

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

¹For example, the first volume of Husserl's Ideas appeared in 1913; however, the English translation did not appear until 1931.

²These two problems have been discussed in an excellent paper by Heap and Roth (1972). This paper served as an impetus to the present inquiry during the very early stages of formulation.

³For instance, Spiegelberg (1971b) complains of the misunderstandings created by the inadequate translation from German to English of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article entitled "Phenomenology" which appeared in 1929. Incidentally, Richard Palmer (1971) has presented a new complete translation of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article.

⁴For example:

"Phenomenology is not 'subjectivity' if we mean the 'merely subjective' observations which characterize the reports of uncritical and untrained observers chosen at random" (Spiegelberg, 1971a: 667).

"Phenomenology [is] not descriptive psychology" (Farber, 1968: 208).

"Phenomenology is thus empirical in its insistence on a continuous and unbiased scrutiny of experience, but not empiricist as the word is commonly used to refer to explanation through past experience" (MacLeod, 1968: 68).

"Phenomenology is not a form of Platonism, nor is it a revived form of Aristotelian realism. Nor is phenomenology a late edition of idealism or of irrationalism of a philosophy based by necessity on atheism. Phenomenology is not another name for introspection and it is not simply a method used in metaphysics. It is not a preparatory science which is supposed to ready us for the real work of philosophy" (Luijpen, 1966: 153-54).

⁵Although this inquiry is highly critical of the works of Edward A. Tiryakian, we acknowledge the intuitive (but vague and ill-formulated) recognition by Tiryakian that writers such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons do display an affinity to phenomenological philosophy. In this respect, I oppose Peter Berger's (1965) critical remarks on Tiryakian's position. Berger maintains that sociological figures discussed by Tiryakian have little or nothing to do with either phenomenology and/or existentialism.

⁶ Many other examples could be cited. For that matter, Heap and Roth (1972) have advanced criticisms of the metaphorical usage of such phenomenological concepts as "phenomena," "description," and "reduction." As a consequence, Douglas (1970) and Psathas (1971) are included along with Tiryakian and Bruyn as culprits in the illegitimate metaphorical transference of phenomenological concepts into sociological analysis.

⁷ The term Geisteswissenschaften does not have a satisfactory English equivalent. Most translators have settled for the expression "human studies." Dilthey's conception of Geisteswissenschaften encompasses what would now be called the humanities and the social sciences. He formulated this conception primarily with the theoretical problems of the historian in mind. For an explicit discussion, see Makkreel's (1969) attempt to delineate Dilthey's theory of the Geisteswissenschaften by contrasting it to the theory of the Kulturwissenschaften (cultural sciences) which the neo-Kantians offered as an alternative. It is ironic to note that the term Geisteswissenschaften appeared as the German translation for J. S. Mill's conception of "moral sciences" (Popper, 1968: 378, footnote 2).

⁸ Many of the issues raised in this inquiry have roots much earlier than the Methodenstreit. In particular, the writings of Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle are relevant. However, little more than "lip service" can be made to such influences.

⁹ An affinity exists between Parsons' The Structure of Social Action and the format of this inquiry. In particular, the limitations mentioned above are analogous to some limitations mentioned by Parsons (1968: 3-27).

CHAPTER 2

SOME PHASES IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES

Only an understanding from within of the movement of modern philosophy from Descartes to the present, which is coherent despite all its contradictions, makes possible an understanding of the present itself. The true struggles of our time, the only ones which are significant, are struggles between humanity which has already collapsed and humanity which still has roots but is struggling to keep them or find new ones.

--Edmund Husserl (1970b: 14-15)

The famous "methods controversy" (the Methodenstreit) which arose during the latter part of the 19th century in Germany provides the historical departure point for this inquiry. The Methodenstreit later evolved into the more encompassing crisis of European sciences which arose around the turn of the 20th century. The central question concerned the relation of values and science. In particular, question was raised as to the applicability of natural science methodologies to investigate man, society, and history. As a consequence, distinct methodologies for investigation of the human or cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) began to emerge.

The format of Chapter 2 is as follows: an historical summary of some of the relevant ideas preceding and surrounding the Methodenstreit are briefed; then, the main issues of the broader crisis of European sciences are outlined; and, finally, a few of the many divergent responses to the Crisis are mentioned.

ADVENT OF 'METHODENSTREIT'

In its narrowest conception, the Methodenstreit referred to the methodological dispute between two schools of economic thought: (1) the German historical school of economics, and (2) the Austrian school of economic theory (Schumpeter, 1954: 814). Before discussing the Methodenstreit per se, it is useful to gain a general acquaintance with some prior events. The doctrine of "cameralism" is relevant.

Cameralism is the German and Austrian conception of mercantilism. It is a term applied to the whole body of political and economic practices of the absolute monarchy in the states of Germany and Austria during some three hundred years (Bell, 1967: 87). From approximately the mid-16th to the mid-18th centuries, cameralism was codified as a body of social theory which was concerned with answering one fundamental question: How may a government be strong enough to resist other states and to preserve order among its own people? The cameralistic answer to this question was to have the ready means (i.e., money) to finance wars (Small, 1923a: 160).¹ Although the prevailing style of thought during the cameralistic period stressed concern for "the welfare of the state,"² cameralism was not a philosophy but rather an administrative technology geared to meet short-run political needs. Individual interests were incidental whereas the interests of government (i.e., those of the prince) were foremost. Thus, reflectively speaking, German social science (especially political science) was at the outset a fiscal science; that is, attention was focussed on ways and means of supplying the public treasury.

Although there was no discrete and easily identifiable transition from "cameralistic science" to that methodology which was worked out in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, a general synopsis can be made of some pertinent activities which entered into this transition. Firstly, during the last quarter of the 18th century, the German political philosophy of collectivism came under strong attack by both the French Physiocrats and the English economic liberalists (following Adam Smith).³ Secondly, with the decline of cameralistics social theorists had no

fundamental problem or principle to guide their thoughts (Small, 1923b: 170). Thirdly, the first three quarters of the 19th century was consequently a period in which German scholars in the fields of economics, history, and political science concentrated on trying to get their ideas settled about how to work most intelligently (Small, 1923c: 305). In this quest, German economists concentrated their efforts on applying the suggestions of Adam Smith in an "experiment of trying to make the water of Adam Smith's individualism mix with the oil of German collectivism" (Small, 1923c: 306).

The German attraction to Adam Smith's works rested on such factors as (1) its systematic and thorough presentation, (2) its emphasis on generating an objective economic method, (3) its recognition of the importance of moral and psychological elements, and (4) its policy of laissez faire which provided an alternative to the solely collectivist doctrine of cameralism. Albion Small has expressed the whole of the German experience with English classical economics in these words:

The upshot of this whole experience, so far as scientific method is concerned, may be reduced to this formula: It took the Germans from 1765 to 1870 to reach the fundamental conclusion that human relations in connection with wealth cannot be truly stated in terms of individuals. They can be understood only when interpreted as moral or social (1923c: 306).

Subsequently, most of the German economic investigations of English classical economics were shelved to make way for the reappearance of the ethical factor (about 1870) in German economic thought. Chronologically, the reappearance of the ethical factor signals the later clash between two schools of economic thought: (1) the older German historical school of economics,⁴ which attempted to reconstruct classical economic theory

on the basis of comparative economic history, and (2) the Austrian school of economic theory, which attempted to reconstruct economic theory by an appeal to psychology.

The German historical school, which peaked during the second half of the 19th century, developed as a countermovement to romanticism and as an opposition to classical economics whose approach was timeless and atomistic. The historical school embedded economics in a matrix of all fields in which man is socially active, thus providing the foundations for a social theory of economics. Two notable precursors were Adam Müller and Friedrich List. Both appeared as offshoots of romanticism and forerunners to the historical school of economics, with the substantial figure, Karl Marx, appearing in between.⁵

Müller's economics consists of a negative revaluation of part of Adam Smith's arguments. To Müller, classical economics was mechanistic, coldly rational, materialistic, and static. To the individualist conception of economic life, Müller contraposes the idea of the interconnection and unification of all social elements. At the same time, he pays heed to their historical setting (Spann, 1930: 160-61). Like Marx, Müller saw the economy as evolving and totally immanent in history. Unlike Marx, Müller was concerned with "spiritual forces" behind material appearance of economic life, whereas Marx subsequently regarded these "spiritual forces" as epiphenomenal. The second precursor, Friedrich List, was champion of the concept of the nation. Envisioning the economic potentialities of the German nation, List saw the present as merely a state of transition where policies lose their meaning because they are geared to administration of what seemingly appear to be permanent

conditions (Spann, 1930: 199-200).

The older German historical school of economics emphasized the inclusion of economics in the totality of the common moral and national life, whose historical, organic growth is based on free human deeds rather than on natural laws. Bruno Hildebrand was critical of the concept of natural law (in the sense that makes economic laws epistemologically analogous to physical laws) and placed emphasis upon the moral-science character of economics and on the historical method (Schumpeter, 1954: 507). Wilhelm Roscher, while remaining partially dependent on classical economic notions, compiled a statement of principles which supported the historical method and differentiated it from philosophical methods (Small, 1924a: 445-46). The third main proponent, Karl Knies, substantively correlated ethics with economic theory (Small, 1924c). As well, Knies pointed toward the methodologically significant insight that statistical rather than causal regularities apply in the socio-historical field. This insight marked a definitive break from classical economics and carved the foundations for the later (or younger) historical school.⁶

The later historical school of economics, founded by Gustav Schmoller, concentrated its attention on the fundamentals of universal, historical, economic development. Departing from the position of the older historical school, the later historical school began to research concrete cases. Emphasis was placed on an historical, inductive, individualizing, and descriptive approach to economics as opposed to deductive, generalizing search for economic laws (Schumpeter, 1954: 811-13). In addition, the later historical school reintroduced ethical factors into questions of social policy.

The main opponent of the later historical school of economics was the Austrian school of economic theory headed by Carl Menger. According to Menger and followers (notably Jevons, Walras, F. von Wieser), the chief fault of the historical school was their one-sided inclination toward particularistic investigation along the lines closely associated with history and their complete exclusion of theoretical research in the field of economics (Small, 1924d: 587). In brief, the Austrian school was based on the rediscovery of the concept of "marginal utility" which permitted a distinction between objective and subjective theories of value. The explanation of value offered arose from an analysis of the conditions determining the distribution of scarce goods among competing uses and of the way in which different goods competed or cooperated for the satisfaction of different needs--in short, what has been termed the "means-end structure" (Schumpeter, 1954: 909-16). Later, Friedrich von Wieser systematically developed part of Menger's works, since the Austrian type of marginal-utility analysis appeared suitable as a basis for further development (Schumpeter, 1954: 848). From this sprang most of what is known today as the logic of choice, or the "economic calculus."

Menger's work on economic theory remained practically unnoticed in Germany, chiefly owing to the fact that the dominance of the historical school had almost eliminated the teaching of economic theory from German universities. The famous "methods controversy" (the Methodenstreit) erupted in 1883 when Menger, trying to vindicate the position of economic theorists, wrote a critical commentary on the historical method advocated by Schmoller and followers. Following a strong and negative review of Menger's commentary by Schmoller and an equally strong rebuttal

by Menger, the contest began.⁷

The Methodenstreit debate might well have subsided by the turn of the 20th century had it not become entangled in a much more serious controversy. This second conflict, concerning the role of value judgments in economic theory, evolved into the broader crisis of European sciences.

CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES: THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS

The Methodenstreit evolved into the broader crisis of European sciences (hereafter, Crisis) just after the turn of the 20th century when concern was raised about the place of values in economic thought. Two prevalent attitudes were (1) to demand value-free science, whether natural or social, or (2) to believe that social sciences can never be value-free for, even though they may seem to be so, values would merely be latent. The central question which arose was whether or not the methodology of the natural sciences could be employed in the study of man, society, and history. Two general responses were (1) naturalistic doctrines of historicism, which advocated natural science methodology, and (2) anti-naturalistic doctrines of historicism, which argued that the procedures of natural sciences cannot unveil the nature of man either considered as an individual or in groups.

In strong opposition to methodological naturalism in the field of sociology, historicism claims that some of the characteristic methods of physics cannot be applied to the social sciences, owing to the profound differences between sociology and physics. Physical laws, or the 'laws of nature', it tells us, are valid anywhere and always; for the physical world is ruled by a system of physical uniformities invariable throughout space and time. Sociological laws, however, or the laws of social life, differ in different places and periods (Popper, 1964: 5).

The anti-naturalistic view states that science provides no orientation to the study of man because science separates man from nature, whereas man has a place in nature. And, furthermore, by focussing on selected aspects of man's experience of nature, the scientist must arbitrarily discard much of man's subjective experience, for value has no place in natural sciences. From this perspective, science began to be viewed as a destructive agent in that it tended to demolish not only this or that particular valuation of man but even man's belief in value as such (Köhler, 1938: 32). As a consequence, a distinction began to be drawn between natural sciences and the human or cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), and thus a philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaften, akin to the philosophy of natural sciences, began developing.⁸

The writings of Max Weber serve well to illustrate the central issues of the Crisis. Thus, these issues are elaborated in the context of Weber's works. However, a more complete understanding can be achieved by first mentioning three pertinent influences on Weber: Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Werner Sombart. The subsequent discussion is opened by outlining Sombart's position since his views provide a transition from the later historical school of economics to the youngest historical school, which included Max Weber.

Sombart, who was both historian and economic theorist, studied modern capitalism in all its ramifications (Schumpeter, 1954: 818). In the main, Sombart's contribution is synthetic, passing beyond the scope of the Schmollerian (or later historical school) and eliminating everything but Marx's emphasis on historical perspective (Spann, 1930: 242). Sombart's interpretation moves away from Marx's materialism and back into



the German historico-idealistic methodological tradition. This was accomplished by assigning priority to the conception of "spirit of capitalism." According to Sombart, the concrete activities of men are expressions of this Geist ("spirit").

Another important influence on Max Weber was Wilhelm Dilthey. In the context of our present discussion, Dilthey is relevant for his attempt to establish the social sciences and humanities (Geisteswissenschaften, as coined by Dilthey) on a basis different from that of the natural sciences. While Dilthey is also relevant for his role in the development of hermeneutics, it would not be appropriate to introduce such a discussion here; therefore, this contribution is discussed in Appendix A to the study.

Dilthey revolted against the Hegelian system which envisioned "the human person as a puppet of the absolute mind" (Salomon, 1945: 588). For Dilthey there is no cleavage between "mind" and "matter." Mind is organic to nature and nature is organic to mind. The ultimate unit of social life, man himself, is not a disembodied mind nor a fortuitous concourse of atoms; man is a psychophysical entity inseparably linked with the world of nature, animate and inanimate, because he is part of it and it is part of him (Becker and Barnes, 1952, II: 885). Yet, in spite of man's oneness with nature, the natural sciences are quite different from the social sciences. The natural scientist constructs explanatory ultimates, such as the electron or the quantum, which are to some extent abstractions from the raw data. On the other hand, the social scientist finds his understandable ultimates directly in his raw data, in the concrete manifestations of human life (Friess, 1929: 21-22).

In sum, Dilthey distinguished "explanation" in the natural sciences from "understanding" in the social sciences.

Heinrich Rickert challenged Dilthey's practice of distinguishing between the natural and social sciences at the point where mind enters, as being logically questionable and methodologically useless (Becker and Barnes, 1952, II: 886). According to Rickert, the natural-scientific procedure is quite well justified in the realm of the psychical as it is in that of the physical. There is no logical warrant for assuming that the difference cannot be diminished or even overcome. As a neo-Kantian, Rickert warned against the common-sense notion that our knowledge is a passive mirror image of reality. Any sort of description involves an active transformation of experience, a conceptualization (Ringer, 1969: 326.)⁹

Max Weber's epistemology stems from Rickert's ideas. With Rickert, Weber argued that all knowing must involve conceptualization. While Dilthey saw explanation and interpretation as independent methods, for Weber any relation which is intelligible through interpretation should also be capable of "adequate" causal explanation (Weber, 1949: 174-76).

He [Weber] pointed out that the particular is no more accessible without "abstract" concepts than the rule. He was highly critical of the often unacknowledged tendency to solve this problem by picturing the concrete historical individuality as the emanation of an idea. More clearly and insistently than Rickert, he traced the qualitative differences between types of explanation to the diversity of our interests. Once the questionable notion of a fully "determined" event is discarded, it becomes possible to observe that our sense of satisfaction with an answer depends to a large extent upon the nature of the question asked. When explaining a particular development, we may indeed use available causal rules; but we do not seek to

establish any new ones. Nor do we attempt the impossible task of uncovering all the "real" or elementary connections involved in the process. We are satisfied to find an "adequate," not a necessary, relationship between two circumstances, and we do not proceed to erect this relationship into a general law (Ringer, 1969: 329).

From a naturalistic standpoint, cause-effect does not allow for the human element. Interpretative explanation is needed since our knowledge is not complete until we have both explained an activity causally and grasped its subjective meaning.

Weber begins with an opposition to two main traditions of idealistic social thought: (1) objectivism and (2) intuitionism. Both traditions contended that sociocultural sciences cannot make use of "general laws" of the logical character of those occupying unquestioned status in natural sciences (Parsons, 1968, 11: 580).¹⁰

Objectivism, or historical particularism, maintained the position that historical and social sciences should concern themselves only with detailed facts of particular human acts and should not attempt to construct general theories. Objectivism further contended that the objective nature of subject matter of social sciences was such as to make generalization about it impossible, since human action was thought not to be subject to regularities as are natural phenomena.

Weber denied the distinction between natural and social sciences on the basis of inability of social sciences to employ general explanatory concepts. According to Weber, both social and natural sciences select only partially from the possible experienceable elements or reality. The difference between natural and social sciences must lie in the principles according to which facts (i.e., experienceable elements of reality) are to be selected (Weber, 1949: 80-82). In the

social sciences, value relevance plays a part in the selection of facts, whereas in the natural sciences theoretical relevance takes precedence.

The second tradition that Weber opposed was intuitionism.

Intuitionism claimed to have established the possibility of valid scientific knowledge of phenomena of human action without reference to general concepts. The intuitionists constituted the methodological rationalization of the collectivist branch of German historical thought. They were concerned with the grasp of total cultural Gestalten, as wholes in their unique individuality. These cultural totalities constituted some sort of meaningful system of which the concrete facts were an expression or manifestation. This methodological position involves two principal propositions: (1) that generalization in the field of human affairs can only mean the grasp of these cultural totalities in all their uniqueness and individuality and (2) that the grasp of cultural totalities takes the form of an immediate intuition, that is, a direct grasp of meaning without the intervention of any concepts.

Weber's primary arguments against the intuitionists include:

(1) that they confuse the processes by which valid knowledge is arrived at with the logical grounds of its validity; (2) that the whole which is intuitively discovered is not immediately given, but involves selection, systematization, and relation of experience to concepts; (3) that immediate experience is diffuse and becomes precise only through conceptualization; and (4) that the intuitionists tend to become engulfed in pure subjectivity and thus are caught in solipsism.

Thus Weber's critique of idealistic methodology led him to conclude that both social and natural sciences must have systems of

general theoretical concepts, otherwise anything approaching logical proof is out of the question. The fundamental elements peculiar to human action which remain after Weber's critical analyses are: Verstehen, value, and the means-end schema.

Another significant issue that arose in the context of the Crisis was concerned with the meaning of "ethical neutrality" in economics and sociology. Weber differentiated what he meant by "ethical neutrality" in teaching from "ethical neutrality" in research. According to Weber, value judgments could be permitted in teaching,

. . . only when the teacher sets as his unconditional duty, in every single case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his lecture less lively or attractive, to make relentlessly clear to his audience, and especially to himself, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced or empirically observed facts and which are statements of practical evaluations (1949: 2).

However, in research Weber would not permit any value judgments.

But in no case, however, should the unresolvable question-- . . . --as to whether one may, must, or should champion certain practical values in teaching, be confused with the purely logical discussion of the relationship of value-judgments to empirical disciplines such as sociology and economics. Any confusion on this point will impede the thoroughness of the discussion of the actual logical problem (1949: 8).

In brief, Weber believed that science can tell us what we can do and, in some cases, what we want to do, but never what we ought to do. In other words, science clarifies facts.

Weber's attempt to draw a line between wissenschaft and value judgment was clearly intended as an intervention in the debate over the future of social reform (Ringer, 1969: 61). In 1919, Weber delivered his famous lecture on "Wissenschaft as a Vocation." Speaking before an audience of students interested in academic careers, Weber proceeded to

make uncompromisingly critical remarks of contemporary fashions employed by the academic community to deal with the shaky methodological and philosophical foundations. In particular, Weber reacted against the Romantic resurgence in the student body. He did not insist that they concentrate on the clarification of relevant factual and logical relationships but maintained that normative judgments be methodically factored out and subjected to conscious reflection and critical analysis. Thus, the issues of the crisis of European sciences confronted an audience which was ambivalent as to whether a normative or factual basis was most appropriate to social science investigation.

To recapitulate, the main methodological issues arising in conjunction with the crisis of European sciences were (1) natural science and/or social science methodologies, (2) the question of social facts and their interpretation (i.e., measurement versus meaning), (3) the parallel (or lack thereof) between physical laws and social laws, (4) the "objectivity" of social sciences, and (5) value judgments versus value neutrality on the part of teachers and researchers.

Kaufmann (1944) has reviewed these issues. His general comments were as follows. First, most methodological issues are directly or indirectly concerned with the relation of natural and social science methodologies. However, the nature of these methods are frequently misunderstood, and this misunderstanding has often suggested erroneous views concerning the range of their applicability. Second, the contrast between fact and value is not one between different realms of being but between two different types of rules, namely, procedural rules and axiological rules. Third, the comparison of physical laws and social laws

has been misled by erroneous preconceptions concerning the nature of the former. Physical laws have been viewed as strict, necessary laws, whereas in the social realm only rules or tendencies prevail. This position is erroneous since physical laws are not strict and no synthetic proposition is necessarily valid. A fourth issue reviewed by Kaufmann was the debate as to whether or not subjective factors must be included in social science analysis or whether or not they can be eliminated by using natural science methodology. This is an issue linked to a conception of objective validity that is not in accordance with scientific procedure. Closer analysis reveals that 'objective validity of synthetic propositions' must be defined in terms of rules of empirical procedure. It is then realized that the elliptical formulation of problems related to the concept of objectivity is largely responsible for the controversies concerning the objectivity of social science. Fifth, one more persistent methodological issue in social science that loses its point as soon as the meaning of 'objectivity' is clarified is that of the admissibility of value judgments. Since value judgments are analytic propositions, which is clearly recognized when their elliptical formulation is replaced by the complete formulation, they do not belong to the corpus of an empirical science. However, there is no objection to the acceptance into social science of sentences containing value terms provided their meaning is unambiguously established by axiological rules. According to Kaufmann, it is then seen that there are no insoluble value problems.

Overall, Kaufmann concluded that the difference between the levels of clarity attained in natural and social sciences is not satisfactorily explained by pointing to the fact that social events are

interrelated in a more complex way than are physical events. One of the most important consequences to be expected from methodological analysis is the removal of obstacles that aprioristic and relativistic fallacies have put in the way of cooperation between social scientists. The apriorist as well as the relativist are prone to disregard objections raised against his arguments by fellow scientists. But criticism is one of the most important forms of scientific cooperation (Kaufmann, 1944: 244).

Nevertheless, Kaufmann's comments are not to be construed as the last word on the issues raised by the crisis of European sciences. On the contrary, the response to the Crisis assumed many forms, resulting in the diversification and birth of many new social science disciplines.

MULTIPLE AND DIVERSE RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES

During the latter part of the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries, the social sciences were being born as autonomous disciplines, struggling to define their subject matter and to assert their independence from one another. In the main, the social sciences were being converted into empirical (human) sciences.

Although the origin of the Crisis can be traced to the conflict between the German historical school of economics and the Austrian school of economic theory, the developments in neighboring fields were also affected.¹¹ Two main trends related to the rise of German sociology were (1) an attempt to narrow the field of sociology to a limited but homogeneous subject matter that would make sociology an autonomous and specialized science and (2) an increased emphasis on exhaustive

monographical studies of specific aspects of social life, based upon detailed and specialized research employing inductive methods and quantitative analysis (Abel, 1929: 5; Ginsberg, 1933).¹² However, the attempt to delimit the subject matter of German sociology took many directions. Salomon has suggested that, in Germany, there is no sociology, just sociologists.

In America and in France sociology has an objective function in the context of the respective societies as an instrument of pragmatic enlightenment and of moral education. Sociology is a social institution. In Germany, the climate of opinion was political and opposed to anything that had to do with an independent society. Sociology became the concern of some scholars who, starting from different fields of research such as history, economics, philosophy, finally met in the development of sociology as theory and method (1945: 587).

Excluding the historical, interpretive response of Max Weber and others who "debated with Marx's ghost," some relevant responses include: (1) Ferdinand Tönnies' pioneering study of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaften which differentiated three types of sociological endeavor--theoretical, applied, and empirical; and (2) a neo-Kantian response following Georg Simmel's attempt to provide a critical exposition of social science pre-suppositions. In particular, Simmel described sociology as a specialism which would investigate the form and content of social relationships. And (3), the work of Leopold von Wiese, one of Simmel's successors, who followed up the inductive procedure implicit in Simmel's writings. And (4), the effort of Alfred Vierkandt who, taking his point of departure from Simmel's formal sociology, tried to apply the phenomenological method to formal sociology in order to establish sociology as a science of social categories (Ginsberg, 1933: 24-26; Abel, 1929: 50-79).¹³

Without further elaborating the many particular directions of German sociology, the overall pattern has a common ancestry. Sometime around 1890, German academics began to express misgivings about the current condition of German learning and of German cultural life more generally (Ringer, 1969). They spoke of a decline in the vitality of their intellectual traditions and of a loss of meaning and relevance. They wondered whether they themselves were partly to blame for the shallowness of the age, the apparent separation of Geist from politics, and the violence of the new social conflicts. These doubts continued to trouble the German academic community from the 1890's to the 1930's.

Modern German sociology cannot be understood apart from this ancestry. It dealt with the destructive effects of capitalism upon pre-capitalist forms of social organization. It traced the disturbing results of this process in political and cultural life, and it raised some troubling questions about relations between men in modern society. The overall impact of the Crisis on the foundation and development of German sociology has been poignantly expressed by Karl Mannheim in these words:

If I were asked to summarize in one sentence the significance of German sociology since 1918 I should say: German sociology is the product of one of the greatest social dissolutions and reorganizations, accompanied by the highest form of self-consciousness and of self-criticism. In order to understand this sentence it is necessary to analyse its implications in some detail. First we must be agreed that a process of social dissolution and crisis is not simply a negative process. For the significance of crises lies in the fact that they are not simply disintegrations but are, rather, the attempts which society makes to overhaul the whole of its organization, and in the course of these attempts the utility and value of every institution and of every form of spiritual and cultural relationship is put severely to the test under entirely new conditions (1953: 210).

However, the impact of the Crisis was not limited to German sociology. Edmund Husserl's general response to the Crisis led to his explication of "pure" phenomenology.

Husserl's initial reaction to the so-called crisis of European sciences was to question exactly where this Crisis lay. Accordingly, he attempted "to awaken new interest in the oft-treated theme of the European crisis by developing the philosophico-historical idea (or the teleological sense) of European man" (1965: 149). Unmistakably, the natural sciences were not in any crisis, but were models of rigorous and highly successful scientific disciplines.¹⁴ Speaking of the special science of psychology, Husserl noted that humanistic disciplines obviously had slower development due to their retardation of method and shorter existences as sciences.

If the world were constructed of two, so to speak, equal spheres of reality--nature and spirit--neither with a preferential position methodologically and factually, the situation would be different. But only nature can be handled as a self-contained world; only natural science can with complete consistency abstract from all that is spirit and consider nature purely as nature. On the other side such a consistent abstraction from nature does not, for the practitioner of humanistic science who is interested purely in the spiritual, lead to a self-contained "world," a world whose interrelationships are purely spiritual, that could be the theme of a pure and universal humanistic science, parallel to pure natural science (Husserl, 1965: 152).

To Husserl, what was unmistakable was the "scientific" character of natural and newly forming humanistic disciplines as opposed to the "unscientific" character of philosophy. Indeed, philosophy was succumbing to skepticism, irrationalism, and mysticism.

Husserl believed that the motives for crisis of science lay in the general lament about the crisis of European culture (especially German)

and the role here ascribed to the sciences. Looking to psychology, Husserl saw the central question to be the age-old enigma of subjectivity and, thus, the enigma of psychological subject matter and method (1970b: 5). The positivistic reduction of the idea of science had excluded those questions which became most pressing in the late 19th century--questions concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of human existence. The natural sciences had, for the sake of maintaining canons of scientific rigor, eliminated all subjective elements. Scientific, objective truth became exclusively a matter of establishing what the physical world is in fact. But what can this conception of science say about man, his relations to other men, his relations to the world, and his history?

It is relevant to note that it was not always the case that "science" understood its demand for rigorously grounded truth in the sense of that objectivity which dominated positive sciences by the turn of the 20th century (that is, adherence to a method which is the basis for the support of widespread acceptance of a philosophical and ideological positivism). The specifically human questions were not always banned from the realm of science; their intrinsic relationship to all the sciences (natural or human) was not left unconsidered. As long as this condition remained, science could claim significance in the completely new shaping of European humanity which began with the Renaissance. Why, then, did science lose its leadership (Husserl, 1970b: 7-14)?

In the Renaissance, European humanity brought about a revolutionary change. It turned against its previous way of existing (the Medieval) and disowned it, seeking to shape itself anew in freedom. Its admired model was ancient humanity, whose mode of existence the Renaissance

wished to reproduce. The ancients (Platonics in particular) held to nothing less than the philosophical form of existence, that is, freely giving oneself, one's whole life, to rule through philosophy. For Platonists, all sciences are but dependent branches of the One Philosophy--the science of the totality of what is.

The 18th century (Age of Enlightenment) was filled with ever-expanding interests in philosophy and all the special sciences. However, the universal philosophies which tried to relate metaphysics to all sciences took the form of system-philosophies which were not unified and mutually exclusive. The belief in the ideal of philosophy and method began to decline as the contrast between the repeated failures of metaphysics and the increasing wave of theoretical and practical successes in the positive sciences was accentuated. Thus, there begins a long period extending from Hume and Kant to the 20th century where emphasis was placed on trying to discern why the failure to generate an acceptable method for philosophizing. In particular, doubts about the possibility of metaphysics, the collapse in the belief of a universal philosophy as the guide for the new man, actually represents a collapse of the belief in reason. It is reason which ultimately gives meaning to everything that is thought to be. If man loses this faith, it means nothing less than the loss of faith in himself, in his own true being.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

¹The foundations of cameralism lie deep in the Medieval period. While England and France were taking form as unified states, the many small principalities of Germany were struggling with one another in futile efforts to attain supremacy within Germany. The states were small and constituted separate political, legal, and economic units. Even if the ruler of a particular state was not at war, he had to be prepared to engage in war at a moment's notice. Thus the cameralistic problem took precedence--every ruler had to have sufficient means to finance war (Bell, 1967: 88-89; Schumpeter, 1954: 200-02).

²Modern conceptions of this phrase must be avoided. The "state" meant the government; the "government" meant the prince. To the cameralists, the phrase, "the welfare of the state" had one interpretation--the ability of the prince to exercise control over his subjects and to carry on successful war.

³The group of French thinkers known as the Physiocrats or Economistes believed in the existence of a "natural order" in the universe which had been revealed by Newton. The term "natural" was used in the sense of "normal" or "perfect" rather than "original" or "primitive." All that conformed to this natural order was perfect and destined to succeed, while all that deviated was evil and abnormal just in proportion as it departed from the natural line of procedure (Schumpeter, 1954: 228-49; Spann, 1930: Chapter 6).

While the French Physiocrats were the founders of economic liberalism, the first great systematic writer on political economy in England was Adam Smith. Smith embodied the laissez faire thesis in his writings; but in spite of his acceptance of the general Physiocratic position, Smith abandoned the Physiocratic stress on agriculture and emphasized the value of commerce and manufactures. Later, the development of economic liberalism in Britain was carried on by a number of Smith's disciples, notably T. R. Malthus, D. Ricardo, J. Mill, and J. R. McCulloch (Schumpeter, 1954: 181-94; Spann, 1930: Chapter 7).

⁴For convenience in ordering influences, we shall follow Schumpeter's (1954: 800) demarcation of three phases of the German historical school of economics: (1) an older historical school whose main proponents were W. Roscher, B. Hildebrand, and K. Knies; (2) a younger, or later, historical school founded by G. Schmoller; and (3) a youngest historical school which included W. Sombart, A. Spiethoff, and Max Weber.

⁵It is interesting to note that most writers, e.g., Spann (1930), Roll (1942), Surányi-Unger (1968), cite Adam Müller as being affiliated with a "romantic school of economics." However, Schumpeter (1954: 421) emphatically denies that there ever was such a thing as a "romantic school of economics, or political economy." Regardless, Müller was an important, although sparsely credited, influence.

⁶ A few remarks are warranted on the relations between Marx and the older historical school. Both emphasized the concepts of society and of historical progress. Furthermore, both departed from the relation of human actions to productive forces. The principal difference is that Marx regarded social institutions as a superstructure dependent on the economy, whereas the older historical school saw the economy as the superstructure and the social institutions as the base.

⁷ Schumpeter (1954: 814) has had strong reservations about the merit of the Methodenstreit debate and the vast literature which followed. According to Schumpeter, the history of this literature is substantially a history of wasted energies. At most, a few contributions were made toward the clarification of logical backgrounds. Albion Small (1924d: 571) remarks that "the fight was so hot, principally because no one was able to make perfectly clear to anybody else just what this 'historical viewpoint,' or 'historical method' was, which he advocated or opposed."

⁸ The term Geisteswissenschaft, which has played a central role in the German classification of the disciplines since the early nineteenth century, seems to imply an Idealistic approach to the humanistic disciplines for which it stands. In its antecedents, the word can be followed back to John Stuart Mill or even to the influence of Descartes before him. In Germany, Max Weber has traced it to Hermann von Helmholtz, the famous psycho-physicist of the mid-nineteenth century. The work of Hegel helped to bring it into general use, and the neo-Idealist, Wilhelm Dilthey, finally gave it a clear and systematic definition during the 1880's (Ringer, 1969: 96-97).

⁹ Practical limitations of space do not permit a more comprehensive discussion of Dilthey's and Rickert's positions. Yet, one further relationship should be mentioned. Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband cooperatively studied the question of the relation of history and sociology. The principal question asked was: "How can the data of history be used by sociology at all?" An answer was formulated in terms of the Windelband-Rickert distinction between idiographic and nomothetic disciplines. That is, history depicts the unique and the non-recurrent; whereas sociology sets forth the causal laws of the common and recurrent, respectively. Yet, can social data be torn from their full context? Neglect of this question created methodological problems for the earlier historical sociologists who utilized the comparative method. Rickert suggested that there may eventually be a science of history but it will not follow the pattern of the natural sciences. If sociology aspires to follow the pattern created by natural sciences, then sociology must relinquish all claim to establishing "historical laws." The very essence of history is individualization and where individualization reigns generalization cannot.

¹⁰ The following discussion draws heavily from Parsons (1968, 11: 579-639). As well, see: Weber (1949; 1947: 8-29; 1958: 55-61) and Freund (1968: 37-86). Secondary sources are helpful in this regard since much of Weber's methodological views are presented within the context of his substantive writings, rather than as a separate discussion.

¹¹ Although emphasis has been placed upon the German experience in social sciences during the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries, this is not to assert that all relevant gains should be credited to the Germans. Some principal reasons for examining the German experience are: (1) that the Germans have recorded a relatively complete intellectual autobiography; (2) the pervading and relatively more widespread recognition of the limits of knowledge with a deliberate attempt to overcome those limits; (3) recognition that every social theory, and every type of social science, is a function of practical problems which contemporary men are attempting to solve. That is, the "thinkers" of a generation are tackling in more abstract form the problems about which their whole society at the same time is concretely concerned; and (4) the actual growth of social science in Germany presents a specific case of the interdependence of different phases of social theory (i.e., dependence of one social science upon all the others). The German experience is not a single case, but hundreds of cumulative cases. Nineteenth-century German experience in the social sciences is a multitude of individual attempts to treat life analytically, resulting in as many conclusions that after all the last word about life must be synthetic (Small, 1913: 438).

¹² Albert Schäffle was associated with the Austrian school of economic theory. He was especially notorious since his "radical" ideas early branded him as an economic heretic. Subsequent ill-fated action in public office drove Schäffle to diverge from the main line of economic theory. Consequently, his publications of strictly sociological work became a prominent factor in the early stages of the American sociological movement (Schumpeter, 1954: 788).

¹³ A few critical comments on Vierkandt's "phenomenological sociology" are warranted. Nearly half of Vierkandt's major treatise is devoted to what he purports to be a phenomenological analysis of various experiences, and it is intended to supply the basis for the account which is then given of the real nature of social relationship, conceived as an inward bond, and a classification of the types of community to which it gives rise. Ginsberg (1933) has criticized Vierkandt for falling into the very psychologism which the phenomenological method of Husserl claimed to supersede. Thus, Ginsberg concludes that Vierkandt's analysis of social attitudes and impulses does not differ in method from the psychological discussion of McDougall and, furthermore, it seldom shows the fullness and richness of experience that we find in the psychological work of Shand. But perhaps an even more cogent fault in Vierkandt's work is his emphasis on Husserlian pure phenomenology and the search for "essences." If Ginsberg's assessment is correct, Vierkandt is closer to the Husserlian conception of a "phenomenological psychology" than to a "phenomenological sociology."

¹⁴ This remark must be qualified by noting that only physics was not in any crisis. On the other hand, biology was undergoing a profound crisis. The biologist Johannes von Uexküll maintained that biology was a natural science; moreover, his "revolutionary" views attest to the fact that biology was being radically transformed (Cassirer, 1944: 25-26).

PART II

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT: A CRITICAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

In reaction to the crisis of European sciences, Edmund Husserl formulated an unique, complex, and comprehensive position which rightfully earned him the title of "founding father of phenomenology." Although the term "phenomenology" had already appeared in the writings of such eminent thinkers as Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel, the advent of the so-called "phenomenological movement" takes its inception in Husserl's works.

In Part II of this inquiry, the main goal is to critically examine Husserl's phenomenological method. The procedure is to commence by outlining the essential features of Husserl's program. Subsequently, some of the modifications made by post-Husserlian phenomenologists are briefed. In this regard, the views of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur are discussed.

CHAPTER 3

EDMUND HUSSERL'S "PURE" PHENOMENOLOGY

We shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning of phenomenology.

--Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962: viii)

The positivistic conception of science at the turn of the 20th century was, historically speaking, a residual concept. Positivism separated science from philosophy, broadly conceived. According to Husserl, the fate of philosophy of the modern age, laden with its own unnoticed naiveties, is to seek out the definitive idea of philosophy, its true subject matter and its true method. As a consequence, Husserl's aim became to found philosophy phenomenologically. The ideal was pre-suppositionlessness, that is, to begin philosophy without positing anything whatsoever. Even the results of the natural sciences could not be utilized since natural sciences assume the field of nature. Furthermore, all sciences assume principles of logic by which descriptions of the facts of reality can be logically ordered. Therefore, it is impossible to derive laws of logic from the results of the empirical sciences. Thus, Husserl attempted to formulate and defend the rights of "sciences of essence" as opposed to "sciences of fact." Husserl's most pervasive task became the elaboration of a phenomenological method which is a description of essential structure which underlies knowledge and (known or experienced) reality (Farber, 1968: 572).

The question of what is phenomenology is as irritating for the philosophical specialist as it must be for the layman who would like a rough characterization of the term. The philosophical specialist has the feeling of pursuing an elusive doctrine which still remains to be clearly defined a half century after Husserl's initial statements. However, it would be unreasonable to simply discredit phenomenology by

accusing it of obscurity or confusion. The widespread influence of the Husserlian doctrines and the development of a phenomenological movement attest to the necessity of taking Husserl seriously.

Like other recent philosophical tendencies, Husserl's motif stems from the conviction that philosophy is not a factual science and, therefore, philosophy cannot ground itself in factual sciences nor employ its methods. In Husserl's case, the motif found expression in his attack on psychologism and the subsequent conception of phenomenological philosophy.

In Chapter 3 below, Husserl's phenomenological method is delineated. In addition, some of the major faults are noted. Finally, an attempt is made to express the unity and signification of Husserlian phenomenology from which springs a common denominator for the development of post-Husserlian alternatives.

SHIFT FROM PHENOMENALISM TO PHENOMENOLOGY: KANT, HEGEL, HUSSERL

In whatever context the term phenomenology is used, it refers back to the distinction introduced by Kant between the phenomenon (appearance of reality in consciousness) and noumenon (being of reality in itself). This Kantian distinction has been termed phenomenalism. Phenomenalism expressly affirms the reality of things-in-themselves but denies their knowability.

Kant calls things-in-themselves noumena because they are entities of the understanding to which no objects of experience can ever correspond, and contrasts them with phenomena which are or can be objects of experience. The conception of a noumenon is self-consistent and formed in an entirely straightforward manner by means of the rules which govern

the negation of concepts (Körner, 1955: 94). The concept of a noumenon is, as Kant puts it, a limiting concept (1966: 199). The purpose of conceiving of noumena is as follows:

What then is the cause why people, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phenomena the noumena, which the understanding only is supposed to be able to realise? It is this, that sensibility and its sphere, that is the sphere of phenomena, is so limited by the understanding itself that it should not refer to things by themselves, but only to the mode in which things appear to us, in accordance with our own subjective qualification Unless therefore we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word phenomenon indicates a relation to something the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself, that is an object independent of our sensibility.

Hence arises the concept of a noumenon, which however is not positive, nor a definite knowledge of anything, but which implies only the thinking of something, without taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition (Kant, 1966: 195-96).

Kant thought that the distinction between transcendental and empirical reality was necessary to resolve the conflict between science and morality and religion. By showing that noumena cannot be known but only thought (without contradiction), Kant believed that he had resolved this conflict.

Hegel's philosophy shifts away from the Kantian phenomenalism. Like Kant, Hegel believed that only phenomena appear. Unlike Kant, Hegel believed that phenomena serve as a sufficient basis for a universal science of being; therefore, there was no use in thinking of noumenon. For Hegel, phenomena are revealed through dialectics.

While the 'young' Hegel subscribed to Kantian philosophy, the more 'mature' Hegel attempted to overcome the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena (Maier, 1939: 33-34). Hegel takes "experience" to mean the

inseparable and continuous interrelation of subject and object. Hegel criticized Kant for speaking about a reality apart from a subject (i.e., noumena). For Hegel, the mind is the ultimate, unconditioned reality. Mind is the subject and the object of knowledge (Baillie, 1949: 43). In particular, Hegel raised two criticisms of Kant's noumena: (1) the assumption of such a Thing is untenable on the very ground that we cannot know it, for in that case we could not even know that such a Thing existed; and (2) on the basis of Kant's doctrine we must deny any qualities to the thing-in-itself and by this very denial render it an absurdity (Maier, 1939: 43-44).

The unconditional acceptance of the problem of irrationality and the hopelessness of ever overcoming it led Kant to abandon the possibility of an ontology. However, with Hegel's establishment of the principle of unity of thought and being, a new light is thrown on the meaning of the thing-in-itself. Kant had denied that it was knowable because phenomena were something essentially different from it. From Hegel's ontological position, the relation between thing-in-itself and appearance becomes but a particular case of the relation between being-in-itself and being-for-another (Maier, 1939: 45). According to Hegel, it was necessary to attain a level of "objectivity" in which the duality of subject and object would be dissolved, and wherein subject and object would coincide in identity. This was Hegel's systematic demand, the starting point of his dialectical idealism, and ultimately the ground of his failure (Maier, 1939: 67).

Husserl's attempt to found philosophy phenomenologically was opposed to the Kantian dualism of phenomenon and noumenon and to the

Hegelian constructionism via dialectics. In addition, Husserl reacted against the naturalism or psychologism of the positivistic tradition.

What Husserl found particularly attractive about Kantian philosophy was that it represented, for the first time since Descartes, a great and systematically constructed scientific philosophy which must be called "transcendental subjectivism" (Husserl, 1970b: 97). That is, Kant took as problematic the question of the basis upon which rests the self-evidence of the positive-scientific method. Nevertheless, Husserl was not uncritical of the Kantian position. First, Husserl noted that Kant implicitly presupposed and took-for-granted the validity of the surrounding "life-world" (Husserl, 1970b: 103). Second, it is difficult to understand what the Kantian "transcendental subjectivity" is and how it functions. More broadly, Kant was guilty of mythical concept-formation (Husserl, 1970b: 115). Third, there was an opaque distinction between Kant's "transcendental subjectivity" and "soul," probably the result of an inadequate conception of psychology during Kant's era (Husserl, 1970b: 116). A fourth criticism was that a hidden truth--the possibility of a "new dimension"--has remained obscured both to Kant and to those who have studied him, because of a peculiar antagonism between entry into this new dimension and the everyday life-world (Husserl, 1970b: 118-19). Husserl's optimism at having uncovered this "new dimension" is aptly captured in these words:

All this will be confirmed as I now leave the reference to Kant behind and attempt to show, to those willing to understand, one of the paths I have actually taken; as a path actually taken, it offers itself as one that can at any time be taken again. Indeed, it is a path which at every step allows just this self-evidence to be renewed and tested as apodictic, i.e., the self-evidence

of a path capable of being taken repeatedly at will and capable of being followed further at will in repeatedly verifiable experiences and cognitions (1970b: 120-21).

Generally, Husserl's critique of Hegel is parallel to that of Kant. Like Kant, Hegel failed to recognize the paradox besetting the interrelationships of the "objectively true world" and the "life-world" (Husserl, 1970b: 131-32). As well, Hegel's mythical concept-constructions and world-interpretations were based on obscure metaphysical anticipations (Husserl, 1970b: 201). Husserl partly accounts for this failure by the fact that as transcendental philosophy recognized the necessity of developing a purely mental approach to the world no adequately developed psychology existed to furnish support. The differences between empirical and transcendental subjectivities remained unavoidable, especially since psychology had modelled itself on the method and task of natural science. The possibility of developing a psychology as "universal science of psychic being" had not been pursued (Husserl, 1970b: 203).

From his critical studies, Husserl concluded that only phenomena are given; however, in phenomena are given the very "essence" of that which is. Husserl had no concern with reality as existent since existence is at best contingent, hence existence can add to reality nothing which would be the object of scientific knowledge. According to Husserl, to reach essence is to have an essential and hence "scientific" knowledge of being. Thus, Husserl's aim became to generate "philosophy as a rigorous science." Two principal tasks were (1) to found philosophy phenomenologically, which would then serve as the basis of all science, and (2) to generate a phenomenological psychology upon which an empirical

psychology could be erected. In order to accomplish these two tasks, Husserl developed a method unique to the demands of the task.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD: RADICALIZATION OF CARTESIAN DOUBTING

Husserl view the general frame of reference of his own work as a radicalization of Descartes' demand that all philosophical knowledge be founded in an absolutely certain insight, raised above every possibility of doubt (Kockelmans, 1967a: 25). The Cartesian method of total doubting entails a questioning of all presuppositions of human experience. The goal was to establish an absolutely indubitable sphere of Being.

Although Husserl concurred with the aim of the Cartesian method of doubting, he did not condone Descartes' insistence upon universal denial, that is, the attempt to doubt everything. For Husserl, the utility of the method of doubting was that it served as a device for revealing what had previously been unnoticed and implicit (Husserl, 1931: 107-08). For instance, in relation to logic the method of doubting served to question the presuppositions of judging, of validity, and of truth.

Husserl's attempt to found philosophy phenomenologically rested on the ideal of presuppositionlessness, that is, to begin philosophy on a supposition which need not be clarified because it is immediately evident. Through a rigorously critical and systematic investigation, phenomenological philosophy was to attain absolutely valid knowledge of things. It is in this sense that phenomenology became the means by which Husserl attempted to generate "philosophy as a rigorous science."

The means by which phenomenological philosophy was to achieve a presupposition-free state was through the method of phenomenological reduction. By "reduction" Husserl means (in general) that methodic procedure by which one places oneself in the "transcendental sphere," that is, the sphere in which we can perceive "things as they are in themselves" independently of any prejudices.¹ The "prejudice" to which Husserl refers is that in the positive sciences the object of experience is represented, through abstraction, by concepts. This imposes an artificial structure in reference to the world of our original experience. Accordingly, to discover the truly original structures of the objects in the various domains of being, we must overcome the prejudices of positive sciences and try to reach reality as it is immediately given in primordial experience. In other words, Husserl insists that we return to the Lebenswelt (the world of immediate experience). The task of phenomenological method is to lead us back from the cultural world of the sciences to the primordial world of life. The phenomenological reduction is the means by which a change of attitude takes place. This change of attitude entails learning to see the things in an original and radical way (Kockelmans, 1967a: 30).

Husserl distinguished between an eidetic reduction and a transcendental-phenomenological reduction (Husserl, 1931: 44). The eidetic reduction leads us from the realm of facts to the realm of general essences. By "essence" Husserl means "pure generalities" which put before our mind "pure possibilities" whose validity is independent of experience. The transcendental-phenomenological reduction (hereafter, phenomenological reduction) makes us pass from the world of realities to that of their

ultimate presuppositions. This phenomenological reduction is the principal method employed in phenomenological analysis.

The principal phenomenological method is a complex composed of three general parts. First, it is "transcendental" because it uncovers the ego for which everything has meaning and existence; second, it is "phenomenological" because it transforms the world into mere phenomena; and, third, it is "reduction" because it leads us back to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced world insofar as it is experienced by uncovering intentionality.² Eventually, the phenomenological reduction discloses the transcendental Ego. The transcendental Ego is not given as an object but as the subject for which the object manifests itself. Consequently, the transcendental Ego is not a thing or a residue of experience but an ubiquitous single center or pole from which emanates the "radiations" of consciousness and intentionality. On the other hand, in Kant the transcendental Ego is given a priori as the condition for the possibility of his whole transcendental philosophy. Unlike Husserl, Kant does not end up with a transcendental Ego, but rather starts with it. Herbert Spiegelberg expresses the nature of Husserl's reductive operation as follows:

. . . : Reduction is not merely a moving away from the natural world but a moving toward something The goal of this movement is none other than transcendental subjectivity. This positive aspect is of course also indicated by the title "transcendental reduction," which serves increasingly as the synonym for phenomenological reduction. It indicates that reduction has the purpose to inhibit and "take back," as it were, all references to the "transcendent" as the intentional correlate of our acts and to trace them back to the immanent or "transcendental" acts in which they have their source. Thus what happens in the phenomenological reduction seems to be

something like this: We withhold not only our beliefs in reality but also those acts which give transcendent meaning to what is an integral element of our consciousness (Spiegelberg, 1971a, I: 136).

For Husserl, the reductions disclose, on the level of experience, the bare and basic elements of pure consciousness. The conception of phenomenological reduction can be further elucidated by examining the fact that it entails a shift from thinking to reflection. This "reflection" is of a particular type and can be understood only by explicating what Husserl means by the phrase, "the thesis of the natural standpoint and its suspension."

According to Husserl, the non-philosophical sciences have presuppositions because they abide within the natural standpoint or "natural attitude." The natural attitude refers to the world in which we find ourselves at every moment of our life, taken exactly as it presents itself to us in our everyday experience (Husserl, 1931: 101-06). The world from the standpoint of the natural attitude is a fact-world. In order to know this fact-world more comprehensively and more trustworthily, Husserl proposed that we radically alter the thesis of the natural standpoint by suspending belief in it:

We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no change in our conviction, which remains in itself what it is so long as we do not introduce new motives of judgment, which we precisely refrain from doing. And yet the thesis undergoes a modification--whilst remaining in itself what it is, we set it as it were "out of action," we "disconnect it, "bracket it" (1931: 108).

The phenomenologists does not deny the existence of the outer world, but, for analytical purposes, the phenomenologist makes up his mind to suspend belief ("bracket") in its existence, that is, to refrain from all judgments related directly or indirectly to the existence of the

outer world. By a radical effort of one's mind, one "brackets" or suspends belief in the natural attitude of man living within his taken-for-granted world (Husserl, 1970b: 148).³

Husserl borrowed the notion of "bracketing" from mathematics where one places an expression in brackets and places a plus (+) or minus (-) sign in front of it (Schmitt, 1967: 59-60).⁴ By bracketing the objective world, one gives it a different value. The phenomenologist does not turn away either from the whole of experienced reality and actuality or from certain segments of it; he only suspends judgment concerning the validity of what is experienced. The world before the transcendental-phenomenological reduction and the world thereafter do not differ in content, but rather they differ only in the way in which I am related to each of them. Thus, phenomenology takes as its fundamental problem the clarification and expansion of all mundane knowledge (knowledge within the natural attitude) by relating it to the question of "the origin of the world" (Farber, 1968: 548).

The phrase "origin of the world" refers to the origin of the totality of the horizon of intentional objects facing consciousness. The notion of "intentionality" is the key conception in Husserl's works. Husserl drew the concept of intentionality from his teacher, Franz Brentano. Brentano, an Austrian psychologist, proposed the thesis that mind is intentional.⁵ In other words, psychical activity "intends" or is primarily directed toward objects and only secondarily does psychical activity reflect upon itself.

Husserl elaborated Brentano's conception of intentionality. For Husserl, intentionality is the property of consciousness being

consciousness of something (1931: 241-46). To fully comprehend the importance of this conception, it is relevant to recall the Cartesian influence on Husserl. Although the Cartesian method of doubting provided a pattern for Husserl's pure phenomenology, Husserl (1970b: 81-82) claimed that Descartes did not make a sufficiently radical distinction between the act of thinking and the object of thought. The technical term used by Husserl to designate the relationship between the act of thinking and the object of thought was intentionality. Subsequently, Husserl developed a theory of noesis (subject-in-relation-to-the-object) to account for modifications of the intentional object which are due to the activities of the mind; and a theory of noema (object-in-relation-to-the-subject) to account for modifications of the intentional object which originate in the object itself. The "noetic" and "noematic" poles are two directions of reflection. These two poles are linked by the conception of intentionality so that each pole can only be understood in the light of the other pole (Schmitt, 1967: 67).

Intentionality has nothing to do with relations between "real" objects but is essentially an act that gives meaning. In Husserl's philosophy the object appears as essentially determined by the structure of thinking itself. This thinking itself first gives meaning to the object and then continues to orient itself to the pole of identity which it itself has already created. The intentional analyses ultimately become constitutive analyses, that is, analyses which do not indicate how meaning is found in the primordial experiences but which want to explain how the meaning of things is primordially constituted in and through consciousness (Kockelmans, 1967a: 34-35).


RELATIONS OF PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE

While the transcendental-phenomenological-reduction is to be taken as the principal method of phenomenology, Husserl's second type of reduction--the "eidetic reduction"--serves as a focal point for discussing the relations among the natural attitude, science, and pure phenomenology. These relations are illustrated in Figure 1 below. Four relevant relations are depicted in this illustration: (1) a direct relation between the natural attitude and pure phenomenology which is linked by the phenomenological epoché (bracketing and transcendental-phenomenological-reduction); (2) a direct relation between science and the natural attitude which is linked by abstraction, or conceptualization; (3) a direct relation between science and pure phenomenology through an eidetic reduction; and (4) an indirect relation between the natural attitude and pure phenomenology which is mediated by science.

The conception of eidetic reduction is particularly a product of Husserl of the Logical Investigations.⁶ The intent was to give an epistemological foundation to logical concepts and to clarify their ultimate meaning. This is possible only if the logical concepts as unities of meaning are taken in the way they manifest themselves in "original intuition." According to Husserl, in the natural attitude all knowledge begins with experience and remains within experience. Every empirical and individual experience, however, can be transformed into an essential insight by means of a special process which Husserl called "ideation." The object of such an ideation is an eidōs (essence). Thus, essential insight which reveals an eidōs serves to establish the foundation for knowledge within the realm of the natural attitude (Kockelmans, 1967c: 80).

Figure 1

Schematic Representation of Relations among Natural Attitude, Science, and Phenomenology



By eidetic reduction, Husserl means the movement from the realm of facts to the realm of general essences. For Husserl, a "fact" refers to empirical generalities of experience. An "essence" refers to "pure generalities" which put before our mind "pure possibilities" whose validity is independent of experience. Essences are the most basic constituting entities--the "what is it" (Husserl, 1931, Section 1: Chapter 1). Thus a "science of facts" provides an account of why things are actual, whereas a "science of essences" provides an account of how things are possible. An eidetic science (one concerned with essences) excludes in principle every assimilation of the theoretical results of empirical sciences. Yet, no fully developed science of facts could subsist without eidetic knowledge.⁷

But why did Husserl seek to generate a "science of essences"? An answer to this question can be formulated by pursuing two lines of development in Husserl. First, one must recall Husserl's notion of "bracketing the standpoint of the natural attitude." And, second, one must recall the broader frame of reference whereby Husserl aimed to found philosophy phenomenologically.

According to Husserl, knowledge within the natural attitude begins and ends within "experience." The sciences proper to the "natural standpoint" are sciences of the world, that is, sciences of experience or sciences of fact.⁸ Empiricists and positivists insisted that the experimental nature of science (as opposed to the non-experimental nature of philosophy) permitted verification of observations because they had a factual basis. However, when two questions are raised, this "factual" basis becomes problematic. First, what is a science? Second, what conditions are necessary to have a science at all? The problem is to determine what an isolated "fact" is. No one has ever discovered a fact which is independent of a system (Kattsoff, 1940: 206).⁹ Husserl's phenomenology was not interested in "factual facts" but in the essences of the immediately given phenomena. However, Husserl admitted that for every essence one can match a concept (Kockelmans, 1967c: 80). In other words, the sciences of essence had relevance for the sciences of facts. According to Husserl, science must employ philosophy in order to strengthen its foundations; while the foundations of philosophy would be strengthened by phenomenology. As philosophy functions as a transcendental theory of all science, a phenomenologically founded philosophy functions as a transcendental theory of all philosophy.

Eidetic sciences were to be descriptive sciences aimed at discovering the universal and essential structures of meaning of experience. By the process of eidetic reduction, essences would be discovered. The world of exact scientific concepts (science of facts) are derivatives of these essences. Some examples of eidetic sciences include pure logic, pure mathematics, and pure time theory. In each instance, these eidetic sciences are wholly free from positing any actual facts. That is, in these sciences no experience qua experience can take over the function of offering a logical ground (Kockelmans, 1967b: 91). Alfred Schuetz aptly summarizes the purpose of the eidetic approach as follows:

Again we see that the eidetic approach is merely a methodological device for the solution of a special task. The phenomenologist, we may say, does not have to do with the objects themselves; he is interested in their meaning, as it is constituted by the activities of our mind (1962: 114-15).

Criticism of the Logical Investigations did not deter Husserl from his main goals. For instance, one major criticism pertains to the question of evidence: "How are we able to know an eidos or essence?" According to Husserl, every essence can be "set out as an Idea" (Kockelmans, 1967b: 106). That is, every empirical intuition can be transformed into an intuition of an essence by means of the process of ideation. Just as empirical intuition is consciousness of an individual object and intuitively brings it to givenness, so "essential intuition" is the consciousness of an "object" toward which consciousness directs its glance as toward something "self-given" (Kockelmans, 1967b: 106). It becomes clear that Husserl presupposes that self-evidence based upon intuition is the ultimate criterion of all truth and that the principle that intuition is the ultimate source which justifies all our knowledge is

even the leading idea of his phenomenology as a whole (Kockelmans, 1967b: 107).

CRITIQUE OF THE HUSSERLIAN PROGRAM

Ironically, Husserl, who was so highly self-critical, refused to enter into a discussion with the contemporary critics of his phenomenological program. Instead, Husserl retained an assistant, Eugen Fink, whose prime function was to act as Husserl's intellectual opponent (Spiegelberg, 1971a, 1: 89). The reason for Husserl's reluctance to debate with his critics was as follows:

Many have occasionally been troubled by the fact that in the past years I have refrained from entering into a discussion with critics of the "transcendental" or "constitutive" phenomenology which has its basis in my writings and which develops with an internal consistency in them. I have from time to time stated my reason for this silence. All of the critiques with which I have become acquainted miss the basic meaning of my phenomenology to such an extent that it is not in the least affected by them, despite their direct quotation of my own words. I held that it is more important to deal with the demands made by problems relating to this new science that emerge upon ever new levels in comprehensive and concrete work, and to bring them, partly through methodical development and partly through a self-reflective clarification of their principally new philosophical meaning, to a level of concrete development where they will in the future be capable of representing their unassailable claim to truth on the own as completed work (Husserl, 1970c: 73).

Nevertheless, Husserl admitted that a number of well-founded criticisms had appeared; therefore, at Husserl's request Eugen Fink entered into a discussion with the Husserlian critics.

According to Fink, many of Husserl's contemporary critics had misconstrued the meaning of Husserlian phenomenology because they had misunderstood the direction of change in Husserl's thought from the

Logical Investigations to the first volume of the Ideas (1970: 74-75). Marvin Farber (1968: 544-45) agrees with Fink in that much misunderstanding can be avoided by distinguishing the pre-reduction stage of development in the Logical Investigations from the phenomenological reduction as first presented in Ideas I.

The main opponent of Husserlian phenomenology was critical philosophy, which raised two basic objections: (1) that phenomenology had unjustly extended the concept of intuitionism and (2) that phenomenology was ontological (Fink, 1970: 78). The implication of these two objections for the whole phenomenological program is quite profound.

Now insofar as phenomenology, in Criticism's view, proves to be a form of dogmatism because of its mistaken methodological beginnings (intuitionism and ontologism), its "scientific" character must be denied. This represents a very sharp criticism of the intellectual endeavor which is to lead Husserl toward the realization of "philosophy as rigorous science" (Fink, 1970: 80-81).

However, Fink refutes the position of critical philosophy by noting that it rests on two unwarranted assumptions. Thus, the phenomenological perspective can be vindicated by overthrowing these two presuppositions (1970: 93-94). The first presupposition is that the method employed in the Logical Investigations is dogmatic. The second presupposition is that the shift in thought from Logical Investigations to the Ideas represents a turn toward the critical philosophy itself.¹⁰ To overthrow the two fundamental presuppositions of the critique entails demonstrating phenomenology's own individual character by singling out the differences between the two. The complexity of this endeavor does not allow for elaboration here. However, it is worth noting that Fink (1970: 75) endorses the following maxim: No philosophy can be criticized from the standpoint

of another philosophy. Hence, phenomenology must be criticized solely within the framework of its own methodological position.

All of the criticisms of the Husserlian program could not be vindicated by Fink. Even Husserl ultimately admitted to some of the more pertinent failings. The most recurrent and significant criticism is Husserl's failure to achieve a balance between idealism and realism. Husserl's leaning toward transcendental idealism is exemplified by the difficulties that he encountered in trying to resolve the question of intersubjectivity. Husserl's failure to account for intersubjectivity in the reduced, egological sphere (transcendental realm) finally forced him to admit to the solipsistic fallacy.¹¹ Alfred Schuetz, as well as many others, critically examined the question of whether or not it is meaningful, or even conceivable, to speak of a plurality of transcendental egos. Schuetz concluded that Husserl's account of transcendental intersubjectivity did not succeed. Furthermore, it could never have succeeded:

It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (Gegebenheit) of the life-world. It is the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology (Schuetz, 1966: 82).¹²

Even Husserl's assistant, Eugen Fink, found it impossible to justify the Husserlian account of transcendental intersubjectivity. With Schuetz, Fink agreed that the a priori in Husserl's theory of empathy was unfounded (Schuetz, 1966: 84-86).

Another major criticism of Husserlian phenomenology is that the phenomenological reduction (in contra-distinction to the claims made by Husserl as early as the Logical Investigations) cannot transcend the necessity of logic. The Logical Investigations attempted to refute the

position of logical psychologism which suggested that logic is founded upon psychology (Farber, 1966: 121). According to Husserl, the phenomenological method could transcend the requirement of logic. However, the possibility (let alone the actualization by Husserl) of this statement is highly questionable. Farber (1968: 549), among others, states that phenomenological philosophy cannot be freed of logic. All phenomenological statements are logic-bound.

As well, there are many more criticisms (of both a particular and general nature) of the phenomenological method and program. Since many of these criticisms will emerge in subsequent discussions of post-Husserlian phenomenologies, these criticisms need not be mentioned here. In the main, criticism of the phenomenological method centers around accusations such as dogmatism, irrationality, metaphysics, and mysticism.

The accusation of "mysticism" arises as a consequence of the terminological ambiguity which surrounds Husserl's work as a whole. The "pictorial language" of phenomenology prompts a tendency toward a metaphorical usage of phenomenological terms in the discourse of other domains of inquiry. This difficulty is exemplified by three paradoxes which continually obscure the phenomenological problematic (Fink, 1970: 142-45).¹³ First, there is the paradox of the communication of knowledge from the transcendental observer to the dogmatist within the natural attitude. All that the phenomenologist can accomplish in this communication is to supply enough information to lead naive persons¹⁴ to make the reduction themselves. The second paradox is that only mundane word concepts of language are available to the phenomenologist for communicative purposes. As a consequence, all phenomenological reports are inadequate because of

the attempt to give a mundane expression to non-wordly meanings. Third, the logical paradox of transcendental determinations maintains that logic is not equal to the task of solving the problems arising in the determination of basic transcendental relations. This, in effect, removes the realm of phenomenology beyond proof or disproof in the customary sense because mundane logic is declared inadequate. If the three paradoxes are accepted, then "one can never be convinced of phenomenology in natural terms, but must adopt the phenomenological attitude" (Farber, 1968: 560).¹⁵

THE UNITY AND SIGNIFICATION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

All of phenomenology is not Husserl, even though he is more or less its center (Ricoeur, 1967b: 3). After Husserl, the phenomenological movement might be depicted as "spokes radiating away from a central hub." However, the disparate character of phenomenology is not confined solely to post-Husserlian developments. It is also difficult to isolate common elements which would provide unity to the immense breadth and depth of Husserl's writings. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that most writers tend to demarcate several distinct periods or phases in Husserl's philosophical career.

Three general periods may be distinguished in Husserl's writings.¹⁶ However, it is important to note that these three periods should not be considered as discrete and mutually exclusive. The first period is distinguished by Husserl's publication of the Logical Investigations (1900, 1901). The second period commences with the publication of Ideas I (1913). This period also includes the writing (but posthumous

publication) of Ideas II and III, and extends to the publication of the Cartesian Meditations (1931). The third period centers around the unfinished and posthumously published edition of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis).¹⁷ Paul Ricoeur (1967a: 2) has demarcated the same three periods; however, his labelling is different. First, one might distinguish "Husserl the logician." Second, the "intuitive Husserl" or the "Husserl of transcendental reduction" emerged. And, third, there arose the "Lebenswelt Husserl" or the Husserl of the "crisis of European sciences."

Given these different periods in Husserl's career, the question arises as to whether or not any common denominator exists, or even should be expected to exist, within Husserlian phenomenological philosophy? Pierre Thévenaz maintains that a unifying thread is present in the phenomenological movement as a whole, for these reasons:

If a method originally forged for a very particular and limited end has been able to take on so many varying forms, it is because it holds within itself a latent truth and efficacy, a power of renewal, a principle of progress which attests to an exceptional fecundity. Further, does not a good part of this obscurity come from our incapacity to hold on to all of these threads at once and to discern the profound unity of the diverse philosophies which claim the title of phenomenology (1962: 37-38)?

Furthermore, Thévenaz believes that this unity of method also permeates Husserl's entire philosophical career.¹⁸ The key to this unity is Husserl's emphasis on the conception of foundations:

The problem that haunted Husserl from his Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) until his death was that of foundations. This is the guiding thread of his thought and it shows us the unity of the prodigious effort of reflexion that made of this mathematician one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century (Thévenaz, 1962: 41).

The general aim of the phenomenological method was to radically reformulate the entire enterprise of philosophical reason.

This leads us to postulate two common denominators to Husserlian (and also to post-Husserlian) phenomenology. First, phenomenology is a method and not a system. Second, the method of phenomenology is groping; that is, no strictly teachable program exists. One simply "takes-up" the flow of the thought. This is not to deny that the phenomenological method has undergone modification; however, it is to assert that all phenomenology first begins with the method of phenomenological reduction. The contemporary French philosopher and phenomenologist, Paul Ricoeur, aptly expresses the fact of phenomenology as method in these terms:

Thus, phenomenology continues the transcendental of Kant, the originary of Hume, and the doubt and cogito of Descartes. In no way does it represent a sharp mutation in philosophy.

Beyond this, phenomenology is a vast project whose expression is not restricted to one work or to any specific group of works. It is less a doctrine than a method capable of many exemplifications of which Husserl exploited only a few (1967b: 4).

Since phenomenological reduction (or, more fully, phenomenological epoché) was postulated as the unifying thread of Husserl's program, a brief review is warranted of the role of the epoché in the three periods of Husserl's philosophical career.

As discussed in the section entitled "Critique of the Husserlian Program," many misunderstandings of the phenomenological epoché stem from confusion as to the direction of shift in Husserl's thought from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas. In the Logical Investigations, the task of the phenomenological method was to transcend the temptations

of psychological descriptions of consciousness in order to go beyond its irremediable contingency and, thus, to reach a more radical foundation in apodictic evidence (Thévenaz, 1962: 51). After the Logical Investigations, Husserl's works follow two paths. First, he continued emphasis on description of phenomena. Second, he continued to refine the method of his philosophy (Ricoeur, 1967b: 7). However, the shift to Ideas I did not eliminate confusion as to what the phenomenological method was and as to how it was to be performed:

The straightforward introduction of the reduction makes it difficult to recognize the radically new meaning of the problem which is here raised for the first time. In a very real sense, the presentation of the reduction here (in the Ideas) is an appeal for its actual performance (Fink, 1970: 106).

The most pervasive difficulty in understanding the phenomenological epoché is the fact that the reduction cannot be understood from the standpoint of the natural attitude. Phenomenology, having "bracketed" the standpoint of the natural attitude, makes the reduction its own presupposition insofar as it alone opens up that dimension of problems with reference to which it establishes the possibility of theoretical knowledge (Fink, 1970: 105). Consequently, insight into the basic correlation of epoché and belief in the world is of the utmost importance for understanding the reduction. Phenomenology transforms the question concerning the being of the world into the question concerning the essence of transcendental subjectivity. That is, the true theme of phenomenology is the world's becoming in the constitution of transcendental subjectivity (Fink, 1970: 130-31).

The idealistic interpretation of the being of the world as unveiled by the phenomenological epoché reached its climax in the Cartesian Meditations. This marks the end of Husserl's second period and the emergence of the third period. The decisive fact is the progressive abandonment of the idealism of Cartesian Meditations. The reduction less and less signifies a "return to the ego" and more and more a "return from logic to the antepredicative," to the primordial evidence of the world (Ricoeur, 1967b: 12). The primacy and pre-givenness of lived experience becomes the dominant theme, and the purpose of the phenomenological epoché is to lead us back to the Lebenswelt or life-world.

As Husserl began (in his later works) to abandon the quest for a completely pure phenomenological method, the way was opened for the correlation of Husserl's phenomenology with existentialism. The conception of an "existential phenomenology" combined phenomenology as method with the main theme of post-Hegelian philosophies, that of the problem of existence.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

¹ Concepts that apply to the world as a whole, to transcendental consciousness or the transcendental realm, are termed "transcendent" by Husserl, whereas whatever applies to the pure Ego Husserl calls "transcendental." Kant distinguished between both terms, but for him they have different meanings: "transcendent" applies to the noumenal world, and "transcendental" to the phenomenal world (Koestenbaum, 1964: 11-111).

² The conception of "intentionality" is central to Husserl. A more detailed discussion of intentionality is given below.

³ In Husserl's later works, the conception of phenomenological epoché or transcendental epoché subsumed both the "bracketing" and the phenomenological reduction as integral parts of the phenomenological method. It is interesting to note that Husserl of the Crisis criticizes Husserl of the Ideas for permitting the following shortcoming:

"I note in passing that the much shorter way to the transcendental epoché in my Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, which I call the 'Cartesian Way' (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the Cartesian epoché of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes' prejudices and confusions), has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained. Hence also, as the reception of my Ideas showed, it is all too easy right at the very beginning to fall back into the naïve-natural attitude--something that is very tempting in any case" (1970b: 155).

⁴ It is interesting to note that Husserl was first a mathematician, and only later a philosopher. His concern over the weaknesses in the foundation of mathematics (especially with regard to the presuppositions of arithmetic) eventually led Husserl to philosophy and logic in order to strengthen the foundations of mathematics.

⁵ Brentano owes his conception that mind is intentional primarily to his studies of Aristotle, to scholasticism, and to Bernhard Bolzano, an Italian logician.

⁶ It is convenient to separate Husserl's writings into three phases. Sometimes these three phases have been collapsed into two phases: a pre-Crisis versus a post-Crisis Husserl. A more complete discussion of these three phases is presented later.

⁷Alfred Schuetz (1962: 113) has noted that the distinction between the empirical and eidetical approaches has nothing to do with the distinction between the mundane and phenomenologically reduced spheres. Even within the mundane sphere, eidetical science is possible. It is informative to note that Georg Simmel's writings on the sociological a priori were written with the intent of showing that no fully developed science of facts could subsist without eidetic knowledge.

⁸For Husserl, the sciences of the world, or sciences of our natural standpoint, include not only the natural sciences but also such sciences as biology, physiology, psychology, and those related to the Geisteswissenschaften.

⁹According to Kattsoff (1940: 213-14), every part of a completed science is a whole of conceptual steps each of which is immediately evident. An experiment is the act of placing a phenomenon in "evidence," that is, so that it can be grasped by intuition. The concepts and propositions of a science can be transformed in this way into eidetic intuitions.

¹⁰For example, it is argued that phenomenology and critical philosophy have similar aims in that both do not remain within the dogmatism of the naive world, but overcome it insofar as they make it an explicit problem (Fink, 1970: 89). In addition, both critics and Husserl hold that empirical reality of existence is founded upon its transcendental ideality (Farber, 1968: 546).

¹¹The question of intersubjectivity took on increasing importance in direct relation to the chronology of Husserl's writings. Intersubjectivity was virtually ignored in Ideas I (1913). It became more relevant in Ideas II and III (published posthumously). By the publication of the Cartesian Meditations (1931), the question of intersubjectivity was predominant (especially 5th Meditation). The issue still was focal in Husserl's last main work, the incomplete and posthumously published edition of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.

¹²Although the questionableness of transcendental intersubjectivity has evoked generalized criticism of the entire phenomenological program, Schuetz (1966: 90-91) emphasizes that phenomenology's failure to answer the question of intersubjectivity should not in any sense be construed as indicative of a failing of phenomenology as a whole.

¹³Farber (1968: 543-60) summarizes and comments on the essential issues discussed by Fink (1970).

¹⁴For the phenomenologist, the term "naive" is employed in a non-pejorative sense simply to refer to a person who has not done a phenomenological reduction. In a parallel manner, the expression "mundane sciences" refers to those disciplines which require phenomenological grounding before meaningful empirical analyses can be undertaken.

¹⁵In this regard, it is informative to note that Schuetz (1962: 144) recognized the importance of clearly knowing when one has and when one has not "bracketed" the natural attitude. Schuetz criticized Ortega y Gasset for criticizing (from the standpoint of the natural attitude) Husserl's theory of empathy. Since Husserl's theory of empathy is meaningful only in the context of the suspension of the natural attitude, then y Gasset's criticisms are invalid.

¹⁶Spiegelberg (1960: 74) has also distinguished three stages in Husserl's phenomenological program: (1) the pre-phenomenological period marked by Logical Investigations I; (2) the period of phenomenology as a limited epistemological enterprise, marked by Logical Investigations II; and (3) the period of pure phenomenology as the universal foundation of philosophy and science, which took shape around 1906. However, for present purposes, this demarcation is not especially suitable.

¹⁷Parts I and II of the Crisis appeared in 1936; however, all extant parts were not available until 1954. In this context, it is relevant to note that Husserl's personal demands for exactness coupled with his highly self-critical attitude kept the majority of his writings from being published during his lifetime. The fantastic accumulation of some 45,000 shorthand pages is preserved in the Husserl Archives in Louvain. Editorial work continues, but the time lag involved in publishing the German text has been great. Of course, the time lag for translations from the German is even greater.

¹⁸Thévenaz (1962: 40-41) states that to understand Husserl's phenomenology it is necessary to avoid taking each of his works in isolation and treating them merely as successive applications of an original method to various subjects. As well, Husserl's later works are to a large extent indispensable for obtaining a correct interpretation of his earlier works.

CHAPTER 4

POST-HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGIES: ALTERATIONS TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

"Man is not the lord of being, he is the shepherd of Being,"
and the poets and thinkers are the "guardians" of this
dwelling-place.

--Pierre Thévenaz (1962: 64)

The strict canons of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction had demanded the suspension of ontology. However, there are indications in his later works that Husserl conceived of a distinctive existential possibility in conjunction with his transcendental phenomenology. In the works and manuscripts of the last ten years, Husserlian phenomenology became more existential to the degree that the problem of perception was described as the basis and genetic origin of all operations of consciousness (Ricoeur, 1967b: 204).

Existential phenomenology makes the transition between transcendental phenomenology, born of the reduction of every thing to its appearing to me, and ontology, which restores the question of the sense of being for all that is said to "exist" (Ricoeur, 1967b: 212). The existentialists recognized that the act of existing is something very different from the mere presence of an essence before the mind; and, furthermore, they recognized that non-existence is very different from the absence of such an essence in a faculty that is ready to receive it. In addition, the existentialists have clearly grasped the weakness and contingency of human nature. They also have restored to full significance the law of contradiction.

While it is tempting to simply assume that there is a relation between phenomenology (as method) and existentialism (as subject matter), this assumption is not unproblematic. Spiegelberg (1960) has made several remarks which vindicate the compatibility yet independence of phenomenology and existentialism. Yet, Earle (1960) has raised a number

of well-founded counter-arguments to illustrate their incompatibility. And, while the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre believes that he has "liberated" Husserl by radicalizing Husserl's original doctrine of intentionality, Maurice Natanson (1967) maintains that Sartre has done little more than explicate a relation which was already present. Moreover, Natanson suggests that Sartre's inadequacies serve well to illuminate Husserl's achievements. However, this controversy is not at issue in the present inquiry. For our purposes, it can be conclusively stated that Husserl's phenomenological method has had a strong influence on many existentialists.

In the subsequent discussion, the main issues with which existentialism confronts phenomenology are briefed. The emphasis in this discussion is on discerning relevant methodological modifications to Husserl's phenomenological method. In this regard, three post-Husserlian programs are discussed--those of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HERMENEUTIC TURN: MARTIN HEIDEGGER

In 1914 the promising young philosopher and theologian, Martin Heidegger, submitted a doctoral thesis entitled The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism. The work bears the stamp of Husserl's criticism of psychological strains in contemporary formal logic, and Heidegger's characteristic style was already apparent. He referred to psychologism as an "un-philosophy" (Naess, 1968: 175). However, the publication of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) in 1927 clearly marks Heidegger's departure from Husserl's influence, especially the transcendental idealism:

For his part Heidegger made it clear that for him the stumbling blocks in Husserl's philosophy consisted in the transcendental reduction as "bracketing of Being," in the "reduction" of man to pure consciousness, and, finally, in the "reduction" of Being into Being-object-for (Kockelmans, 1967c: 274).

This is not to say that Heidegger discarded the phenomenological method. On the contrary, Heidegger rethought the concept of phenomenology itself, so that phenomenology and phenomenological method take on a radically different character (Palmer, 1969: 125-26).¹

Heidegger's philosophy, as a whole, can be characterized as an attempt to ask questions rather than to supply answers. Although phenomenology had attempted to remain neutral with respect to metaphysics, the development of phenomenology uncovered the ontology which was sustaining it. While this remained implicit in most of Husserl's works, it became explicit in Heidegger's (Thévenaz, 1962: 54).

The key to Heidegger's rethinking of phenomenology is that the authentic dimensions of a phenomenological method make it hermeneutical. For Heidegger, "phenomenology" is a means of being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it. The implication of this statement for hermeneutics is that interpretation is not grounded in human consciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us. Then, ontology must meet phenomenology.

Heidegger's key question is: "What is the meaning of Being?" Although Heidegger is aware that this question is difficult to answer because the meaning of the question is itself unclear, the general aim is to reawaken an understanding of, and to elucidate the fundamental

questions about, the meaning of Being. According to Heidegger, the proper method of an ontological analysis which seeks to explicate the meaning of Being is the method of descriptive phenomenology. Thus, Heidegger defines philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology which takes its point of departure from the "hermeneutics of Dasein," as an historical analytics of existence (Palmer, 1969: 129-30). The key point is that understanding in Heidegger has become ontological. Understanding, which is the basis for all interpretation, is ontologically fundamental and prior to every act of existing (Palmer, 1969: 131).

Although Heidegger describes his own method as phenomenological, this method is opposed to that of Husserl, who envisaged phenomenology as a fundamental "science" with its own intricate structure of concepts (Naess, 1968: 193). In Husserl, the search for a radical foundation led to transcendental or constituting consciousness. In Heidegger, interrogation pushes still deeper, even beyond transcendental consciousness, to the "foundation of the foundation," the so-called Dasein. Dasein ("to-be-there") refers to an ontological structure beneath the level of consciousness, from which one is permitted to understand the possibility and the meaning of a consciousness, or what Husserl called a "transcendental ego" (Thévenaz, 1962: 56-57). Heidegger's conception of Dasein reflects his radicalization of the Husserlian conception of intentionality. In particular, Heidegger breaks away from the Cartesian roots which influenced Husserl's conception of intentionality.² For Heidegger, the intentional structure is present not only in the realm of consciousness, understood in terms of man's cognitive and theoretical relation to his world, but already in the whole of man's precognitive awareness.

Dasein already exhibits a preconceptual understanding of Being in which the intentional structure of experience is already operative (Schrage, 1967: 281).

Heidegger agrees with Husserl that the phenomenological method is both descriptive and transcendental. Husserl's eidetic reduction was interested solely in a science of essential being, while the transcendental-phenomenological reduction sought to suspend the factual world by placing it between brackets. However, Heidegger insists that it is precisely this bracketed, factual world of existence which is to be described and subjected to a fundamental ontological analysis. Whereas Husserl's phenomenology is directed toward a "science of essences," Heidegger's phenomenology is directed toward a fundamental ontology of existence (Schrage, 1967: 289). This existence is both historical and temporal, hence Heidegger's phenomenological description proceeds from an historical interpretation or hermeneutics.

The turn to hermeneutics (as a method of "uncovering" or "laying bare") is crucial. Heidegger's method, the so-called "Daseinsanalytics," clears the path to hidden and forgotten being. It is this that constitutes the originality in Heidegger's coupling of phenomenological method and ontology (Thévenaz, 1962: 58). It is a question of isolating the fundamental structures of being which are the "conditions of possibility" of our empirical world, which are the constitutive foundations of all that is.

The turn to hermeneutics signals a shift away from phenomenology. Husserlian phenomenology aimed at a presupposition-free founding of philosophy. However, hermeneutics (as interpretation) is never

a presuppositionless grasping of something given in advance (Palmer, 1969: 136). As phenomenologist, Heidegger was concerned with uncovering being starting with man. The shift to hermeneutics reverses the man-Being relation. Instead of man revealing Being, it is Being which "opens" itself to man. Thus, Dasein represents the opening of Being to man (Thévenaz, 1962: 60).³

The relevance of language is accentuated in Heidegger's writings after Being and Time. Language is placed at the center of the Being-man relationship. Man does not possess language, it is Being which speaks to man. As Palmer has stated:

To put the matter in terms of expression and appearance: language is not an expression of man but an appearance of being. Thinking does not express man, it lets being happen as language event. In this letting-happen lies the fate of man and also the fate of truth, and ultimately the fate of being (1969: 155).

Even before man thinks or speaks, Being speaks to man and renders language, logic, and thought possible.

Heidegger moves toward renewal of the importance of the philosophy of language. By "exploding" the everyday meaning of words, Heidegger tries to disclose their implicit or buried meanings in order to recover human language at its meaningful source (Thévenaz, 1962: 62). Man ought, before speaking, once more let Being speak to him, even at the risk of having little or nothing to say in answer to this call. Only thus is it possible to restore to the Word its essential value and to man the privilege of dwelling in the truth of Being.⁴ Thus, Heidegger's philosophy will probably never achieve a final formulation. His thought is still groping for more precise and exact ways of expressing many of his initial

ideas concerning being. The distinctive character of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology is that it is an ontology of Dasein or human existence. As such, it is an existentialist ontology. The point of departure of this existentialist ontology is a hermeneutics of the concrete experience of the historically existing self (Schrage, 1967: 284). Of all the existentialist thinkers, Heidegger's method is the most exact, his ideas the most revolutionary, and his ontological insight the most profound (Wild, 1955: 178).

Nevertheless, Heidegger was not solely responsible for the reintroduction of ontology in phenomenology. Jean-Paul Sartre also reintroduced the ontological factor in a manner which promoted the juxtaposition of phenomenology and existentialism. Thus, while Heidegger's hermeneutic turn moved him away from Husserl's phenomenology, Sartre's position emerged in conjunction with his subscription to phenomenology as method.

EXISTENTIALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY: JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

What French phenomenology learned from the later Husserl was that the phenomenological reduction strains our links to things only to discover that these links exist prior to any act of consciousness. Thus, the original is clearly what can neither be reduced nor constituted (Ricoeur, 1967a: 7). Hence, French phenomenology allied with existentialism as opposed to essentialism (essence). This alliance is reflected by the famous Sartrean slogan: Existence (of consciousness) precedes essence.

According to Sartre, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger had tried to solve the problem of intersubjectivity without lapsing into solipsism, or else resorting to the assumption of a personal God. However, none of them had succeeded (Schuetz, 1962: 183). With reference to Husserl, Sartre disapproved of the idealistic tendencies. Sartre's existentialism derives from a problematic critique and transformation of Husserl's doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness. For Sartre, the phenomenological doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness not only leads to, but is, an existential theory (Natanson, 1967: 341).

Sartre begins by questioning the relevance of the results of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. That is, is it (after the reduction) relevant to speak of a "transcendental ego" which precedes consciousness? Sartre's answer is no.⁵ The ego is not transcendental, but transcendent like all mundane things. As such, the ego is not part of the original structure of consciousness but rather something that is constituted by the pure stream of conscious acts (Kockelmans, 1967c: 317). What Sartre calls the "transphenomenality of being" is lost in the reduction. In other words, the phenomenon of being requires the transphenomenality of being. It is in this sense that the phenomenon of being can be given an ontological proof.

Sartre's attack against the reduction rests immediately on his conviction that the unrealized noema lacks transphenomenal being, that the whole purpose, therefore, of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality has been undermined. Instead of consciousness transcending itself toward the objects of reality, consciousness falls back upon itself (Natanson, 1967: 344).

In other words, as Kockelmans states: "The world cannot be in consciousness, as Husserl would have it, but consciousness is in the world,

as Heidegger has shown (1967c: 321). While Heidegger discarded the Husserlian "transcendental Ego-consciousness" and replaced it with the conception of Dasein, Sartre rejected the "transcendental Ego" but with the explicit aim of rescuing the Husserlian "consciousness of" from Heidegger's sceptre. Under Sartre, Husserl's conception of intentionality was radicalized.

In order to explicate Sartre's alteration to Husserl's theory of intentionality, it is relevant to emphasize the relation between Sartre's conception of consciousness and his theory of phenomenon. As a matter of definition, a "phenomenon" is as it appears; a phenomenon is identical with its appearance (Naess, 1968: 285).

Sartre manages to retain Husserl's principle that consciousness is always consciousness of something. In knowing-consciousness there is something which appears, namely knowledge, as a pre-reflective object of consciousness (Naess, 1968: 288). However, implicit in the concept of phenomenon is the notion that phenomena appear to something, and the word "consciousness" is itself the term denoting this to-relation. What has to be grasped is that consciousness must in no way be thought of as an additional phenomenon to all the others. Because the to-relation is implicit in the concept of phenomenon, Sartre is able to deny the existence of phenomena other than in relation to consciousness: Without phenomena there is no consciousness, without consciousness there are no phenomena (Naess, 1968: 289-90). This leads to the famous Sartrean distinction of two absolutely separated regions of being: "l'etre-en-soi" and "l'etre-pour-soi." In other words, the being of the phenomenon is called "being-in-itself," and the being of the pre-reflective cogito is

called "being-for-itself." This dichotomy forms the basis for Sartre's Being and Nothingness:

Thus we have left "appearances" and have been led progressively to posit two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself, concerning which we have as yet only superficial and incomplete information. A multitude of questions remain unanswered: What is the ultimate meaning of these two types of being? For what reasons do they both belong to being in general? What is the meaning of that being which includes within itself these two radically separated regions of being? If idealism and realism both fail to explain the relations which in fact unite these regions which in theory are without communication, what other solution can we find for this problem? And how can the being of the phenomenon be transphenomenal?

It is to attempt to reply to these questions that I have written the present work (Sartre, 1956: lxvii).

The "being-in-itself" (*en-soi*) is de trop; that is, it cannot be derived from something other than itself. It is roughly identical with the world of things (objectivity) and it is utterly contingent (not subject to change, becoming, temporality). In contrast, the Being-for-itself (*pour-soi*), identical with the human being, is the free subject which continually "creates" its own existence. Sartre's analysis proceeds by examining the relationship between the en-soi and the pour-soi. Following Heidegger, subjectivity and objectivity are understood, not as two separate entities between which a relationship must only be established, but as essential "togetherness," and the question aims at the full and concrete structure of this togetherness (Marcuse, 1948: 312).

Consciousness which breaks itself away from being (which becomes "unstuck") is being-for-itself, or nothingness (Thévenaz, 1962: 70). If consciousness is nothingness, then everything lies in front of it. It is in this sense that Sartrean consciousness is existence without essence.

Having no essence, consciousness has to make or "create" itself. At this juncture, Sartre's ontology moves beyond being (the pour-soi and en-soi dichotomy) to include doing. "Having," "doing," and "being" are the cardinal categories of human reality (Sartre, 1956: 431). This turn moves phenomenology toward recognition of the importance of the conception of action. As Sartre has said:

It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free-will, to cite examples in favor of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action. . . . We should observe first that an action is on principle intentional (1956: 433).

In brief, to be is to act. It is precisely only action which enables us to see and to know. Man will not be defined by characteristics or a nature that would be inherent in him, but solely by his worldly ventures, by his acts.

Sartre thus bases his conception of man on a new relationship between consciousness and the world which entails a double movement of tearing-away from the world by nihilation and the project of transforming engagement in this world. In Husserl, the reduction was the transformation of intentionality; in Sartre, nihilation is the intention of transforming the world (or the intention of self-transformation since the "I" is a part of the world).

To conclude, one might say that Sartre contributed to the reintroduction of ontology into phenomenology. Sartre provided for a novel fusion of Hegel and Husserl. Hegel's ideas serve to enrich Husserl by introducing the "power of the negative" in the explication of self-consciousness. Yet, Husserl's ideas serve to arrest Hegel at the

point where he begins to slide toward speculative philosophy.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF PHENOMENOLOGY: MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY

The personal friendship and collaboration of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is interesting with respect to the differences it reveals between the two men. Sartre tended to be polemical, always attacking an issue head-on. Merleau-Ponty tended to be irenic; that is, he sought to bring opposing views into dialogue and genuine confrontation (Rabil, 1967: 117). It is curious to note that these roles were later reversed and their friendship disengaged due to different political views. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty's irenic attitude is evident in his critical treatment of Sartre's Being and Nothingness.

The main theme permeating Being and Nothingness is that of man's relationship to his natural and social surroundings. Sartre had rejected both classical positions on this matter. On the one hand, man is a part of the world; on the other hand, man is the constituting consciousness of the world. Through the relation of the conceptions of "being" and "nothingness," Sartre hoped to achieve an intermediate alternative to the polarization of consciousness and action. However, Merleau-Ponty stated that Sartre's attempt failed, principally for these reasons:

In our opinion the book remains too exclusively antithetic: the antithesis of my view of myself and another's view of me and the antithesis of the for itself and the in itself often seem to be alternatives instead of being described as the living bond and communication between one term and the other L'Être et le néant is first of all a demonstration that the subject is freedom, absence, and negativity and that, in this sense, there is nothingness. But that also means that the subject is only nothingness, that he needs being to sustain himself, that he can only be

thought of against a background of the world, and, finally, that he feeds on being like the shadows in Homer feed on the blood of the living (1964: 72-73).

Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty readily acknowledged that Sartre had pointed to the central problem of philosophy and with new profundity.

Referring to their positions on the phenomenological method, Sartre saw the phenomenological reduction proceeding to a nihilation which would lead to a perfectly translucent consciousness. However, Merleau-Ponty conceived the radicalism of the phenomenological reduction to lie in an exactly opposite movement. For Merleau-Ponty, the reduction is a means of becoming conscious of our being-in-the-world.⁶ To be-in-the-world is at the outset to perceive that world. In brief, Merleau-Ponty has contributed to phenomenological existentialism a revised understanding of perceptual consciousness, an understanding that places the perceiving human at the focal point of his philosophy. This was the main conclusion of the first stage in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological program. The analysis in The Structure of Behavior climaxed with the assertion that perception is primary.

Three years later, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception was published. The goal was to construct a positive phenomenological program. Even though a half century had lapsed since Husserl's first publications on phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty stated that the fundamental question of what is phenomenology still remained unanswered (1962: vii). The central problem of the Phenomenology of Perception was to discover how meaning emerges from our general perceptual involvement in the world (Bannan, 1967: 59). The question of whether we really perceive a world is not problematic. Rather, the world is what we perceive

Merleau-Ponty, 1962: xvi). For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological method reveals the world of perception (both natural and social), and the more radical the reduction is the less the world appears transparent. In his quest to seek the genesis of meaning, the phenomenologist reveals the mystery of the world and of reason. According to Merleau-Ponty, man must seek meaning because we are condemned to meaning (1962: xix). Because man is lost in a plentitude of meaning, our knowledge can never be exhausted. The task for phenomenology reflects just that:

The unfinished nature of phenomenology and the inchoative atmosphere which has surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of failure, they were inevitable because phenomenology's task was to reveal the mystery of the world and of reason (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: xxi).

To Merleau-Ponty the reduction is not an idealistic movement, that is, a return to a transcendental consciousness before which the world unfolds itself in an absolute transparence. Rather, the reduction is the formula of an existential philosophy of a subject welded to the world. Phenomenology, as a disclosure of the world, rests on itself, or provides its own foundation. Merleau-Ponty has characterized phenomenology as follows:

... phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner or style of thinking, that it existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness of itself as a philosophy (1962, viii).

Since Merleau-Ponty contended that the meaning of phenomenology is accessible only through the phenomenological reduction, it is not surprising that early in his philosophical career he turned to Husserl in order to grasp phenomenology at its source.⁷ It is relevant now to examine some of Merleau-Ponty's critical remarks on Husserl's phenomenological method.

In general, we may say that Merleau-Ponty uses the fundamental concepts of Husserl's phenomenology but interprets them in his own way (Kwant, 1967a: 375). Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty sought to radically reinterpret the Cartesian cogito. Merleau-Ponty agreed with Husserl that the conception of intentionality is central to the phenomenological method. However, Merleau-Ponty emphasized Descartes' failure to capture the contingent and non-conceptual character of our encounters with the world and other beings. Thus, Merleau-Ponty tried to overcome the traditional opposition of subject and object by affirming a new mode of being. This attempt manifests itself in an ontological grounding of the conception of intentionality.

Accordingly, the original intentionality is not yet characterized by the distance between a subject and an object. Merleau-Ponty himself says that this distance is connected with expression and especially with the word. Distance arises only on the level of consciousness and freedom. Hence the original intentionality is pre-objective. In its innermost nucleus our existence is fused with the world (Kwant, 1967a: 379).

For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is a dialectic relationship within which meaning originates. It is an interaction through which an organism makes its material surroundings its situation.

Another point of agreement between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl is that the net result of development after Descartes was a conception of science whose foundations remain obscure, and also ambiguity in descriptions of the relation of man to nature (Rabil, 1967: 56-57). According to Merleau-Ponty, it is perception (the pre-scientific life of consciousness) which alone endows meaning to the conception and operations of science.

The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: viii).

Thus, Merleau-Ponty sides with those who believe in the application of the scientific method but nevertheless maintain that the clarification of empirical data requires an interpretation which will always be philosophical (Rabil, 1967: 16). The necessity to always philosophically clarify empirical data arises because every interpretation is contingent. No interpretation can grasp an eternally true essence. While Merleau-Ponty agreed with Husserl that phenomenology is relevant in critically assessing science, Merleau-Ponty is not uncritical of Husserl's notion of eidetic reduction.

Husserl's eidetic reduction aimed to penetrate to the essential core of concrete phenomenon, that is, to reveal its essence. By transcending the facticity of the world, the eidetic reduction was to open up a realm of general essences.⁸ But Merleau-Ponty's philosophy excludes the notion of a necessary and essential nucleus in phenomena. Therefore, an eidetic reduction in the strict Husserlian sense is not present in Merleau-Ponty's works. Yet, Merleau-Ponty admits to a partial relevance to Husserl's notion of essence. While he agreed that experiences are connected, Merleau-Ponty maintained that essences do not underlie experience but, rather, experience underlies essence. Essence is not an end, but merely a means, for it is the living stream of existence itself that we want to understand (Kwant, 1967a: 382).

According to Merleau-Ponty, the entire realm of essences is merely a provisional conceptual fixation, imposed upon us by the character of language. Thus, an essence is not the ground of our experience but its expression (Kwant, 1967b: 402).⁹ An essence is not a real thing but an ideal object. An essence is the point at which our intellect rests when it searches out the conditions which enable reality to appear. It is our task to overcome this tendency to rest or become fixed.

Merleau-Ponty rejected Husserl's conception of a "pure essence." Since there can only be provisional expressions of our experience, a "pure essence" cannot exist. Yet, the possibility arises that even though we can only have a "pure essence" in principle, it thus serves as a limiting conception for an always imperfect idealization (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 112). However, if a "pure essence" were accepted as an ideal, our real experiences would be devaluated on the basis of an impossible goal; therefore, Merleau-Ponty rejected this alternative possibility.

Beside his rejection of the notion of "pure essence," Merleau-Ponty expanded his criticism along these lines to reject also the conception of inductive knowledge (1968: 115-16). Both the eidetic reduction and the inductive method start from the order of facts. The eidetic reduction aims to arrive at the necessary essence, while induction aims to arrive at the necessary law. Both approaches assume the contingency of facts and thus aim to reach a realm of necessity. Merleau-Ponty stated that these aims were entirely false because facts and essences are two indissoluble aspects of one and the same field of experience:

The necessities by essence will not be the "answer" philosophy calls for, any more than are the facts. The "answer" is higher than the "facts," lower than the "essences," in the wild Being where they were, and-- behind or beneath the cleavages of our acquired culture-- continue to be, undivided (1968: 121).

Consequently, Merleau-Ponty argued that Husserl's conceptions of essence and "pure essence" did not provide for philosophical certainty. Rather, perception is our primordial contact with Being and the world; therefore, perception is our final basis for certainty.¹⁰

From his first book to his last, Merleau-Ponty's overriding interest was in primary perception, as is evident in his repeated appeal to illustrations taken from language and art, phenomena through which we are enabled to grasp the world in a primary expression or gesture. In relation to his elucidation of the primary world, his discussions of the secondary world of science, a world based on abstraction from the primary world, appear fragmentary and incomplete. By way of summary, then, the first phenomenological reflection in Merleau-Ponty's sense consists of an attempt to study the Lebenswelt, free from scientific interpretations and philosophic preconceptions. The second phenomenological reflection is an attempt to account for our contact with the phenomena by turning this reflection toward the relation between the world and the subject to which it appears--the perceiver (Spiegelberg, 1971a: 537-38). For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy is phenomenology. And a basic characteristic of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is the attempt to bring it down from the level of pure consciousness into the world of concrete life, that is, to incarnate it in individual and social human existence. Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty wanted to reduce the constituted or founded phenomena to

the original (constituent or founding) phenomena. But, no matter how profoundly we penetrate into the subject via the reduction, we always find the world. Our existence is interwoven with and in dialogue with the world. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty's most significant contribution is his theory of the body-subject, in relation to which all phenomenological data can be interpreted. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is primary, and the body is our "perceiving perceptible."

CRITIQUE AND IMPLICATIONS

While the third chapter of this inquiry ended with a note on the unity of Husserlian phenomenology, the analysis in the fourth chapter does not leave the reader with the impression that a common denominator can be found within the phenomenological movement. In the works of Heidegger, and later in Sartre, phenomenology has been accused of renouncing itself and becoming ontology. Heidegger departed from Husserl by questioning the claim as to the absolute irreducibility of the Transcendental Ego. Thus Heidegger surpassed phenomenology by seeking to uncover a fundamental ontology. As a result, Heidegger plunged back into the fullness of a mystical nothingness.

In rejecting the phenomenological epoché, Sartre transformed Husserl's theory of consciousness into a philosophy of nihilation. According to the Sartrean view, the world cannot be in consciousness as Husserl would have it, but consciousness is in the world, as Heidegger has shown. Although Sartre claimed to have "liberated" consciousness by radicalizing Husserl's phenomenological method, in effect, Sartre has done little more than explicate the existential dimension which lay

dormant in Husserl's program. Thus, in his effort to avoid the idealistic implications of the phenomenological epoché, Sartre failed to acknowledge his debt to Husserl's method. Finally, it was Merleau-Ponty who explicated the indebtedness of existentialist philosophy to phenomenological method.

In attempting to grasp phenomenology at its source, Merleau-Ponty turned directly to the Husserlian conceptualization. Yet, Merleau-Ponty reinterpreted phenomenological concepts to suit his own purposes. For him the phenomenological epoché is not a return to a transcendental consciousness before which the world unfolds itself. On the contrary, the epoché is the formula for an existential philosophy of a subject welded to the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological reduction served to reveal the perceptual world.

Although our survey of post-Husserlian phenomenologists is far from panoramic, enough has been said to question whether or not a common denominator could possibly be found for the phenomenological movement. Perhaps a common denominator can best be sought through a negative characterization of post-Husserlian positions.

Common to the positions of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty is the tendency to shift attention away from the strictness of method found in Husserl of the Ideas. Existential leanings become more obvious in Husserl's later works; thus many post-Husserlian phenomenologists departed from the later as opposed to the earlier Husserlian writings in an effort to avoid the idealistic tendencies. Another commonality is that Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty all shifted attention to the subjective as opposed to objective world. Rather than mediating between,

or transcending above, the subject-object dichotomy, preference was given to the subjective component. In contra-distinction, Husserl had always demanded that philosophy be generated according to the canons of a "rigorous science." Heidegger and Sartre had reintroduced the ontological component which Husserl had suspended. However, this reintroduction took the form of a replacement of, rather than complement to, phenomenology. While Merleau-Ponty had correctly pointed to the relevance of a phenomenology of perception, he had failed to advance beyond a perceptual to a linguistically based phenomenology.

The phenomenological philosophy of Paul Ricoeur emerges (both chronologically and developmentally) as a refinement and elaboration of phenomenological method. Ricoeur's program recaptures the common denominator implicit but confounded in the works of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty: that, initially, phenomenology must begin with the strictness of method found in Husserl of the Ideas. In Ricoeur's view, phenomenology can point toward the threshold of ontology. According to Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty had recognized the importance of the question of language; however, his views on language were ill-formulated and prematurely released. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty, by too exclusively proposing a return to the speaking subject, placed the phenomenological attitude in opposition to the objective attitude. Hence, in formulating a theory of language, Merleau-Ponty excluded any connection with modern semiotics (Ricoeur, 1967a: 11). That Ricoeur's program could emerge as a more refined phenomenological program than those preceding him is implied in Merleau-Ponty's admission that the phenomenological movement is never complete but continually emerging. According to Merleau-Ponty,

the incompleteness of phenomenology and its inchoative appearance are not the signs of failure; they are inevitable because the task of phenomenology is to reveal the mystery of the world and the mystery of reason (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: xxi).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

¹ Having been a promising student under Husserl, Heidegger's departure from the strict canons of Husserl's phenomenological method was a bitter disappointment to his teacher. Apparently, Husserl attributed Heidegger's deviation to his failure to properly transcend the realm of the natural attitude. By substituting human ek-sistence for the pure and transcendental ego, Heidegger transformed phenomenology into a "philosophical anthropology" which suffered from the same weakness as older, well-known forms of psychologism.

² Heidegger agrees with both Husserl and Brentano before Husserl that intentionality is the presupposition of the phenomenological perspective. However, Heidegger expanded the framework within which intentionality operates.

³ Although there are developmental changes in Heidegger's method, there is no reason to doubt the mainspring of his thought. Heidegger is interested in being per se and has been consistent in this regard from the publication of Being and Time.

⁴ Heidegger's growing sense of the relevance of language cannot be over-stressed. It is interesting to note that Being and Time was only a fragment of the initial task that Heidegger proposed for his philosophical investigations. Why was this project (as initially conceived) not followed through? Heidegger's answer seems to rest not only on the supreme difficulties of the task, but also on the immense problems of language (Wild, 1955: 177).

⁵ According to Arne Naess (1968: 270), this answer paved the way for Sartre's own species of phenomenological analysis which we find in Being and Nothingness.

⁶ Merleau-Ponty (1962: xiv) noted that the phenomenological reduction belongs to existential philosophy, and that Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" appears only against the background of the phenomenological reduction. However, one must remain aware of the differences between Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of "being-in-the-world." In the final analysis, Merleau-Ponty argued that Heidegger's "world" is not a social world at all, but parallels Sartre's world in which men are alienated from one another (Rabil, 1967: 40-41).

⁷ According to Kockelmans (1967c: 354), it is apparent in Merleau-Ponty's many publications that his version of phenomenology remains closer to Husserl's original ideas than does the phenomenological programs of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, or Jean-Paul Sartre.

⁸ For a more complete discussion of eidetic reduction, the reader is referred back to Chapter 3.

⁹ Merleau-Ponty recognized that Husserl's philosophy is a philosophy of meaning. However, Husserl is not looking for the meaning which reveals itself as a matter of fact, but for absolute and necessary meaning. That is, Husserl wanted to locate a nuclei of meaning which would make the whole field of meaning comprehensible. Also, Husserl views beings, but only insofar as they are meaningful. It does not interest him whether the meaningful beings do or do not exist. He simply transforms Being into meaning (Kwant, 1967b: 398).

¹⁰ It is interesting to note that even Cartesian methodic doubting cannot escape this fact. Descartes based his so-called absolute certainty on the cogito, but this cogito is also commingled with facts. The cogito would not exist in the manner in which Descartes experiences it if man did not speak. We are certain because we are involved in Being. This involvement is a clarity which is essentially commingled with facts. We cannot arrive at a reasonable certainty that is completely free of all facts (Kwant, 1967b: 396-97). This is why Husserl did not doubt Being, but simply circumvented the question of Being by bracketing it.

CHAPTER 5

THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAUL RICOEUR

The phenomenological reductions make it possible for the mind to discover its own nature; originally lost in the world, the mind can find itself again by means of these reductions.

--Joseph Kockelmans (1967a: 222)

The "hermeneutic circle" is born: to believe is to listen to the call, but to hear the call we must interpret the message. Thus we must believe in order to understand and understand in order to believe.

--Paul Ricoeur (1970 : 525)

While most post-Husserlian phenomenologists abandoned the strict phenomenological canons of Husserl's Ideas and departed from the later or so-called Lebenswelt Husserl, Paul Ricoeur maintains that the Husserl of the Ideas must not be played down in favor of the Husserl of the very last period (Ihde, 1971: 4-5). Ricoeur contends that the phenomenological reduction is the straight and narrow gate to phenomenology; therefore, he is concerned with analyzing and evaluating the idealistic interpretation of phenomenology which reaches its high point in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations. Ricoeur's phenomenological method arises from a criticism of both Husserlian pure phenomenology and of existential phenomenology. While existential phenomenology broke the bounds of Husserl's transcendental idealism in its application of phenomenological method to such problems as the lived body, intersubjectivity, and human freedom, Ricoeur's phenomenology opens the way for a second breaking of the bounds under the sign of hermeneutics (Ihde, 1971: 7).

For Ricoeur, it is impossible that man may know himself directly. It is only by a series of detours that he learns about the fullness and complexity of his own being and of his relationship to Being. This emphasis upon mediation pervades the whole of Ricoeur's methodology from the early structural phenomenology to the later hermeneutic phenomenology. Ricoeur's application of phenomenology to language, the turn to hermeneutic phenomenology, finds its justification in a need to elaborate concepts indirectly and dialectically rather than directly and univocally (Ihde, 1971: 6-7). According to Ricoeur, the importance of language

cannot be over-emphasized:

This detour through the science of language is not something one can choose or not choose to make: it is essential to phenomenology today if it is to survive. For the philosophical front is shifting. Merleau-Ponty fought on two fronts: that of reflective philosophy in its rationalist and neo-Kantian version, and that of behaviorist and objectivist psychology. These are not the main issues today, which are rather in the sphere of the very precise and vigorous epistemological models which have made their appearance in linguistics, with Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev, and have spread to all the human sciences (1967a: 14).

To conclude this introduction, Ricoeur's phenomenology can be characterized as the movement from a structural to a hermeneutic stand.

For purposes of the present inquiry, the search for an answer to the question of what is phenomenology is terminated within the framework of Ricoeur's philosophical program. The following discussion aims to delineate the primary elements of Ricoeur's phenomenological method. These elements will later serve as criteria for the analysis of the methodologies of selected social action theorists (see Part III). Thus Ricoeur's program will help to clarify the nature of phenomenology insofar as it is relevant for considering the possibility of a human science on a phenomenological basis. As a prelude to the subsequent discussion, our main contention is that Ricoeur's phenomenological method contains three relevant elements. These three elements are parallel (but not equivalent) to three features proposed by Stephan Strasser as characteristic of phenomenological philosophy; that it is hermeneutic, dialectic, and intuitive (1963: 249).

BACKGROUND TO RICOEUR'S PHILOSOPHY¹

Ricoeur recognizes three legitimate forms of phenomenology (Kant, Hegel, Husserl) and defines his own position in relation to them (Spiegelberg, 1971a: 572). The common denominator of these three forms is their concern with the manner in which things appear, while suspending temporarily or permanently the question of their being. In Kant, Ricoeur discerns an implicit critical phenomenology in the study of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. However, this critical phenomenology remained latent because Kant's studies lacked concrete descriptions; and, furthermore, Kant became sidetracked by his preoccupation with the problem of a priori knowledge. With reference to Hegel, Ricoeur is attracted to the close connection Hegel maintains to ontology. Although Ricoeur's position is geared toward Husserl, Ricoeur does not want to eliminate ontology as Husserl had advocated. Hegelian and Kantian "phenomenology" are used by Ricoeur to establish limits to the Husserlian pure phenomenology.

Like most post-Husserlian phenomenologists, Ricoeur contends that Husserl's metaphysical decision in favor of idealism led directly to the problem of transcendental solipsism. Husserl had clearly failed to resolve the persistent tension between idealistic and realistic tendencies. Parallel to Husserl, Ricoeur seeks to resolve the tension between two extreme alternatives:

Ricoeur's hermeneutics is phenomenological in its form and in its aim. Just as Husserl before him fought to create a philosophy which avoided the problems of both realism and idealism in relation to more traditional epistemology and metaphysics, so Ricoeur seeks to create

a philosophy of language which avoids today's major alternatives of romanticism and formalism

The hermeneutic turn is that direction which attempts to go between formalism and romanticism and to formulate a phenomenology of language which exceeds both the Husserlian and existential versions of phenomenology (Ihde, 1971: 162).

Although highly critical of the Husserlian program, Ricoeur stresses the importance of not favoring the Lebenswelt or Crisis Husserl over the Husserl of the Ideas.

While translating Ideas I, Ricoeur developed a strong respect for the pre-Crisis Husserl.² In the Ideas, Ricoeur found the strictness of method that he sought and from which he maintains that any phenomenology going beyond Husserl must begin. Husserl's assistant and critic, Eugen Fink, held that the primary theme of Ideas was that of the "origin of the world" in transcendental subjectivity. Although Ricoeur does not disagree with Fink, Ricoeur's translation of Ideas I led him to conclude that this is not the primary theme (Ballard, 1967: xv). Instead, the theme of the "origin of the world" is a guide to Husserl's general philosophical aim, which is to unveil the ego and its constitutive function. According to Ricoeur, the world, originating in transcendental subjectivity, is to be viewed as a limitation placed upon the ego. The world is the index of the ego's possibilities. Hence Ricoeur's interpretation of Ideas situates it within the perspective defined by the Cartesian Meditations.

The Ideas I describes an ascending path which leads to what Husserl calls the reduction of "suspension" of the natural thesis of the world (Ricoeur, 1967b: 16). This reduction is also a conversion of the

subject itself which frees it from the limitation of the natural attitude. The subject which is hidden from itself as part of the world discovers itself as the foundation of the world. Thus, for Ricoeur, to discover the transcendental subject is precisely to found believing in the world (Ricoeur, 1967b: 26). The movement from Husserl to Ricoeur is a movement toward the suspicion that radicalness in philosophy is not to be attained by way of an egology without ontology. The self and the world stand in a delicate balance.

The necessity to retain ontology reflects the limits Ricoeur sees in Husserl's phenomenological method, especially when it approaches the range of involuntary phenomena, or mystery. The influence of Gabriel Marcel on Ricoeur's intellectual development enters here.³ Marcel's central intuition, expressed in the concept of "incarnation," is precisely one of an ultimate ontological unity of man's being-in-the-world and so stands in clear contrast to the dichotomy of subject and object. For Marcel, the problem is neither one of relating the subject and the object, nor of reducing one of them to the other, but rather one of describing the polar structure of their ultimate unity (Ricoeur, 1966: xiii). Ricoeur accepts Marcel's basic insight of the ultimate unity of subject and object in incarnation, but, unlike Marcel, Ricoeur finds that Husserlian phenomenology provides an adequate methodological tool for elaborating a philosophy of man's being-in-the-world. The question arises as to how Ricoeur proposed to employ the phenomenological method and what modifications he made. The shift from phenomenology to existential phenomenology points to some of the limitations and difficulties of Husserl's philosophy.

In his essay on "Existential Phenomenology," Ricoeur notes that the existentialist theme of the owned and lived body places a limit upon the Husserlian method of reduction. Neither the body, through which I am inserted in the world, nor its involuntary behavior, will allow for our suspension of their existence. The theory of the "owned body" is the critical point where the breakdown of objective thinking is consummated and where the perspectivist doctrine of perception is established (Ricoeur, 1967b: 209). Yet this recognition was not solely post-Husserlian. In the works and manuscripts of the last ten years, Husserlian phenomenology became more existential to the degree that the problem of perception took precedence over all other problems. In the later Husserl, perception is described as the initial basis and genetic origin of all operations of consciousness (Ricoeur, 1967b: 204).

"Existenz philosophie" influenced Ricoeur's early intellectual endeavors which were aimed at formulating a concrete philosophy of human existence. However, Ricoeur's interests shifted away from specifically existentialist tasks:

While he began his career with an open and friendly attitude toward the existentialist philosophies, during ten years of teaching he found his general sympathies tempered by more traditional emphases which eventually moved him further from existentialism (Ihde, 1971: 9).

For Ricoeur, the inner telos of all philosophy is rationality; and even if the existentialists do not recognize it, Ricoeur maintains that their main contribution is the discovery of a new dimension of rationality. The phenomenology termed "existential" is not another division juxtaposed to transcendental phenomenology, but, rather, this phenomenology is a method placed in the service of the problems concerning existence

(Ricoeur, 1967b: 203). Ricoeur sees existential phenomenology as a transition between transcendental phenomenology and an as yet unspecified "phenomenology open to ontology." But before elaborating this turn, it is relevant to briefly indicate some of Ricoeur's criticisms of specific writers affiliated with existential phenomenology.

Although Ricoeur approves of Heidegger's enlargement of the sense of "world," his sympathy with Heidegger is limited. As early as the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger transcended the central demands of Husserl's conception of intentionality (Spiegelberg, 1971a: 566). To the contrary, Ricoeur contends that Husserl's conception of intentionality as consciousness of something must remain central to phenomenological method. With reference to Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, Ricoeur is in agreement with their critical attitudes toward Husserl's transcendental idealism. However, Ricoeur criticizes Merleau-Ponty for exclusively orienting himself to the Lebenswelt Husserl. Merleau-Ponty's neglect of the Husserl of the Ideas tends to make phenomenology solely a study of existential significations. And while Ricoeur supports (with some reservations) Sartre's conceptions of intentionality and imagination, Ricoeur disagrees with Sartre's philosophy of freedom as essentially negation (1967b: 210-11).

Central to Ricoeur is the motif of reconciliation--a reconciliation of man with himself, his body, and the world. Behind this motif lies Ricoeur's vaster scheme for a "reconciled ontology" (Ihde, 1971: 8). Starting with the fundamental philosophical experience of man as a broken unity, Ricoeur moves on, by way of a second and ontological reflection upon the "fault" within human will, to approach a hermeneutic of the myth of evil and an ontology of the fault which characterizes the human

person and is perceptible even prior to the élaboration of an ethic. Thus Ricoeur's philosophy opens up another possibility. Ricoeur contends that phenomenology itself contains a naïveté:

The "constitutive" character of consciousness is a conquest of criticism over naturalistic (or mundane) naïveté. But the transcendental level thus won conceals a second-level naïveté--the naïveté of criticism which consists in considering the "transcendental," the "constitutive," as the absolutely irreducible (1967b: 228).

As a consequence, Ricoeur seeks to radicalize phenomenology itself by uncovering the naïveté of transcendental phenomenology. If reaching transcendental phenomenology can be characterized as a "first Copernican Revolution," then a "second Copernican Revolution" is needed to pass from transcendental phenomenology to ontological phenomenology in order to remove the ego from the center of ontological concern (1967b: 232-33). The problem is how to do this without returning to the naive objectivism which transcendental phenomenology initially overthrew. In an attempt to contend with this problem, Ricoeur outlines a general format for his philosophical career--a project of the Philosophy of the Will. In the context of the execution of this project, Ricoeur's singular contribution to the development of a phenomenological method is unfolding.

INTRODUCTION TO RICOEUR'S PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRAM: PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL

The following discussion outlines the general scope and direction of Paul Ricoeur's projected philosophical program--"Philosophy of the Will." Ricoeur, in approaching the problem of incarnation and of being-in-the-world, relies heavily on Husserlian phenomenological method. Thus the entire philosophical program is conducted within phenomenological

brackets as an intentional analysis. Although it is risky to discuss Ricoeur's still-continuing contribution to the refinement of Husserlian method, the task is undertaken, since Ricoeur's unique perspective on phenomenological method is most understandable within the broader context of his projected life's work. The general scheme of Ricoeur's program is presented in Table 1 below.

Ricoeur's grandiose project for a Philosophy of the Will took its inception from Husserl of the Ideas.

At several points in Ideas I Husserl indicates that the problems of the will could and should be entirely repeated and recast by the method of intentional analysis which had already borne its first fruits on the level of the perceptual consciousness and more generally on the level of objectivating acts. He outlined this transposition of the method to the "affective and volitive subjective processes" in two directions. Phenomenology applied to these new subjective processes will first have to exemplify the universality of intentional analysis, and in particular the universality of the distinction between *noema* and *noesis* (Ricoeur, 1967b: 213).

Based upon Husserl's suggestions, Ricoeur projected a three-phase philosophical program which is still being elaborated (see Table 1).

The task of Phase 1 (Eidetics of the Will) is a phenomenological description of the essential or eidetic structures of man's being-in-the-world. The main aim is to vindicate the relevance of an intentional analysis of man's fundamental possibilities (Ricoeur, 1967b: 214). The analysis of man's "fundamental possibilities" or "structures" of the will is conducted with a double bracketing which excludes both the dimension of fault and the dimension of Transcendence. Through eidetic bracketing, Ricoeur is able to separate the essential structure of man's being-in-the-world from its special existential characteristics.

Table 1

Ricoeur's Projected Philosophical Program:
Philosophy of the Will

Categories	PHASE 1: Eidetics of the Will	PHASE 2: Empirics of the Will	PHASE 3: Poetics of the Will	
			Initial Phase	Main Phase
Major Representative Publication(s) (English translations)	Freedom and Nature	Fallible Man The Symbolism of Evil	Freud and Philosophy	? None Yet
Level of Analysis	Descriptive Analysis (eidetic reduction)	Transcendental Constitution	?	Ontological Phenomenology (Ontology of Consciousness)
Theme	Intentional Analysis of Man's Fundamental Possibilities	Existential Possibility of Evil Attempt to Reach the Pre-reflexive Experience of Fact of Evil	Outlines Theory of Symbolic Expression and Hermeneutic Interpretation	Aims to Determine Status of Consciousness in Total Framework of Being
Methodology (according to Ihde, 1971)	Structural Phenomenology	Structural Phenomenology Hermeneutic Phenomenology	Hermeneutic Phenomenology	Ontological Phenomenology

Yet, in spite of the extensive use he makes of Husserl, Ricoeur is scrupulously careful to avoid any reduction of the world to the subject. Ricoeur presents his basic methodological principle, through which he seeks to avoid either reduction or polarization of subject and object, in the somewhat cryptic formula that "the voluntary is by reason of the involuntary while the involuntary is for the voluntary." In other words, voluntary and involuntary stand in a reciprocal relation. This relation could be paraphrased into less precise but more familiar terminology by saying that while nature makes freedom actual, freedom makes nature meaningful, and neither can ultimately be separated from the other (Kohák, 1966: xv).

This basic principle of reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary also serves as Ricoeur's guide in bridging the gap between phenomenology and the empirical human sciences. The distinction permits Ricoeur to differentiate description and explanation. According to Ricoeur, the involuntary has no meaning of its own. Only the relation between voluntary and involuntary is intelligible. Description is defined as understanding in terms of the relation between voluntary and involuntary (1967b: 218). This is why Ricoeur begins with a description of the voluntary aspect, after which he considers what involuntary structures are needed to make that act or that aspect of the will intelligible. Hence the first task posed is to distinguish the most "natural articulations of willing" (1966: 6). The articulations of willing are the guide into the realm of the involuntary. And entry into this realm proceeds by application of the Husserlian maxim that intentionality is consciousness; and, furthermore, that consciousness is always

consciousness of something. In Ricoeur's terms, the articulations of "the willed" as correlate of willing is precisely what directs our description (1966: 7).

In general terms, Ricoeur's theory of the voluntary and the involuntary is one of understanding how a distinctive understanding of subjective structures of the voluntary and an encompassing sense of the mystery of incarnation mutually complete and limit each other. This aim is exemplified in Freedom and Nature where the task is to understand the mystery as reconciliation, that is, as restoration, even on the clearest level of consciousness, of the original concord of vague consciousness with its body and its world. In this sense, the theory of the voluntary and involuntary not only describes and understands but also restores (Ricoeur, 1966: 18-19). Ricoeur's study of the voluntary and the involuntary is a limited contribution to a far broader scheme which would be a reconciled ontology.

In the second phase of Ricoeur's program (Empirics of the Will), the eidetic brackets imposed in Phase 1 are removed. The subject matter is actual existence, or a descriptive phenomenology of existence as it is reflected in consciousness. The shift from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is expressed by Ricoeur in these words:

The analytical description of overlapping intentionalities within the willing consciousness is only a first stage for phenomenology. There remains the task of recapturing the whole movement of consciousness opening from the future, making its landscape with its deeds, and working through what it has not done. The question of the interpretation of the whole of the life of consciousness arises in this passage from intentional analysis to existential synthesis (1967b: 220).

Although the eidetic brackets are removed, the phenomenological brackets remain since the approach still begins with an intentional analysis. Furthermore, the question of ontology is still suspended.

The two representative publications of Phase 2 are Ricoeur's Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil. Fallible Man examines the existential possibility of evil; however, it is limited in that this work does not yet reach the level of the experienced fact of evil. This limitation opened the way for the methodological shift from structural phenomenology to hermeneutic phenomenology, marked by the publication of The Symbolism of Evil. In this work, an attempt is made to reach the very experience of evil, not as a reflexive formulation in consciousness which removes it to the level of possibility but as a pre-reflexive experience of the fact of evil. It is in symbolic expressions of evil and their systematization in myths that a concrete experience presents itself for philosophical analysis.

In this second phase, the phenomenology of the will revises Husserlian transcendentalism in a more existential direction but does not overthrow it (Ricoeur, 1967b: 228). Unlike the existentialists, Ricoeur rejects neither traditional philosophy nor empirical science, but rather makes extensive use of both. Since freedom is incarnate in nature, empirical description of nature is prima facie relevant evidence for philosophy. But, since philosophy, as Ricoeur understands it, is intentional analysis of the subject's being-in-the-world, it has to approach empirical science "diagnostically," as a description of "symptoms," that is, description of the ways in which the cogito becomes actual in the world, and apply it to its own question, the question of the

underlying intentional structure manifest through the objective form. The term diagnostics refers to this process of uncovering intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions (Kohák, 1966: xv).

Similarly, the "hermeneutics" to which Ricoeur turns at length in Freud and Philosophy⁴ is a complement to diagnostics on the other end of the spectrum. While the term diagnostics refers to uncovering intentional structures or meanings latent in objective, empirical description, so hermeneutics refers to the uncovering of latent meanings of symbolic and mystical expressions of experience (Kohák, 1966: xv-xvi). Thus Freud and Philosophy signals the movement into Phase 3 (Poetics of the Will) of Ricoeur's philosophical program. This work takes up the question left unresolved at the end of The Symbolism of Evil, namely the relationship between a hermeneutics of symbols and a philosophy of concrete reflection (Ricoeur, 1970: xii). To be more precise, Freud and Philosophy is a propaedeutic to Phase 3 since this work outlines a theory of symbolic expression and hermeneutic interpretation but does not reach the level of ontological phenomenology, or an ontology of consciousness.

In Phase 3 per se (for which no major publication as yet has appeared), a "poetics" of the will shall determine the status of consciousness in the total framework of being. Ricoeur expresses the problem for a properly ontological phenomenology as follows:

Here our problem is to show the resources of a phenomenology of the will in the movement toward the threshold of ontology. Phenomenology has, in fact, its own way of eliciting the transition to the problem of the being of the human existent by unveiling a specific non-being of the will, an ontological deficiency belonging to the will (1967b: 228).

The task of an ontological phenomenology is to distinguish intentional analysis of the vision of a reconciled humanity from "poetry." In a basic sense of the word, poetry is the art of conjuring up the world as created. It is in effect the order of creation which description holds in suspension. The task of the "poetics" is the evocation of the vision of Transcendence and reconciliation. A phenomenology of man's being-in-the-world remains incomplete as long as it does not include an intentional analysis of the vision. But again the poetics of the will continues to operate within phenomenological brackets. The question of the ontological status of Transcendence and reconciliation remains in suspension (Kohák, 1966: xvi).

In order to prepare an understanding of the Poetic, we need to strive at length to understand freedom as a rule over motives, powers, and even over the necessity built into its very heart (Ricoeur, 1966: 30). There is no thinkable system of freedom and Transcendence, any more than of freedom and nature. The paradox of freedom and Transcendence can be sustained only as a mystery which it is the task of poetics to discern (Ricoeur, 1966: 33). The abstraction of the fault and of Transcendence makes it possible to restore the meaning of freedom understood as a dialogue with nature. Such abstraction is necessary in order to understand as much as possible the paradox and the mystery of incarnate freedom.

The turn to an ontological phenomenology presents a danger in that such a turn may return one to the rule of the object which transcendental phenomenology had to overcome in the first place. In the following section, a more intensive examination is made of Ricoeur's shift from the methodology of structural phenomenology to that of hermeneutic phenomenology.

RICOEUR'S METHODOLOGY: A SHIFT FROM STRUCTURAL TO HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

The general strategy of opposing two sides of a polarity leading to a limit concept is a major tactic of Ricoeur's thought. A dialectic of oppositions, limited in a third term, remains the hallmark of Ricoeur's method:

In the play and counterplay of phenomenology and counter-phenomenology Ricoeur seeks to isolate latent phenomenologies from their objectivist contexts and to provide a critique which destroys the naïveté of the objectivist attitude toward the subject. But in the same play and counterplay a set of limits ultimately shows that the countermethods may not be taken up into a centrally weighed focus. The dialectic remains one of only partly overlapped circles (Ihde, 1971: 16).

In Ricoeur's view all methods are dialectically limited and are founded through the discovery of limits. To discover the limits of a method opens the possibility of exceeding that method.

Don Ihde (1971) has distinguished two phases in Ricoeur's methodological development--an earlier "structural phenomenology" followed by a later "hermeneutic phenomenology." Ricoeur has both vindicated Ihde's classification and attempted to account for this methodological shift. According to Ricoeur, this shift is partly a response to historical changes in philosophical problematics:

At first I was absorbed by the question: What is will? I took it as equivalent to the question undertaken by Merleau-Ponty: What is perception? It was thus that the relation voluntary-involuntary became the center of gravity for all other questions. Today the relationship between speech and action (or saying-doing) seems to me to be more encompassing. The question of language is thus no longer simply a milieu in which a discourse on action can be articulated; it is a mode of being, a pole of existence as fundamental as action itself. A new equilibrium between saying and doing must be sought,

but it has not yet been found. It will give the future "Poetics of the Will" an entirely different aspect from the one which was initially foreseen (1971: xiv).

The shift from structural to hermeneutic phenomenology entails a movement from the study of the structures of experience to the study of concrete expressions in symbols and myths that man makes concerning his existence. In other words, the hermeneutic turn shifts attention to the question of language, commencing with symbolic discourse. Ricoeur holds that the interpretation of symbols is the focal point for all hermeneutics today. The need to understand symbolic discourse is the theme for Ricoeur's entry into the philosophy of language. The hermeneutic turn finds its justification in a need to elaborate concepts indirectly and dialectically rather than directly and univocally.

The elaboration of a hermeneutic phenomenology arises in conjunction with Ricoeur's aim to radicalize all phenomenology. While the Husserlian phenomenological epoché served to dispel the naivety of the standpoint of the natural attitude, the question arises as to the possible naivety of the phenomenological epoché itself. Ricoeur wants to dispel this second naivety (i.e., radicalize all phenomenology) by a final "reading" of the will in a "poetics" which would displace the subject from its self-made circle. This "poetics," hermeneutic in its mode of indirectness, has not yet been formulated. However, the need for this poetics has been anticipated from the outset of Ricoeur's philosophical program; and, furthermore, its demands have been clarified in the publication of Freud and Philosophy (Ihde, 1971: 19).⁵ In the subsequent discussion, the salient features of Ricoeur's methodology are outlined, illustrating some of the chronological alterations to Ricoeur's

method as it shifts from a structural to hermeneutic phenomenology.

The structural phenomenology of Freedom and Nature anticipates Ricoeur's subsequent hermeneutics. In the dialectical conflict between phenomenological and objective universes of discourse, a latent hermeneutics emerges. By the so-called method of diagnostic,⁶ the findings of phenomenology are played off against the findings of objective studies. The purpose is to indirectly gain a better understanding of the movement from existence to objectivity in which the subject becomes alienated from the full sense of its experience.

The latent hermeneutics is anticipated in two ways: (1) the diagnostic is the methodological anticipation of a general dialectic which permeates all of Ricoeur's thought, and (2) the playing off of the findings of phenomenology against the findings of objective studies raises the question as to how the subject can assimilate more than one perspective. The answer to this question is found in the movement toward the formulation of a new perspective which raises the two opposing perspectives to a different level (Ihde, 1971: 55-56). In brief, the methodological lesson from Freedom and Nature is that fundamental possibilities of the will have both an upper ideality limit and a lower obscurity limit. And, furthermore, these structural limits can be interpreted "in a Kantian sense."

Fallible Man begins from this Kantian sense of limits as it elevates structural phenomenology to a higher level. The appeal to a Kantian idea as a limit concept is employed by Ricoeur in an attempt to eliminate the transcendental idealism which is inherent in the Husserlian version of phenomenology. By casting phenomenology in

a Kantian interpretive framework, the cogito is prevented from making a circle with itself, hence phenomenology is stopped short of becoming fully idealistic (Ihde, 1971: 59). According to Ricoeur, the Kantian foundation and limit is provided by a return to the distinction between intention and intuition. In Husserlian terms this means that an intention need not be fulfilled since empty intentions are permissible. Ricoeur makes the strong claim that all intentions stop short of total fulfillment (Ihde, 1971: 60). Thus, the Kantian interpretation limits transcendence to an intentionality without total fulfillment.

In general, Fallible Man remains on the side of a structural phenomenology, and its task is to do a "phenomenology of fallibility" as the fundamental possibility of human will (Ihde, 1971: 66). The goal of Fallible Man is to understand the structures of the will as a totality, but its achievement is not to be taken as a fundamental ontology. Ricoeur limits structural phenomenology so that it remains short of a deduction of man's actual experience of evil and suffering. Instead, Ricoeur investigates the realm of expressions of evil under the sign of Fault (Ihde, 1971: 80).

With the publication of The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur begins a detour into a mythics which is concerned with religious confession of experienced evil and suffering. Methodologically speaking, this publication begins the turn to hermeneutics in the full sense of interpretation.⁷ Hermeneutics presupposes that a "text" or an "expression" has something to say which in turn can be interpreted or resaid in another way. In Ricoeur's view, hermeneutics is a "reading" or a "listening" to what is said (Ihde, 1971: 83). Hermeneutics is the

specific way in which Ricoeur opens up the problem of language. For Ricoeur, symbols and myths are the primitives of language; hence, to uncover the symbol is to locate the "fullness of language" since, presumably, symbols enigmatically house language. In The Symbolism of Evil, the study of language is limited to expressions dealing with the symbols and myths of evil. The symbolic language of the confessions of evil is the field of understanding Fault as the existential situation of man. Experience is read through the expressions of anguish found in the confessions of evil (Ihde, 1971: 95).

Ricoeur's overall aim is to "elevate symbols to the rank of existential concepts" (Ihde, 1971: 102). It is the symbol which reveals originary experience. The symbol reveals experience through expression; the myth interprets the expression which the symbol gives. The hermeneutic problem at this level is one of finding an interpretation which is adequate to the invariance of the symbol. Thus, the experience of evil must be interpreted in such a way as to retain the primary intentionalities of the symbol (Ihde, 1971: 129).

In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur discovered that the structure of symbols were multi-layered. While this work dealt with the cosmic aspects of symbolic discourse, Ricoeur's next major publication, Freud and Philosophy, pays attention to the psychic side of symbol structures. Hence, Freud and Philosophy continues the interrogation of symbolic meaning, thus sharpening the hermeneutic tool. In general, this publication serves as a propadeutic to a yet unwritten work which would reach the levels of poesis itself.

The two main goals of Freud and Philosophy are (1) to reinterpret philosophically Freud and his intellectual journey and (2) to elucidate certain relationships between language and the theory of the unconscious. In the latter instance, the particular aim is to relate the conception of the unconscious to a problem of interpretation (Ihde, 1971: 132).⁸

The method by which Ricoeur approaches these two tasks is to follow his general strategy of opposing two sides of a polarity leading to a limited third term. In Freud and Philosophy, the dialectic exhibits three distinct moments. The first moment is one of opposition, focussing on the debate between a hermeneutics of belief and a counter-hermeneutics of suspicion. While "belief" serves to restore lost meaning, "suspicion" serves to guard against illusion or false consciousness. The second moment of the dialectic is one of approximation. Concern is on the indirectness of method, specifically with a comparison of Husserl's phenomenological reductions as they approximate the Freudian theory of the unconscious. The third moment is the Hegelian moment which in Ricoeur's usage restores a radicalized understanding of the symbol and the subject.

The effect of the three moments of the dialectic is twofold. First, the Freudian perspective, by limiting and radicalizing phenomenology, serves to limit the phenomenological tendency toward transcendental idealism. Second, the Freudian radicalization of phenomenology is counterbalanced by a "new phenomenology" which emerges from the Hegelian position. Ricoeur does not aim to fuse Freud and Hegel but, rather, to show that both the Freudian and Hegelian positions meet in the movement of becoming self-conscious:

Whereas Hegel links an explicit teleology of mind or spirit to an implicit archeology of life and desire, Freud links a thematized archeology of the unconscious to an unthematized teleology of the process of becoming conscious. I do not confuse Hegel with Freud, but I seek to find in Freud an inverted image of Hegel, in order to discern, with the help of this schema, certain dialectical features which, though obviously operative in analytic practice, have not found in the theory a complete systematic elaboration (Ricoeur, 1970: 461-62).

The detour into Freud as hermeneut provides a model for the regressive aim of decentering immediate consciousness by using a theory of the unconscious as the set of rules which provides the decentering. Its gain suggests an "archeology of reflection." But it is also necessary to recognize an antithesis to an archeology, an inverse side which is a progressive genesis of meaning through successive figures, each of which is understood from the one which follows. This model is provided by Hegelian hermeneutics with its progressive and teleological direction. Since these directions (regressive and progressive) are two sides of a single inversion, each is implied in the other. These two interpretations meet in a third term which is the symbol itself (Ricoeur, 1970: 495).

According to Ricoeur, the problem of the symbol is co-extensive with the problem of language (1970: 16). The reason for this equality of symbol and language is to be found in the concept of the "fullness of language." Presumably, the symbol already holds this fullness within itself enigmatically. The symbolic expression is the place within language where primitive experience and primitive expression meet. To understand the symbol calls for an understanding of a full architectonic of meaning.

Through the detour into Freud, Ricoeur claims an advance in understanding the enigmas of the symbol. Reread as rules of interpretation, the Freudian theory of the unconscious relates back to the problem of the symbol. The theory of the unconscious is a latent theory of language (a difficult and metaphorical language) which requires a reading aimed at revealing hidden meaning. The theory of the unconscious and the technique of indirectness in the therapeutic relationship combine as the "excess" of Freudianism which is not reducible to phenomenological reflection (Ricoeur, 1970: 406). Ricoeur employs this Freudian "excess" to radicalize phenomenology in order to circumvent the tendency toward transcendental idealism. However, Ricoeur is careful to counterbalance this "excess" of Freudian psychoanalysis. Hegel provides the counter-focus which aims at attaining a balance. In Freud, the coming to self-consciousness is the progressive counterpart to the regressive unfolding of the psyche. Hegel inverts Freud, and Ricoeur ultimately sides with Hegel. A progressive analysis of symbols and the self will have the last word in this redress of the Freudian "excess" (Ihde, 1971: 159).

The dialectical detour, which revealed the multiplicity of levels in symbols, ultimately parallels a basic phenomenological view. For Ricoeur the symbol is the concrete expression which has a multiple function (1970: 16). Translating this statement into phenomenological terms is to say that phenomena display multiple dimensions. That is, a phenomenon is almost always found to be richer than one initially might expect; that is, phenomena are multiple and complex in structure (Ihde, 1971: 161). The multiplicity of functions in symbols is not to



be considered problematic. Rather, the symbol allows for the possibility of carrying and engendering multiple and opposing interpretations, each of which is self-consistent (Ricoeur, 1970: 496).

DIRECTIVES FROM RICOEUR'S METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The following discussion presents: (1) a short summary of Ricoeur's program as discussed above, (2) the main emphasis in Ricoeur's thought since Freud and Philosophy, and (3) a concluding statement which briefs my interpretation of the essential features characterizing Ricoeur's methodic procedure.

In both its structural and hermeneutic modes, Ricoeur's phenomenology sought to establish a balance between the extremes of romanticism and formalism. In structural phenomenology, a fundamental possibility was seen to have both a "top" or ideality limit and a "bottom" or obscurity limit. The dialectical detour of hermeneutic phenomenology further demarcated these two limits. Freudian regressive hermeneutics established the "bottom" or obscurity limit; Hegelian progressive hermeneutics began to establish the "top" or ideality limit.

Ricoeur's tactic of inverting Hegel and Freud concluded with the designation of Freud and Hegel as two ends of a single scale of symbolization. The structure of symbols, which lies at the bottom or obscurity border of language, ascends from its base toward its ideal possibility which is the creation (poesis) of human possibilities.

Hermeneutics substitutes the natural world of the body and the thing for the cultural world of the symbol and the subject, a language world. The symbols as the "living words" of culture are the historical basis from

which man understands himself. The language world is the cultural lifeworld (Ihde, 1971: 163, emphasis added).

The fullness of language is a fundamental possibility inscribed in and upon the authentic symbols of historical cultures.

There are two related directives found in Ricoeur's interpretation of Husserl's view of language which are centrally employed by Ricoeur. First, language is essentially a mediation, a third term, situated between two limits or borders:

The first one, as we said, constitutes its ideal of logicity, its telos: all meanings must be able to be converted into the logos of rationality; the second one no longer constitutes an ideal, but a ground, a soil, an origin, an Ursprung. Language may be reached "from above," from its logical limit, or "from below," from its limit in mute and elemental experience. In itself it is a medium, a mediation, an exchange between Telos and Ursprung (Ricoeur, 1967c: 209).

Second, the phenomenological reduction is patterned upon a certain understanding of language. The way between limits attributes both a certain immanence and a certain transcendence to language (Ihde, 1971: 169). Language can be neither pure ideality nor a simple description of the generation of meaning from pre-linguistic experience. All language is already instituted as a breaking of any unity with natural surroundings.

These two directives, taken from Husserl, provide the platform from which Ricoeur distinguishes his own method from that of existential phenomenology and from the linguistic sciences. While he agrees with existential phenomenology for reraising the question of the subject and his experience, Ricoeur criticizes existential phenomenology for almost taking subjectivity for a direct ontology (Ihde, 1971: 170). This tendency excludes objectivist gains from the outset. Ricoeur attempts to take up

the debate with the linguistic sciences in such a manner as to include the findings of objective investigation.

Given the development of Ricoeur's philosophical program thus far, the final outcome remains germinal. However, it is relevant to note that Ricoeur has begun to reformulate the main idea of his last major publication, Freud and Philosophy. In a series of articles describing his more recent study of the linguistic disciplines, Ricoeur contends that his equation of the problem of symbol with that of language really is a problem more broadly within the realm of language. According to Ricoeur, he failed to see this in his study of the symbols of evil and the detour by way of Freud (Ihde, 1971: 167).

In his debate with the linguistic sciences,⁹ Ricoeur employs his familiar diagnostic method whereby one seeks to be informed by the findings of objectivism but never reduced to its methods. In this instance, the term "diagnostics" refers to the process of uncovering intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions. The result of Ricoeur's diagnostic investigation of structural linguistics is the de-mystification of the problem of the symbol. What Ricoeur discovers is that the symbol is not privileged because it is poetic, spontaneous, or polysemic. For that matter, all the words of an ordinary language have multiple significations.¹⁰ As a consequence, univocity rather than polysemy now emerges as problematic to Ricoeur. Nevertheless, the de-mystification of polysemy does not mean that the "mystery" of language has vanished.

But there is a mystery of language. It is that language says, says something, says something of being. If there is an enigma of symbolism it resides entirely at the level of manifestation where the equivocity of being becomes said in discourse (Ricoeur, quoted and translated by Ihde, 1971: 180).

For Ricoeur, the word is that instance of language which mediates between structure and event. Thus, the word in this mediating position, as a third term, is like the symbol. The mystery of the word (like that of the symbol) necessitates the turn toward an "ontology of language." To date, Ricoeur has not tackled this topic. However, as he is well aware, the topic cannot be circumvented since the "poetics" of the will and the broad conception of philosophy of language cross in the question of an ontology of language.¹¹

The question arises as to whether or not Ricoeur can ever reach an "ontology of language," especially through the use of his diagnostic method. Our contention is that Ricoeur will probably not succeed, especially through the use of the diagnostic, because to reach ontology likely requires a "leap of faith of language." Some remarks by Stephan Strasser (1963) are illuminating in this regard.

Strasser (1963: 241) maintains that it is characteristic of intellectual life in our time to desire broader and more profound knowledge. Metaphysical aspirations still remain relevant to modern man; however, the metaphysics suitable for 20th century man must emerge from a dialogue with the findings of positive science. In this regard, Strasser parallels Ricoeur. What the phenomenological philosopher offers the empirical human scientist is a meaningful vision of the facts of experience. Hence the specialist in empirical human sciences must become acquainted with the "language" of the philosopher. Yet, to provide a vision from the facts of experience the philosopher must be willing to listen to the empirical human scientist. As Strasser has succinctly stated:

. . . the specialist will have to be more than a mere specialist, and the metaphysical "dreamer" will have to be more than just a dreamer. Only then will the two be able to collaborate fruitfully (1963: 240-41).

The route to what Strasser has called the "third objectivity" depends upon acquiring a metaphysics which can utilize rather than reject positive scientific findings. Scientific illumination cannot be undone but only elevated to a higher level. However, as Strasser's historical vision suggests, the resolution of a metaphysical vision with scientific findings will require a very special effort.

Briefly summarized, this vision claims that in the past Western thought has ascended from the "natural" uniformity of archaic culture to the artificial uniformity of a universal scientific culture. From this artificial uniformity Western thought will have to risk the leap toward the free multiformity of a great metaphysical vision. The leap has to be made, for there is no other way up (1963: 242, emphasis added).

This conception of "leap" has relevance for Ricoeur, who anticipates from the outset the possibility that he may not be able to generate an "ontological phenomenology" without a "leap" or "act of faith."

Since Ricoeur's work is not complete, it is not fruitful to pursue the question as to whether or not Ricoeur will describe an "ontology of language." From Ricoeur's program (as it now stands), a number of directives arise which are important to the central task of this inquiry.

To recapitulate, the central task of this inquiry is to discern what phenomenology can contribute to sociological inquiry. The main contention is that phenomenology can contribute a method for the conceptualization of action. The thesis to be defended by this inquiry is that the phenomenological method is implicit in the methodological

positions of such eminent sociological theorists as Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. The inquiry now shifts its attention directly to this task.

The historical analysis of selected phenomenological positions has led us to the conclusion that the methodological program of Paul Ricoeur is relevant for our analysis of the methodologies of selected social action theorists. The principal reasons for this conclusion are as follows: (1) Although his method emerges from a critical assessment and refinement of Husserlian and existential phenomenological programs, Ricoeur's program still embodies the essential aims of phenomenological philosophy as conceived by Edmund Husserl. (2) Ricoeur's position is emergent from an historical review (i.e., history of ideas) of the main conceptions in phenomenological philosophy. (3) The conception of action is important to Ricoeur and he anticipates the centrality of this conception from the outset of his projected philosophical program. Consequently, Ricoeur points out that the concept of Action will emerge in his final phase (poetics of the will):

The conception of action, so broad and so precise, seems to us to acquire its full significance on the level of a Poetics or, better yet, of a spiritual analysis of the will, such as we find in Pascal, Dostoevski, Bergson, or Marcel. On this level there prevail essentially unifying concepts, beyond the diversity of acts and in particular beyond the duality of knowledge and of acting whose divergence in aim and object we have had to respect. Action is one such unitive concept (1966: 31).

(4) Of the phenomenological programs surveyed, Ricoeur's program most emphatically brings the problem of language into the center of focus. Recall that it was predicted that the phenomenological method and methodologies of selected social action theorists would converge on the

essential variable of language.

To conclude our discussion of Ricoeur, it is pertinent to indicate the main features of his method. These features will subsequently serve as criteria in the analysis in Part III of this work. In its current form, Ricoeur's philosophical program focusses attention on the problematics of language. The phenomenological method by which this problem is tackled has three key features--it is hermeneutic, dialectic, and intentional.

The method is hermeneutic because it is concerned with indirectly disclosing the structures of experience through an interpretation of expressions for that experience. Experience is to be read through expression. Second, the method is dialectic in that it attempts to mediate the findings of opposing positions. In general terms, Ricoeur diagnostically uncovers the relevance of the facts of experience of objective, scientific disciplines by placing these facts into a "dialog" with the findings of phenomenological philosophy. However, the resolution in a third term always assumes the form of a "postponed synthesis" since the nature of dialectics is that it is never complete. Third, Ricoeur's method is always an intentional analysis of the subject's being-in-the-world. The aim is to uncover the intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions.

One additional reason for advocating Ricoeur's position can be generated by briefly comparing Ricoeur with Stephan Strasser's characterization of phenomenology. Strasser (1963: 249) has demarcated three main features in his characterization of phenomenology--that it is hermeneutic, dialectic, and intuitive. However, Strasser arrived at this

conclusion simply by demarcating as succinctly as possible what he thought to be the main elements necessary to adequately pose an answer to the question of what is phenomenology? Yet, Strasser admits that the better approach to determining what phenomenology is would be to write a history of the phenomenological movement (1963: 249).

Our contention is that Strasser's position partly vindicates our historical interpretation of the main features of Ricoeur's method. Strasser's analysis moves parallel to, but falls short of, the conclusions reached by Ricoeur. For Strasser, the primary aim of phenomenological philosophy is to "lay bare the general and necessary structures of experience" (1963: 275). For Ricoeur, this type of structural phenomenology was only a first (although essential) stage in the development of a hermeneutic phenomenology. There are two important reasons why Strasser falls short of Ricoeur: (1) the failure to bring the problem of language into the center of focus and (2) the limitation to "hermeneutics" in Heidegger's sense.¹² Nevertheless, both Strasser and Ricoeur are in agreement on a fundamental issue--that the contribution by phenomenologist and empirical human scientist must be reciprocal. The phenomenologist can help "purify" the human sciences from empiricist, objectivistic, and scientistic prejudices.¹³ The empirical human scientist can prevent the phenomenologist from generating a philosophy which would be of little or no use in constructing a philosophical anthropology.

Phenomenology does not seek to destroy or eliminate the results of empirical inquiry, but rather to draw attention to the limitations of the results of this "first" experience. Strasser may be right in

stating that "perhaps it is the role of the phenomenological philosophy to act as 'midwife' at the birth of a new ideal of science" (1963: 313).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

¹Although it is risky to attempt to capture the essence of a philosophical program which is still evolving, two factors favor making such an attempt in the case of Paul Ricoeur. First, Ricoeur has outlined the essential tasks of his overall program, which he then proceeds to elaborate. Second, Don Ihde (1971) has made such an attempt, and his attempt has been vindicated by Ricoeur.

²The time to study Husserl in detail was afforded Ricoeur under rather unusual circumstances. At the outset of World War II, Ricoeur, an officer in the French army, was captured, sent to a series of POW camps, met Mikel Dufrenne, and spent the war reading German philosophy. Ricoeur's translation and commentary upon Husserl's Ideas I was the major work of this period, and it established Ricoeur's position (after the war) as one of France's foremost Husserl experts (Ihde, 1971: 9).

³Gabriel Marcel can be credited as an early and lasting intellectual stimulator of Ricoeur's thought. Ricoeur, a student of Marcel, shares with his teacher a profound respect for the mystery of being. Ricoeur, like Marcel, holds a deep mistrust of simple reductive explanations of man and culture (Ihde, 1971: 8-9).

⁴The English translation of De L'Interprétation: Essai sur Freud has reversed the order of the title and the sub-title. It appears as Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation.

⁵It is interesting to note that Ricoeur has taken the occasion of his prefacing of Don Ihde's (1971) book to mention that the idea of interpretation as posed in Freud and Philosophy is too limited, in the sense that hermeneutics is bound to the notion of symbol with its double meaning. Ricoeur now opts for taking the widest notion of a text as a guide on the hermeneutic level. This modification to Ricoeur's philosophical program as initially projected now anticipates a general theory of text which will be at the heart of the "Poetics of the Will" (Ricoeur, 1971: xvii).

⁶The term "diagnostics" refers to the process of uncovering intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions. That is, Ricoeur views philosophy as an intentional analysis of the subject's being-in-the-world. Therefore, philosophy approaches empirical science "diagnostically," as a description of "symptoms." These symptoms are descriptions of the ways in which the cogito becomes actual in the world. Thus, the task is to reveal the underlying intentional structure manifest through the objective form (Kohák, 1966: xv).

⁷The distinction between hermeneutic and existential is often confused when reading Ricoeur's works since the theme of Ricoeur's hermeneutics is existential while the method is not existential.

⁸ According to Ricoeur, Freudian psychoanalysis conflicts with every other global interpretation of the phenomenon of man because it is an interpretation of culture (1970: xii).

⁹ In particular, Ricoeur challenges the empirical model of structural linguistics, which has had such widespread influence in the social sciences. Ricoeur criticizes structural linguistics from the phenomenological viewpoint in an attempt to break the mystique which often surrounds the initial successes of objectivist methods.

¹⁰ Ricoeur contends with the controversial debate as to what is a "symbol" and what is a "sign" as follows. For Ricoeur, symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in which the meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality (1970: 16). Then, a sign is characterized by the problem of unity of language and the interrelationship of its multiple functions within a single empire of discourse.

¹¹ It is interesting to note that in his introduction to the task of Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur already anticipates that the broad and comprehensive philosophy of language that we are waiting for today will likely never be elaborated by any one man (1970: 4).

¹² Since both Heidegger and Ricoeur share the aim of revealing an "ontology of language," how then do we distinguish between their respective "hermeneutic phenomenologies"? Ricoeur differentiates his own method from Heidegger's on the basis of its indirectness and its dialectic with, rather than an exclusion from, the linguistic disciplines. Heidegger's way is the short route toward what Ricoeur calls a "direct ontology of comprehension" (Ihde, 1971: 171). In other words, Heidegger breaks all methodological debates and drives directly toward ontology. For Heidegger, to comprehend is no longer a mode of knowledge, but a mode of being, the mode of that being who exists in comprehending. Thus, Heidegger's "hermeneutic phenomenology" either avoids or opposes objectivism. In contra-distinction to Heidegger, Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology continues to debate with the objective sciences in the search for methods which are adequate to the subject matter under investigation (Ihde, 1971: 172).

¹³ In brief, these three types of prejudices are: (1) empiricism which is based on a faulty conception of the essence of experience, (2) objectivism which stems from a misconception concerning the partners playing a role in experience, and (3) scientism which results from a metaphysical over-valuation of empirical insights (Strasser, 1963: 307-08).

PART III

TOWARD CONVERGENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL ACTION TRADITION

The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur brings to fruition the possibility of a comprehensive view of man's being in the world, an endeavor which was contained in Brentano's intentional psychology and Husserl's phenomenology. In elaborating the conception of incarnate cogito as a philosophical guideline rather than as a mystery, Ricoeur resolves precisely the dichotomy of being-for-itself and being-in-itself which had driven earlier existentialist thinkers toward mysticism or materialism. At the same time, Ricoeur's insistence that the cogito is actual in and through the world makes a diagnostic use of empirical investigation possible, opening a line of communication between philosophy and the human and social sciences (Kohák, 1966: xxxii). The movement from Husserl to Ricoeur is a movement toward a more critical awareness of the presupposition of the finality of the scientific ideal of rigor and objectivity along with an accompanying suspicion that radicalness in philosophy is not to be attained by way of an egology without ontology. The self and the world stand in a delicate balance.

The task in the third part of this dissertation is to draw to a point of convergence the phenomenological philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and the positions of some eminent social action theorists. In their attempt to mediate between description and explanation, social action

theorists have often generated an obscure and incompletely formulated methodology. In this connection, phenomenological method can enter into a meaningful dialogue with the descriptive methods of such social action theorists as Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. A main contention of this dissertation is that these four writers have implicitly employed phenomenological method and, although Parsons admits to an affinity between his methodology and phenomenology, he does not elaborate this relation. In the following discussions, this relation will be explicated and elaborated. In general terms, the convergence between phenomenological method and the methodologies of social action is on the essential variable of language.

CHAPTER 6

SURVEY OF SELECTED METHODOLOGICAL PROGRAMS FROM SOCIAL ACTION TRADITION

Without a critical conscience about one's debt to past thinkers, one's trivial thoughts begin to sparkle with the glitter of originality and grit of self-admiration. One has, without it, no standards by which to judge one's own experience or to recognize the quality of one's thought.

--Arun Sahay (1971: 15)

Eminent social action theorists such as Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons have advanced methodologies which emphasize the relevance of an empirical, scientific approach to the investigation of social phenomena. While Weber and Parsons have explicitly attempted to construct methodologies capable of mediating values and facts, Pareto and Durkheim initially favored a more positivistic approach which excludes at the outset all questions of value. However, the claim to have circumvented philosophical issues often appears as little more than the forcing of such issues into the position of implicit assumptions within one's writings. In this regard, it is interesting that Durkheim's intellectual development later brought him to admit to the presence of elements which he had so fervently tried to avoid in his earlier works.

Regardless of their differences, a common problem arises for all four social action theorists. None of them were able to forward a precise and clear methodology for the conceptualization of social action. Parsons has advanced furthest in this regard as exemplified by his attempt to draw the seemingly disparate positions of Weber, Pareto, and Durkheim (also, Marshall) to a point of convergence on the conception of voluntarism. While he touched on the relevance of phenomenology as a method of conceptualization of social action, Parsons did not elaborate this relation. The contention of this inquiry is that Parsons, as well as the other three theorists, could have improved their methodologies by relating them to phenomenology.

Before drawing the phenomenological and social action methodologies to a point of convergence, it is relevant to outline the essential features in the programs of Weber, Pareto, Durkheim, and Parsons. In Chapter 6 below, the general perspective of each writer is outlined. In addition, their methodologies are briefed. Considerations of space prevent a comprehensive treatment of each writer; therefore, only a minimal attempt to criticize each program shall be made in this chapter.

MAX WEBER--SOCIAL ACTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF IDEAL TYPES

The encyclopedic knowledge of Max Weber was shaped through his challenge to the ideas of many writers. One notable influence on Weber was the position of Karl Marx. Like Marx, Weber objected to the cloudy mystification of German idealism, hence both men focussed their investigations on the actions of concrete human actors. However, Weber, although regarding all perspectives as necessarily limited and partial, criticized Marx for his one-sided accentuation of the economic factor. Unlike Marx who maintained that the religious factor was epiphenomenal, Weber believed that ascetic protestantism had contributed to the development of modern capitalism. The question was to determine the extent of that contribution (Weber, 1958a: 26-27). Because the Weberian position emerged principally from a debate with Marxian views, Weber has been referred to as the "bourgeois Marx" (Salomon, 1945: 598). Limited to his methodological writings, perhaps it would be more apt to characterize Weber as the "bourgeois compromise between Marx and Hegel."

For Hegel, human history was the process of "objectification" of the single unitary Weltgeist (Parsons, 1968, II: 478). Historical attention was focussed not on individual events or acts but on the Geist which constituted their unity. The gap between the ultimate unity and the historical uniqueness of particular epochs was accounted for by the dialectic which allowed for qualitative differences in the stages of self-realization of the Weltgeist. Parallel to Hegel, Marx conceived of human development as a single process toward a determinate goal. However, Marx maintained that the dynamic forces of history are not to be found in the immanent self-development of a Geist in the Hegelian sense but rather in the sphere of men's concrete interests (Parsons, 1968, II: 490). In this regard, Marx generated a materialism in opposition to the Hegelian idealism.

The province of Weber's investigations and interests was incredibly broad, including studies in law, economics, the interpretation of religious doctrines, medieval trading companies, the medieval origins of Western music, and much more. Within the context of our study, only a very thin slice of Weber's contribution is particularly relevant. This relates to Weber's discriminating systematization and conceptualization which is especially obvious in the first part of Economy and Society. Weber sought to transform the human and cultural sciences into empiric, scientific disciplines. The clash between ideal standards and concrete realities posed the crucial question of Weber's methodological inquiries. His attempt to mediate between these two tendencies also reflects his intermediate position between Hegel and Marx. It is in this sense that Weber might be called the "bourgeois compromise between Hegel and Marx."

Weber's methodology stemmed from an opposition to two main traditions of idealistic social thought: objectivism and intuitionism.¹ In brief, Weber's critique of both these traditions focussed on their contention that social sciences cannot make use of general laws of the logical character of those occupying unquestioned status in the natural sciences. In this regard, Weber's most basic thesis is that generalized theoretical categories are essential to the proof of causal relationships in the social sciences as well as in the natural sciences. Otherwise, anything approaching logical proof is out of the question. According to Weber, advances in the social sciences depend upon a critique of concept-construction:

The history of the social sciences is and remains a continuous process passing from the attempt to order reality analytically through the construction of concepts--the dissolution of the analytical constructs so constructed through the expansion and shift of the scientific horizon--and the reformulation anew of concepts on the foundations thus transformed (1949: 105).

Having recognized this, Weber introduced an element of relativity into his methodology, thus overcoming the necessity of having to make claims of empiricist absolutism. The consequence of Weber's efforts was the recognition that a knowledge of action and its elements is indispensable to ground the methodology of science and, vice versa, scientific knowledge constitutes an indispensable element in the analysis of action (Parsons, 1968, II: 600). However, Weber was never completely clear on the question of how scientific method applies to the study of human phenomena. This is illustrated from Weber's struggle to precisely explicate the intent of his "ideal-typical" method. Broadly the goal of "ideal-typical" concept-construction is always to make explicit not the class or

average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena (1949: 101).²

Weber began the process of systematic conceptualization by establishing a classification of four types of social action according to mode of orientation (1947: 115). First, Weber identified social action in terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (Zweckrational). Second, Weber demarcated a type of social action in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value (Wertrational). Third, Weber identified social action in terms of affectual orientation, that is, as determined by specific emotions and states of feeling of the actor. Fourth, Weber noted a type of social action which was traditionally oriented through the habituation of long practice. Having distinguished these four types of social action, Weber proceeded to judge the usefulness of the classification, since the classification in itself is only an attempt to formulate in conceptually pure form certain sociologically important types of social action. In order to judge the relevance of this fourfold classification, Weber introduced the concept of "social relationship." The consequence was to refer social action to the subjectively meaningful behavior that takes into account the behavior of others:

The term 'social relationship' will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms. The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be, in some meaningfully understandable sense, a course of social action (1947: 118).

In this context, the term "meaningful" refers to a behavior in question making sense to an acting individual. Meaning can be of two sorts:

(1) that dealing with a behavior in question actually making sense to an actor or an average or approximation of behavior making sense to a plurality of actors and (2) that dealing with ideal typical meanings attributed to one or more hypothetical actors. This latter sort of meaning is elaborated below.

Weber assumed at the outset that no individual science is capable of furnishing an authentic copy of reality. The utmost that can be accomplished by any one social science is, through reasoned thought, to bring order into the world of reality which is in a state of ceaseless flux. The principles of classification, by which this order is to be achieved, cannot draw upon reality but must be imposed by the scientist himself. Reality, so interpreted, is the process of creating meaning, and the science of reality, therefore, is the understanding of such meaning patterns. Consequently, Weber's construction of "ideal types" served as an heuristic tool which provided fixed points of reference for measuring the extent of divergence of individual imputations of reality.³

It is difficult to construct a precise definition of the Ideal Type simply because the concept itself is not precise. The Ideal Type is not a single entity, which Weber leads us to believe, but rather a conception composed of two separate types, one of which has two subtypes (Rogers, 1969: 87). Thus, there are three different Ideal Types, each of which is intended for the analysis of a specific set of phenomena.⁴ For purposes of this study, two senses of ideal type are relevant. First, Weber's ideal type can serve as a short-cut method for the description

of empirical reality. Second, the ideal type functions as a hermeneutical device in the construction of meanings. Nevertheless, attempts to characterize what an ideal type is have not been unproblematic.

Much has been made of Weber's negative characterization of the ideal type; that is, the ideal type is not this, not that. For instance, Weber stated that the "ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research: it is no 'hypothesis' but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses" (1949: 90). And, furthermore, Weber maintained that the ideal type "is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description" (1949: 90). Regardless of such negative characterization, one fact remains certain. In its conceptual purity, the ideal type cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. Rolf Rogers captures this notion in his summary statement of Weber's ideal type:

. . . the Ideal Type is a utopian construct which is primarily rational and abstract. It is normatively ideal, therefore, in its conceptual purity it cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. While it does not describe a concrete course of action, it does describe an "objectively possible" course of action. Thus it contains, within the logical requirements of the relevant frame of reference, all the necessary properties or features of a concrete act or complex of action (1969: 91).

One Weberian commentator has recently criticized sociologists for tending to see the ideal type as irreconcilably generalizing and individualizing. Arun Sahay (1971) argues that it has become fashionable to label any arbitrary description which cannot be justified as "ideal typical."⁵ To reduce ambiguity, Sahay has attempted to positively characterize the ideal type:

An ideal type is a logically consistent description, from a specific, or given, point of view which makes the means-end relationship of the action, event, process or interpretation of ideas, unambiguous, to enable one to translate disparate, fragmentary ideas, interpretations or correlations into scientifically explicable terms. The ideal-type concept, in fact, is the realization of the principle of sociological rationality, which is Weber's basic and original contribution to scientific analysis. Its contents are only relatively objective, and the purpose of sociological analysis is to decide which particular one--or combination--of these relatively objective but possible descriptions of facts is the completely valid one, i.e., which gives the correct cause of an event or action (1971: 72-73).

Nevertheless, whether one characterizes the ideal type negatively, positively, or as a hybrid of the two, the preciseness of the conception is still not unproblematic.

One problem with the ideal type is the tendency to equate it with the notion of ideal in the sense of a metaphysical perfection. Weber aptly responds to those who would tend toward this error:

An "ideal type" in our sense, to repeat once more, has no connection at all with value-judgments, and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one. There are ideal types of brothels as well as of religions; there are also ideal types of those kinds of brothels which are technically "expedient" from the point of view of police ethics as well as those of which the exact opposite is the case (1949: 98-99).

Obversely, there is the danger that the ideal type will be confounded with reality. Talcott Parsons criticized Weber for tending to reify his ideal typical conceptions, especially the process of rationalization which is the prominent feature of Weber's empirical work (Parsons, 1968, 11: 607). In addition, Parsons has forwarded other criticisms of Weber's methodology such as: (1) Weber's failure to examine how each of the four types of social action and their elements fit into a total functioning system;

(2) Weber's emphasis of polar or extreme ideal types to the exclusion of intermediate possibilities;⁶ and (3) Weber's failure to systematically examine the psychological component, which eventually created problems, since the isolation of rationality and the treatment of affect as only a factor of deviation from rational norms is incompatible with the findings of modern psychology which points to the integration of affective and rationally cognitive elements in the same action (Parsons, 1968, II: 610-39).⁷

Regardless of the imprecision of the ideal type, Weber's work was highly relevant for vindicating the position that scientific conceptualization is in the nature of the case abstract; and, furthermore, it never fully exhausts or reflects concrete reality. For purposes of imputing the cause of empirical events, the construction of ideal types helps to answer the question as to what a behavior pattern would be like if it possessed completely rational, empirical, and logical correctness and consistency (Weber, 1949: 42). Moreover, Weber permitted a wide array of possible ideal types, since, from a logical point of view, the normative "correctness" of these types is not essential. Whatever the content of the ideal-type, be it an ethical, a legal, an aesthetic, or a religious norm, or a technical, an economic, or a cultural maxim or any other type of valuation in the most rational form possible, it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergence or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally (Weber, 1949: 43).

VILFREDO PARETO--NON-LOGICAL ACTION AND THE RESIDUES

Like Max Weber's, Pareto's position was formulated partly through a critique of the views of Karl Marx. While Marx had viewed man as rational and perfectible, Pareto saw man as non-rational and unchanging. And while Marx saw a linear progression to history, Pareto regarded history as essentially cyclical. In direct antithesis to Marx's theory of class struggle, Pareto advanced his theory of the circulation of elites. Unlike Max Weber, Pareto regarded reason as an irrelevant factor for understanding society and history. To vindicate the principle that man's action is non-rational, Pareto advanced his theory of residues.

Like many of his predecessors, Pareto set out to make economics and sociology positive sciences on the model of the physical sciences.⁸ However, Pareto did not advocate radical empiricist positivism but, rather, characterized science as "logico-experimental" (1963: 9). Two essential elements are involved: logical reasoning and observation of "facts." For Pareto, a fact was any observation made by the senses. The aim of science was to arrive at statements of uniformities among observed facts. In other words, to generate theory the scientist must first observe facts and then argue logically from these facts. Thus, Pareto favored the inductive method. This preference is illustrated in the following quotation:

In the former [logico-experimental theories] procedure is gradual. One starts with facts and reaches this or that abstraction, thence going on to a more general abstraction, becoming more and more circumspect, more and more cautious, the farther one gets from direct experience. In non-logico-experimental theories, a deliberate leap is taken away from direct experience, as broad a leap as possible,

and the farther one gets from direct experience, the greater the assurance, the greater the recklessness (Pareto, 1963: 48-49).⁹

Pareto never suggested that an experimental fact necessarily embodies the totality of a concrete phenomenon. The scientist is always faced with an infinite number of facts; therefore, statements of uniformities among the facts must proceed through a series of successive approximations (1963: 55-56).

In addition to the logico-experimental domain (science and logic), Pareto demarcated a second domain of human conduct--that of "sentiment." This second domain of human conduct is non-logico-experimental, and it is independent of the logico-experimental domain.¹⁰ According to Pareto, sentiments are the predominant force in society. But because the ultimate basis for all sentiments is non-logical, the only path to logico-experient truth is to reject all sentiments. This sets the basic theme for Pareto's magnum opus, A Treatise on General Sociology. Given the whole range of human conduct, the problem is to find categories that will separate logical actions from non-logical actions. Logical actions are those that logically conjoin means appropriate to ends, as observed from both subjective and objective positions. Non-logical action is a residual category, being defined as all action which is not logical action (1963: 77). Logical actions are largely the results of processes of reasoning. Non-logical actions originate chiefly in definite psychic states, sentiments, subconscious feelings, and the like (1963: 87-88). According to Pareto, it is the task of psychology to investigate such psychic states. For him, these psychic states are the data of fact from which he begins his analysis.

In Pareto's view, man's actions are generally non-logical. But man seeks to justify his non-logical acts, that is, to make them appear logical (1963: 172). This is the departure point for Pareto's inquiry. Talcott Parsons has succinctly summarized Pareto's analysis on non-logical action:

It is inductive and starts with a distinction of two classes of concrete data--overt acts and linguistic expressions. Pareto is directly concerned only with the latter and as a result of the analysis of nonscientific "theories" in this sense arrives at the categories of residue and derivation, the relatively constant and variable elements of these theories respectively. Thus the residue is a proposition (1968, II: 705).

A study of the relations among residues, derivations, and derivatives (resultants of residues and derivations) forms the core of Pareto's investigations.¹¹

Residues are the constant, unchanging, bio-psycho forces. The residues are not to be confused with the sentiments or instincts to which they correspond. Residues are the manifestations of sentiments and instincts just as the rising of the mercury in a thermometer is a manifestation of the rise in temperature (Pareto, 1963: 511). Pareto distinguished six general classes of residue: (1) Instinct for Combinations, (2) Persistence of Aggregates, (3) Need of Expressing Sentiments by External Acts, (4) Residues Connected with Sociality, (5) Integrity of the Individual and his Appurtenances, and (6) The Sex Residue (1963: 516-19). Of these six classes, Pareto emphasized the importance of Class I (Instinct for Combinations) and Class II (Persistence of Aggregates). Class I includes such characteristics as the ability to think, inventiveness, imagination, and originality. Class II refers to such

things as the persistence of relations between a person and other persons or places; that is, it includes such notions as habit, custom, tradition, and other beliefs and practices that persist through time.

Pareto's conception of derivations was generated to account for the production and acceptance of varying justifications and non-scientific theories by which people attempt to account for their conduct.

Concrete theories in social connexions are made up of residues and derivations. The residues are manifestations of sentiments. The derivations comprise logical reasonings, unsound reasonings, and manifestations of sentiments used for purposes of derivation: they are manifestations of the human being's hunger for thinking. If that hunger were satisfied by logico-experimental reasonings only, there would be no derivations; instead of them we should get logico-experimental theories. But the human hunger for thinking is satisfied in any number of ways; by pseudo-experimental reasonings, by words that stir the sentiments, by fatuous, inconclusive "talk." So derivations come into being. They do not figure at the two extreme ends of the line, that is to say, in conduct that is purely instinctive, and in strictly logico-experimental science. They figure in the intermediate cases (Pareto, 1963: 889).

In this manner, people mistakenly believe that the "explanation" is also the cause of their conduct. But the researcher who seeks only logico-experimental knowledge must not halt the analysis at manifestations of social activity, that is, at the derivations. The cause of the activity lies deeper, in the residues (1963: 890-91). Pareto listed four classes of derivations: (1) Assertion, (2) Authority, (3) Accords with Sentiments or Principles, and (4) Verbal Proofs.

Derivations fabricate persuasive explanations for non-logical action because they are derived from an individual's sentiments. Furthermore, derivations appeal to the dominant sentiments such as the authority of maxims prevalent in a community, or to the authority of

supernatural beings (Zeitlin, 1968: 184). Granted that derivations and residues are elements of the non-scientific theories which accompany non-logical action, the question now arises as to how residues and derivations function.

The function of residues and derivations can be systematically examined as the relation of four mutual dependencies: the mutual dependence of residues and residues, of residues and derivations, of derivations and residues, and of derivations and derivations (Homans and Curtis, 1934: 229).¹² First, with respect to the relation of residues and residues, the main point is that residues are constant, or else change only slightly over long periods of time. The consequence is that contradictory residues exist side by side within the same person and within the same community. Second, the influence of residues on derivations can best be explained by means of the notions of residue-in-chief and residue used to derive:

We are exhorted to accomplish some act. That exhortation is the residue-in-chief. In one era we are exhorted to accomplish it because it is the will of God, in another because it will fulfil the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." These are the residues used to derive. The first brings in a residue of the Persistent Aggregates, the second a residue of Sociability. The choice of one or of the other depends on whether these residues are strong at a given time in the author of the derivation and in the people he seeks to persuade by it. It is in this sense that the derivations may be said to depend on the residues (Homans and Curtis, 1934: 240).

Third, the relation of derivations and residues suggests the notion of a feedback mechanism whereby derivations strengthen the residues with which they have been associated by clarifying sentiments which had been confused and vague. In other words, derivations tend to bring sentiments

into the focus of consciousness. Final and fourth, the relation of derivations and derivations suggests that as residues change different derivations will come into vogue. This does not necessarily imply that different classes of derivations will come into focus. Rather, it may simply mean that complementary derivations within the same class will become noticeable.

Let us now comment on the question of the bearing of the residues on social utility. Pareto has studied this question by considering the interaction of four factors: the residues of Combination, the residues of Persistent Aggregates, a group of men called the *élite*, and all other men called the non-*élite* (Homans and Curtis, 1934: 250). The interaction of these four factors resulted in a process which Pareto called the "Circulation of the *Élite*."

The theory of the circulation of *élites* is based on the assumption that people are unequal physically, morally, and intellectually. Pareto designated the label *élite* to a class of people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, which can be anything (1963: 1423).¹³ Two particular groups interested Pareto: a governing élite, composed of individuals who directly or indirectly play a role in government; and second, a non-governing élite who comprise the rest. All other persons are part of the non-*élite* or lower stratum:

The least we can do is to divide society into two strata: a higher stratum, which usually contains the rulers, and a lower stratum, which usually contains the ruled. The fact is so obvious that it has always forced itself even upon the most casual observation, and so for the circulation of individuals between the two strata (Pareto, 1963: 1427).

According to Pareto, changes in the proportion of Class I and Class II residues to be found within the two social strata (*élite* and non-*élite*) have an important influence in determining the social equilibrium (1963: 1427). For example, the *élite* often has contained groups of people called the aristocracy. There are cases in which the majority of individuals belonging to such aristocracies actually possess the qualities requisite for remaining there, and in other cases they have not possessed those requisites. Nevertheless, over long periods of time, all aristocracies decline. "History is a graveyard of aristocracies" (Pareto, 1963: 1430). Aristocracies not only decline in number, but there is also a reduction in the proportions of residues which had once enabled the aristocracies to win and hold their power. If a governing *élite* is to be effective and stable, it must consist of individuals who have a strong mixture of Class I and Class II residues (Pareto, 1963: 1740-41). In addition, a superior governing *élite* should be ready and willing to use force. A decaying *élite*, shying away from the use of force, tries to buy off its adversaries. The consequences of such action are marked:

To prevent or resist violence, the governing class resorts to "diplomacy," fraud, corruption--governmental authority passes, in a word, from the lions to the foxes. The governing class bows its head under the threat of violence, but it surrenders only in appearances, trying to turn the flank of the obstacle it cannot demolish in frontal attack. In the long run that sort of procedure comes to exercise a far-reaching influence on the selection of the governing class, which is now recruited only from the foxes, while the lions are blackballed (Pareto, 1963: 1515).

Elaborating on the analogy of the lions and foxes, men primarily moved by Class I residues are like "Machiavelli's foxes," capable of experiment and innovation. However, such men lack fidelity to principles and to

those conservative virtues that insure stability. On the other hand, the conservative forces are represented by men in whom Class II residues predominate. These men exhibit traits such as loyalty, class solidarity, and patriotism. Such men, who are also not afraid to exercise force, might be called "Machiavelli's lions."¹⁴ Thus, in Pareto's view, the political and economic controls of any country inevitably rotated from the hands of old lions to new foxes, and so on. Here is the crux of the theory of the circulation of élites.¹⁵ By implication, the ideal governing élite would be composed of a judicious mixture of lions and foxes.

At this juncture, it is relevant to comment on Pareto's theory of revolution. Revolutions are sparked when a governing élite begins to decay. That is, it loses those residues necessary to rule and becomes unwilling to employ force. At the same time, elements of superior quality are arising in the lower strata of society (1963: 1431). If the circulation of élites is slow and if the avenues for upward mobility are blocked, the "ambitious" foxes are prone to overthrow the old lions (1963: 1797).

What, then, is the upshot of Pareto's overall perspective? What emerges is a perspective in which societies change little or not at all, since Pareto's social equilibrium rests on unchanging (or at least very slow-changing) sentiments. Pareto attempted to show how the distribution of residues in a population is related to the state of the polity and of the economy. The social equilibrium is determined by the distribution of residues or, more precisely, by the distribution of individuals holding these attributes (1963: 1444). Hence Pareto's theory of the structure of society is ultimately psychologically based.

In his efforts to highlight those aspects of a social system that are not amenable to economic investigation¹⁶ and thus require complementary analysis on a specifically sociological plane, Pareto was led to make the distinction between the maximum utility of and maximum utility for a community (1963: 1464-71). The latter is the point where each individual has attained the maximum possible private satisfaction, whereas the former refers to the maximum utility of the group or society as a whole. This distinction signals a shift from a classical liberal economic to a sociological viewpoint. Pareto rejected the classical economic standpoint's assumption that total benefits for a community simply equalled the sum total of the benefits derived by each individual member (1963: 1465). The sociological viewpoint treated society as a total unity and sub-groups of individuals are considered from the viewpoint of their contribution to the overall system as well as in terms of their peculiar wants and desires. In brief, system needs were distinguished from individual or sub-group needs.

At this point, Pareto's thought converges with that of Emile Durkheim. Both Pareto and Durkheim rejected utilitarian and individualistic notions and stressed the need to consider the requirements of social systems qua systems. However, they are different in that Durkheim maintained that system needs could be determined objectively and scientifically, whereas Pareto contended that judgments of such needs sprang from the desires, propensities, values, and norms of those in command.

EMILE DURKHEIM--RULES OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD

The writings of Emile Durkheim emerged from a debate with many eminent scholars. Two notable influences were Karl Marx and Saint-Simon. From the tradition following Saint-Simon, Durkheim owes his positivistic orientation. To Marx, Durkheim owes the insight that social existence determines social consciousness.¹⁷

In his early writings, Durkheim's general question became that of examining the relations of the individual and the social group. His familiar, now classic, answer to that question was that Society is not a simple aggregate of individuals but a reality sui generis. That is, the individual is not a concrete entity but merely an abstraction from the group. In turn, the group is subordinate to the Society. Society, for Durkheim, is always to be written with a capital letter "S" since the social order must be maintained at all costs.

Although Durkheim was aware of class conflicts, he contended that social order and stability could be achieved. Like de Bonald, de Maistre, and Saint-Simon,¹⁸ Durkheim maintained that the decline of religious forces had left a moral vacuum. Moral ideas are the real cement of Society; therefore, integration and stability could be achieved by instituting the appropriate moral ideas. The task for positive science was to determine what moral ideas are best suited to achieve stability under the new industrial conditions.

In his first major publication, The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim sought to demonstrate that a growing division of labor brings with it an even higher form of solidarity (1964a: 62-63). The shift from

mechanical to organic solidarity (from old to new form of society) does not result in an automatic loss of "collective conscience" but only in an alteration of its form. The common or collective conscience refers to the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citizens of the same society (1964a: 129).¹⁹ Because the collective conscience is independent of individuals (collective sentiments are engraved on all individual consciences), it does not change with each generation. Rather, it connects successive generations. According to Durkheim, a normal society must be founded on such traits as collective conscience, moral authority, community, and the sacred. The only appropriate response to modern conditions is to strengthen such traits. Then such factors as suicide, economic conflict, and the frustrations of anomic life will be moderated.²⁰

The methodology employed by Durkheim in his study of the division of labor is only implicit. Durkheim subsequently explicated his methodological position in The Rules of Sociological Method (Rules) (1964b: 1x). The Rules presents Durkheim's early methodological approach--sociological positivism. This position stemmed from two sources: a critical examination of the methodology of utilitarian individualism and the elaboration of Durkheim's conception of positivism. Briefly, Durkheim's most basic criticism of utilitarian individualism was its inability to account for the element of normative order in society (Parsons, 1968, 1: 346). With reference to his positivistic orientation, Durkheim's task was to construct a methodology for the observation of "social facts." This first entailed deciding which facts are commonly called social. The definition Durkheim forwarded was as follows:

... ∴ A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations (1964b: 13).

Durkheim next formulated his rules for the observation of social facts. The first and most fundamental rule was to consider social facts as "things" (1964b: 14). It is relevant to elaborate the intent of this rule in order to illustrate the importance of the two main criteria of social facts: exteriority and constraint.

Things are objects of the external world which can be objectively confirmed. Things include all objects of knowledge that cannot be conceived by purely mental activity, those that require for their conception data from outside the mind, from observations and experiments (Durkheim, 1964b: xliii).²¹ And social phenomena are things. Social phenomena are external to any particular individual; thus, they cannot be explained on the biological or psychological levels. Furthermore, social phenomena endure over time while particular individuals die and are replaced by other individuals (Coser, 1971: 129). Consequently, Durkheim contended that the task for sociology (as a positive science) was to discover the social facts of social phenomena.

For Durkheim, the essential analytical problem was to define the nature of the social factor in human behavior. His particular aim was to arrive at something more than a residual definition of the social factor. His task now became to distinguish social facts from non-social things (Parsons, 1968, 1: 365). This was accomplished by means of the formula that "social facts are facts about psychic entities."

However, the notion of psychic entities (which included conscience and representations) was not precisely clarified and, ultimately, this notion led Durkheim into problems related to the assumption of "group mind" (Parsons, 1968, 1: 357).

According to Parsons, Durkheim's early methodology had two main failings: (1) Durkheim failed to guard against the interpretation that social reality is a concrete entity separate from individuals, and (2) Durkheim had only a partial grasp of the conception of analytical abstraction (1968, 1: 367-68). In addition, Durkheim was concerned with the question of the relation of science and ethics. Like most positivists, Durkheim thought that it was possible to develop a scientific ethics which would serve as the basis for rational action and human betterment (1964b: 23). According to Parsons, the very possibility of a scientific ethics contributed to Durkheim's subsequent de-emphasis of positivism and his acknowledgment of the relevance of subjective factors:

The employment of the schema of scientific methodology as a framework for the analysis of action from the subjective point of view was very probably dictated in large part by the requirements of a scientific ethics. For ethics must, in so far as it is to yield practically applicable rules of conduct, take the subjective point of view of the concrete individual. A scientific ethics must, in turn, be capable of fitting all the elements which are determinant of conduct into this schema (1968, 1: 374).

Thus, while in his early work Durkheim defined social facts by their exteriority and constraint, his later work stressed that social facts become effective guides and controls of conduct only to the extent that they become internalized in the consciousness of individuals.

Durkheim's earlier concern with social regulation was focussed on the external forces of social control, more particularly on the legalistic way of looking at things in terms of the relation of an individual to a rule which he either obeys or violates. Later, Durkheim considered forces of social control that were internalized in individual consciousness. Being convinced that "society has to be present within the individual," Durkheim was led to study theories of religion; since religion was a force that created within individuals a sense of moral obligation to adhere to society's demands (Coser, 1971: 136). The major representative publication was Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Elementary Forms). Theoretically, there are two different though intertwined elements in the Elementary Forms: a theory of religion and an epistemology. In this final phase of Durkheim's writings, there was an explicit methodological shift from the earlier sociologicistic positivism to a sociological epistemology.

The theory of religion departs from the distinction between beliefs and rites:

Religious phenomena are naturally arranged in two fundamental categories: beliefs and rites. The first are states of opinion, and consist in representations; the second are determined modes of action. Between these two classes of facts there is all the difference which separates thought from action (Durkheim, 1965: 51).

In his examination of religious beliefs, Durkheim found the common denominator to be a distinction between the sacred and profane. Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things are those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. Thus religious beliefs are the

representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should conduct himself in the presence of sacred objects (Durkheim, 1965: 56).

As in his other studies, Durkheim's procedure was to start by criticizing traditional conceptions in other theories, in this instance theories of religion (1965: 65). The two classes of theories on which Durkheim concentrated his critique were animism and naturism. Durkheim accused both of reducing religious ideas to illusions. But if religious ideas are not sheer illusion, they must correspond to an external, observable reality. And for Durkheim that reality was the social reality:

... and we have seen that this reality, which mythologies have represented under so many different forms, but which is the universal and eternal objective cause of these sensations sui generis out of which religious experience is made, is society (1965: 465).

Society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common. Consequently, action dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is Society which is its source (Durkheim, 1965: 466). This line of argumentation terminates with Durkheim's famous proposition that God or any other sacred object is a symbolic representation of Society (Parsons, 1968, 1: 417).

According to Durkheim, the fundamental error of other theories of religion has been to confuse intrinsic and symbolic relationships. Failure to make this distinction led positivists to view religion as irrational. Since symbolism has no place in the positivistic scheme of analysis, science cannot provide a model for religion.

Moreover, the fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of science, are of religious origin (Durkheim, 1965: 466). Accordingly, Durkheim concluded that religious beliefs rested upon a specific experience which is independent of, yet just as valid as, experiences called scientific. Nevertheless, Durkheim's sociology of religion aimed to study religious ideas from a scientific perspective. This resulted in Durkheim's concluding that religious ideas must be distorted representations of an empirical reality. In Talcott Parsons view, the consequence was that Durkheim had reverted to his earlier positivistic approach:

Analytically regarded the reference of religious ideas cannot be to any empirical reality at all, if they are to be held to represent the principal existential cognitive element of the ultimate value complex. In effect this procedure forces Durkheim back from a genuine analytical position to one of empiricism. Instead of the common normative element, the "society" which is symbolized in religious ideas becomes the concrete social group. For this is, indeed, an empirically observable entity. The concrete individual is in a position to observe it, to be assimilated to the situation of a scientists (1968, 1: 421).

That being the case, Durkheim found himself in a dilemma. An exclusive adherence to scientific reason would place ethics and religion in a relative position. The solution to the dilemma was to view religious ideas as a cognitive bridge between the empirical and non-empirical realms. Durkheim's turn to a sociological epistemology reflects his attempt to resolve this dilemma.

In the Elementary Forms, Durkheim explicitly stated that society exists only in the minds of individuals. This statement reflects the logical outcome of his whole development and also the final abandonment of his objectivist bias (Parsons, 1968, 1: 442). According to Durkheim, the radical empiricist position by itself cannot account for all knowledge.

The apriorists were right in maintaining that non-empirically derived categories are also necessary. However, Durkheim maintained that an "empirical" explanation is eminently possible for apriorist categories, since he believed that their origin was in the social reality (Parsons, 1968, 1: 443). Hence Durkheim's sociological epistemology emerged when he identified the social factor as the a priori source of categories. This identification broke Durkheim's bond to empirical reality. Thereafter, Durkheim tended to favor idealism. And so he ended up vacillating between an idealistic and a positivistic approach. The undesirability of favoring either extreme is aptly expressed in these words:

Just as positivism eliminates the creative, voluntaristic character of action by dispensing with the analytical significance of values, and the other normative elements by making them epiphenomena, so idealism has the same effect for the opposite reason--idealism eliminates the reality of the obstacles to the realization of values. The set of ideas comes to be identified with the concrete empirical reality. Hence the central feature of the category of action, its voluntaristic character, the elements of will, of effort, have no place in such a scheme. Indeed one very important reason why Durkheim was attracted by idealism was that he never really outgrew his empiricism. He could never clearly and consistently think of social reality as one factor in concrete social life, but always tended to slip over into thinking of it as a concrete entity. Then since "ideas" cannot be dissociated from the latter, it must consist of ideas (Parsons, 1968, 1; 446).

Even though Durkheim's study of religion brought him close to recognizing the importance of a voluntaristic element in action, he never quite broke through because the two methodologies--sociologistic positivism and sociological epistemology--tended to counteract one another. However, Parsons contends that Durkheim's difficulties are elucidating and highly instructive because his struggles demonstrate that neither horn of the dilemma provides a satisfactory methodological basis for a science

of sociology, or for any other social science (1968, 1: 448). Such considerations served to reinforce in Parsons' mind that only something akin to a voluntaristic theory of action might help to transcend the positivist-idealist dilemma.

TALCOTT PARSONS--STRUCTURE OF ACTION AND ANALYTICAL REALISM

Our review of the programs of selected social action theorists terminates with an examination of Talcott Parsons' monumental work, The Structure of Social Action. In this study, Parsons attempted to find a common denominator in the seemingly disparate views of Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. The result of this synthesizing effort was the emergence of a voluntaristic theory of action which, according to Parsons, lay unrecognized in the works of writers of utilitarian, positivistic, and idealistic inclination. The relevance of the conception of voluntarism is aptly captured by Alvin Gouldner in these words:

Sombart, Weber, Parsons in The Structure of Social Action, and the young Marx of the philosophical manuscripts, all agree that a situation in which men are molded by autonomous social forces, and in which their aims and efforts are controlled and overridden, is undesirable. Weber and Sombart tended to see this as unavoidable in modern industrial civilization; Marx saw it as inevitable under capitalism but avoidable under communism; Parsons sees it as avoidable even under capitalism. Indeed, it is a central point of Parsons' "voluntarism" that men's efforts always make a difference in what happens (1970: 185).

According to Parsons, any meaningful action theory must be voluntaristic. Action is meaningful only if preceded by a functionally relevant process or orientation and this is possible only if some freedom exists to choose among alternatives--that is, there must be an element of voluntarism

(Devereux, 1961: 19-20).

The publication of The Structure of Social Action codified Parsons' early formulation of his action frame of reference. Two particularly relevant aspects of this action scheme are its subjective reference to action from the point of view of the actor and its normative orientation, that is, the claim that action always involves a reference to or a consideration of some normative element. However, the immediate point is that the early formulation of the action scheme is the best place to look for specific associations with epistemology and ontology. In this respect, Scott (1963: 716) maintains that The Structure of Social Action is really much more a book about the philosophy of science than its title tends to suggest.

Recall that the aim of this dissertation is to explicate the parallel between phenomenological method and, in this instance, Parsonian methodology. In this regard, a number of additional reasons can be forwarded for focussing on the early Parsons.²² First, Parsons recognized the reciprocal influence of science and philosophy and the fact that they can be independent of, yet interdependent on, one another at the same time (1968, I: 20-27). Second, Parsons maintains that there is no empirical knowledge which is not in some sense conceptually formed. In other words, a description of the facts involves a conceptual scheme; hence, descriptive frames of reference are fundamental to all science (Parsons, 1968, I: 30).²³ Third, Parsons recognized (but did elaborate) that his action frame of reference had what might be called a "phenomenological" status (1968, II: 733).²⁴ These considerations lead us to contend that Parsons' methodology--"analytical realms"--parallels

phenomenological method.²⁵

Parsons' action frame of reference can be characterized as emerging out of his criticism of three traditions--utilitarianism, positivism, and idealism. Speaking about the utilitarian and positivistic positions, Parsons states his reason for wanting to mediate between them:

The form of primary interest here is an increasingly sharp presentation of the "utilitarian dilemma": either a really radical positivistic position or the strictly utilitarian. The former course involved abandoning completely the means-end schema as analytically indispensable, the latter meant increasing dependence on extrascientific metaphysical assumptions. In the generally positivistic state of opinion all the weight of "hard-boiled" scientific prestige seemed to lie on the radically positivistic side. But at the same time the utilitarian tenets rested on sound empirical insight which could not readily be explained away. Hence the stage was set for a radical theoretical reconstruction that would transcend the dilemma altogether (1968, II: 702).

The utilitarian action system had four relevant features: atomism, rationality, empiricism, and randomness of ends (Parsons, 1968, I: 60).

According to Parsons, utilitarianism and economic theory served as a good model of systematic and analytical theory; however, it could not achieve the status of general theory.²⁶ On the other hand, the positivistic tradition was attempting to develop a theory which could account for human behavior in terms of determinate scientific laws, such as those in physics. The failing common to all positivistic theories of action was that by implicitly treating ends as if they were reducible to the conditions of action the positivists denied the subjective component of action (Parsons, 1968, I: 66-67). Consequently, the positivistic position denied the independent, metaphysical foundation of values because it has failed to distinguish between the realm of fact and the realm of

ideas from which values spring. But, according to Parsons, action involves volition or willing; therefore, the subjective component cannot be eliminated.

At the other extreme, the idealistic tradition was trying to generate a theory which interpreted concrete social phenomena as emanations from the realm of values. Parsons' principal criticism of idealism was that it widened the gap between fact and value. Hence action itself, as the relation between fact and value, was eliminated. The Parsonian conception of voluntarism, and subsequently the notion of voluntary action, emerged as an alternative to the idealistic and positivistic positions.

From his investigations, Parsons concluded that at some point there emerges a minimum frame of reference for action. In other words, the structural elements of this action frame of reference are irreducible. The minimum elements necessary to have a meaningful description of an act include end, means, conditions, and norms (1968, 11: 732). The basic principle is that of duality--action is defined in terms of its relation between actor and situation. By actor, Parsons means an agent or analytical reference point. The situation is composed of physical objects (including organisms other than men), cultural objects (such as artifacts, language, values), and social objects (individual social actors or collectivities) (Williams, 1961: 68). Other pertinent features of the action frame of reference are (1) that the relations of the structural elements implies a normative orientation of action, a teleological character; (2) that action is always a process in time; and (3) that the action schema is inherently subjective in the sense that normative

elements can be conceived of as "existing" only in the mind of the actor (Parsons, 1968, II: 732-33).

The upshot of the specification of a minimum frame of reference for action is that such a schema sets a definite limit to the extent of useful subdivision of the phenomena into units or parts. In the case of phenomena describable in terms of action schema, the smallest unit which can be conceived of as concretely existing by itself is the "unit act." The implication for a science of action is this:

A definite limit to the scientifically useful subdivision of concrete phenomena into units or parts is set by their relevance to the frame of reference. In the theory of action it is their capability of being thought of as acts or concrete elements of acts. One principal criterion of this capability is that the subjective point of view can be employed. Failure to see this was one of the main reasons why Weber was so afraid of abstraction and hence did not even attempt to develop a generalized theoretical system (Parsons, 1968, II: 738).

Based on these considerations, Parsons formulated his general epistemological position of "analytical realism."²⁷ Analytical realism describes Parsons' position regarding the relation of theoretical concepts to concrete phenomena. This view maintains that at least some of the general concepts of science are not fictional but adequately represent aspects of the objective, external world. In addition, analytical realism avoids the objectionable implications of an empiricist realism. These concepts correspond not to concrete phenomena but to elements in the phenomena which are analytically separable from other elements (Parsons, 1968, II: 730). There is no implication that the value of any one element, or even of those included in one logically coherent system, is a complete description of any particular concrete thing or event.

Therefore, an adequate understanding of one or more concrete phenomena may require the employment of analytical categories drawn from more than one such system, perhaps from several (Parsons, 1968, II: 757).²⁸ In brief, a complete explanation of concrete phenomena may require inter-relating theoretical categories from all analytical sciences.

Thus, on an analytical basis, Parsons detected the emergence of three great classes of theoretical systems--systems of nature, of action, and of culture (1968, II: 762). Systems of nature involve time in relation to space. Systems of action involve time in relation to means-end schema. However, culture systems are distinguished from the other two in that they are non-spatial and atemporal. Disregarding the "sciences" of culture, Parsons concluded that the empirical analytical sciences may then be divided into two groups: natural sciences and the sciences of action. Referring to the sciences of action, Parsons states:

The latter are distinguished negatively by the irrelevance of the spatial frame of reference, positively by the means-end schema and by the indispensability of the subject aspect, hence of the method of Verstehen, which is specifically irrelevant to the natural sciences (1968, II: 764-65).

With the turn to the three great theoretical systems (nature, action, and culture), the relevance of the conception of voluntarism, as it had been applied to the theory of action, diminished.²⁹ Parsons began to make reference simply to the sciences of action as distinguished from those of nature and culture.

In sum, Parsons proposed that adequate sociological theory must be action theory. And as long as social thought remains divided between the positivistic and the idealistic systems there is no place for analytical sociological theory in Parsons' sense (1968, II: 774).

Although Parsons thought The Structure of Social Action contributed toward combatting the tendencies of either idealism or positivism, one of his critics does not agree. As Scott (1963: 732) has stated:

" . . . with all respect for the monumental scholarship that went into its writing and for the exhaustive detail of its exposition, never advances its discussion beyond nineteenth-century epistemology; and never answers the one question on which so much of its discussion turns: what is the nature of valuation?"

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

¹This topic has already been discussed (Chapter 2, Crisis of European Sciences). Therefore, the present discussion shall only recapitulate the main ideas, and then proceed to elaborate Weber's notion of "ideal type."

²For example, the concept of "exchange" is a simple class concept in the sense of a complex of traits which are common to many phenomena, as long as we disregard the meaning of the component parts of the concept and simply analyze the term in its everyday usage. If, however, we relate this concept to the concept of "marginal utility," for instance, and construct the concept of "economic exchange" as an economically rational event, this then contains, as every concept of "economic exchange" does which is fully elaborated logically, a judgment concerning the "typical" conditions of exchange. It assumes a genetic character and becomes therewith ideal-typical in the logical sense, i.e., it removes itself from empirical reality which can only be compared or related to it. The same is true of all the so-called "fundamental concepts" of economics: they can be developed in genetic form only as ideal types (Weber, 1949: 100).

³The literature related to Weber's ideal-type construction is extensive and only a portion can be discussed here. It is relevant to not that much of the confusion surrounding the intent of the ideal-type stems from a failure to grasp the totality of Weber's methodology. Sahay (1971: 68) emphasized that Weber was concerned with the analytical and predictive explanation of action--a clear scientific delimitation of Verstehen. Failure to grasp this has led many critics to designate Weber as an intuitionist, idealist-rationalist, pessimist, and even an apologist for the capitalist ideology.

⁴The distinction among the three ideal-types in Weber's work is credited to Alexander von Shelting (Parsons, 1968, II: 604-06). Von Shelting was the first to point out that under the term ideal type Weber included two quite heterogeneous categories of generalizing and individualizing concepts. Later, von Shelting demarcated two subcategories of the individualizing concepts. Talcott Parsons has contributed to a clarification of Weber's methodology, especially the relation of ideal-type to generalized analytical theory. As well, Parsons provides a synopsis of von Shelting's position, which has not been translated from German into English.

⁵According to Sahay (1971: 73), either contemporary sociologists have ignored or failed to see that the formal basis for all kinds of substantive ideal types are equivalent. All are concerned with the logical relationships between the value, which may have determined the ideas, actions, and events to be analyzed, and the results of the ideas, actions and events. Weber's basic point is that sociological analysis is in terms of values, individuality, and understanding; and the different forms of

ideal types are the various means of relating these methodological principles, each depending on the substantive material.

⁶For example, Weber's basic dichotomy of rational and irrational (with irrational elements being defined residually as a deviation) tends to create a false, theoretically unwarranted antithesis. Parsons maintains that this tendency was exemplified by Weber's confinement of ideal typical analysis to the rational case. A related tendency was for Weber to confine the applicability of subjective categories to consciously intended motives.

⁷Rogers (1969: 81-83) points out that Weber's avoidance of the psychological component may not have been unwarranted. First, Weber was primarily concerned with problems of institutional change. This problem was of no concern to psychologists in Weber's period of writing. Second, psychologists were guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Weber certainly avoided this error.

⁸Pareto studied economics and sociology in the later part of his life. His formal education was in mathematics and physical sciences, and for many years he was a practicing engineer.

⁹It is relevant to note that Pareto equates experience and observation.

¹⁰Within the non-logical-experimental domain, Pareto was careful to distinguish between pseudo-scientific theories and theories transcending experience. According to Pareto, pseudo-scientific theories (those pretending to have a scientific status) are anchored in biological needs. Therefore, pseudo-scientific theories can be eliminated by uncovering the underlying residues, and ultimately basic human sentiments, on which they are resting. However, Pareto is careful to note that theories transcending experience never claim a scientific status. Such theories represent the cultural dimension of human action and as such are a necessary part of any attempt to account for the ends of human action (Pareto, Chapters 4 and 5).

¹¹Pareto (1963: 508) noted that the terms residue, derivations, and derivatives were merely arbitrary word-names assigned to a set of relations among things initially designated as "a," "b," and "c." Moreover, the reader is warned not to infer anything from the proper meanings of these words or their etymologies.

¹²In this regard, the discussion by Homans and Curtis is briefed, since Pareto's discussion is confusing and difficult to follow (Homans and Curtis, 1934: 225-57).

¹³In Pareto's usage, the term élite has no moral or honorific connotations. Élite simply denotes a class of people who have the highest indices in their particular branch of activity. For example, a chess champion is a member of a particular élite.

¹⁴ Pareto's theoretical ambition may be understood as an effort to link traditional Italian "Machiavellian" social theory with 19th century positivist thought. Like Machiavelli, Pareto wanted to construct a science of power that would explain how the few manage to rule over the many. Pareto wanted to discover the relation between human action and man's fundamental nature (Coser, 1971: 407-08).

¹⁵ The circulation of élites discussed here has focussed on the polity. However, Pareto found a parallel situation existing in economics where speculators are similar to the foxes, and rentiers are similar to the lions. For brevity, the economic parallel is not elaborated here (1963: 1555-70 and 2310-17).

¹⁶ The economic system is made up of certain molecules set in motion by tastes and subject to ties (checks) in the form of obstacles to the acquisition of economic values. The social system is much more complicated, and even if we try to simplify it as far as we possibly can without falling into serious errors, we at least have to think of it as made up of certain molecules harboring residues, derivations, interests, and proclivities, and which perform, subject to numerous ties, logical and non-logical actions. In the economic system, the non-logical element is relegated entirely to tastes and disregarded, since tastes are taken as data of fact (Pareto, 1963: 1442).

¹⁷ Of course, Durkheim never admitted to the parallel between his views and those of Marx. The parallel emerges as a result of the work of other writers.

¹⁸ These men were associated with the Romantic-Conservative reaction against the disorganizing consequences of the French Revolution. De Bonald and de Maistre developed Catholic counter-revolutionary philosophies which not only provided an ideological defense for the Restoration but also advocated regression to the order of the old regime. Later, Saint-Simon's writings reflected an absorption of both Enlightenment and Counter-revolution views. For Saint-Simon, science and industry led to the final demise of the old order; and, furthermore, science and industry have become the essential positive principles of the new order. In addition, the views of Auguste Comte (a one-time student of Saint-Simon) influenced Durkheim. Although he disagreed with Comtean metaphysics, Durkheim certainly paralleled Comte's general methodological quest for positive laws of social behavior.

¹⁹ An apt empirical indication for the existence of collective sentiments is the social reaction to crime. For Durkheim, an act is "criminal" insofar as it opposes the collective sentiments. Anything which violates the common conscience (or collective sentiments) is a threat to the solidarity of society.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that from such considerations Durkheim's program for reform advocated the resurrection of the conception of guilds or occupational groups. Guilds had a strong moral influence

capable of containing individual egos and of maintaining the collective consciousness.

²¹ Durkheim refused to permit ideas or concepts to be legitimate substitutes for things. He examined social phenomena in themselves as distinct from the consciously formed representations of them in the mind. As Durkheim said: "Indeed, the most important characteristic of a 'thing' is the impossibility of its modification by a simple effort of the will" (1964b: 28).

²² Scott (1963) has examined the question of the changing foundations of the Parsonian action scheme. In particular, Scott focussed on the question as to the "fate" of the voluntaristic thesis in Parsons' later writings. Two general phases are demarcated for Parsons' writings: (1) a pre-war phase which focussed around The Structure of Social Action; and (2) a post-war phase in which the action scheme still employs a means-end framework, but its constituent elements are presented in a different way. In the present inquiry, interest centers on the pre-war, or early Parsons. It is informative to note Parsons' position with respect to writers who have attempted to trace and demarcate the main themes running through all of the Parsonian publications to date. As Parsons has said, there seems to be a certain unity in the period of intellectual interests and theoretical development running from completion of The Structure of Social Action to the two major books published in 1951, Toward a General Theory of Action and The Social System. The most important thread of continuity lies in what came to be called the "pattern-variable" scheme (Parsons, 1970: 842).

²³ According to Parsons, "fact" is understood to be an empirically verifiable statement about phenomena in terms of a conceptual scheme. A fact is not itself a phenomenon at all but a proposition about one or more phenomena. All scientific theories are made up of facts and of statements of relations between facts in this sense (1968, I: 41).

²⁴ Although Parsons explicitly acknowledged his affinity to phenomenological philosophy, he did not elaborate this relation. In addition, Parsons did not go beyond Husserl of the Logical Investigations. Moreover, the direction of intellectual concern after The Structure of Social Action moved Parsons further away from his affinity with phenomenological philosophy.

²⁵ Of course, the implicit parallel between "analytical realism" and phenomenological philosophy may be partly contingent on the early intellectual influences on Parsons. Obviously, writings reflecting the crisis of European sciences abounded during the first three decades of the 20th century. And phenomenology was one offshoot from that Crisis.

²⁶ Parsons maintained that all the relevant problems related to a general theory of action systematically bordered on the works of Alfred Marshall; but, unfortunately, Marshall had not fully recognized what he was doing. It is interesting to note that Parsons later vindicated his

position on Marshall as it was initially formulated in The Structure of Social Action. Parsons (1961: 317) contended that the most important contribution of The Structure of Social Action was the demonstration of a systematic range of problems on the borderline of Marshall's theory, and a convergent body of concepts oriented toward dealing with these problems, the most fundamental of which is the problem of order. In a recent article, Parsons (1970: 869), reaffirms that the problem of order is a main theme, stemming from The Structure of Social Action, throughout the course of his intellectual pursuits.

²⁷Epistemology here refers to the status of scientific concepts in relation to reality.

²⁸In a recent article, Parsons notes some of the circumstances relevant to his formulation of analytical realism. According to Parsons:

"Weber had insisted on the inevitability and cognitive validity of selection among available factual information. The importance of analytical abstraction was further strongly emphasized by Henderson in his formula: 'A fact is a statement about experience in terms of a conceptual scheme.' The culmination of this conception came for me in A. N. Whitehead's work, especially his Science and the Modern World, including his illuminating discussion of the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' Through channels such as these I arrived at a conception which I called 'analytical realism,' which treated the kind of theory I was interested in as inherently abstract but by no means as 'fictitious' in the sense of Hans Vaihinger" (1970: 830).

²⁹Although the post-war writings of Parsons de-emphasize the importance of the concept of voluntarism, provision exists for its revitalization if it should ever become necessary. The post-war scheme says only that "behavior is normatively regulated." While voluntarism would not be inconsistent with such a conception of action, it is not a necessary conclusion from it. The post-war scheme then uses a new term, "motivation": action involves the expenditure of energy or effort. The scheme was extended by the addition of the now celebrated three modes of orientation of action: cognition, cathexis, and evaluations (Scott, 1963: 725-26).

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACTION METHODOLOGIES

In so far as I understand a text, I understand it--in some respects--better than the author. If I really understand a proof I ought to be able to produce variants to it; if I understand a discourse I should be able to rephrase it--above all in order to assimilate it, make it my own, I have to "translate" it into the language of the traditions I am at home in.

--An old topos of hermeneutics

The following analysis aims to disclose the relation between phenomenological method and the methodologies of Weber, Pareto, Durkheim, and Parsons. The assessment of these four methodological positions is conducted by examining the similarities and differences of each position with Ricoeur's phenomenological method. In this respect, Ricoeur's method acts as an upper ideality limit which the social action methodologies approximate in varying degrees. The aim of the analysis is to discern the affinity and the degree to which the methodologies of Weber, Pareto, Durkheim, and Parsons approximate the phenomenological approach.¹

An assumption relevant to the assessment of the adequacy of these methodologies is that they failed to extend their basic framework (for the analysis of social action) to its logical limit. This failure is reflected in a lack of clarity and precision in formulating these methods. In other words, methodology for conceptualization of social action is less well developed than the phenomenological method which is also relevant for conceptualization. Since this inquiry has concluded that Ricoeur's phenomenological method is relevant, then the assessment of these four positions proceeds in two ways: (1) a negative assessment whereby each method fails short of Ricoeur's method, which is taken as an upper ideality limit; (2) a positive assessment whereby Ricoeur's method is simply taken to be further refined than each method, but all methods are only successive approximations to some undefined, Utopian methodology. Thus, by a process of comparison and contrast, the adequacy of each methodology is judged, employing criteria drawn from Ricoeur's

phenomenological method. The criteria (discussed in Chapter 5) include dialectics, hermeneutics, and diagnostics (intentional analysis).

As a propaedeutic to the assessment, it is relevant to first discuss the views of Alfred Schuetz. In his works, the attempt to relate phenomenology to social action is most conspicuous.

A NOTE ON THE POSITION OF ALFRED SCHUETZ

The work of Alfred Schuetz warrants discussion here because Schuetz attempted to construct a bridge between Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Max Weber's verstende sociology. Two questions of central interest in Schuetz were the relation of objectivity and subjectivity in social science methodology and the nature of human action. Schuetz found clues for answering both these questions in the writings of Max Weber. However, the logical problems involved in Weber's notion of "ideal types" and other key concepts drove Schuetz to a thorough analysis of Weber's entire methodological program. Utilizing the Husserlian conception of "meaning," Schuetz attempted to recast the foundations of Weber's interpretive understanding (Verstehen), thus providing the phenomenological grounding which Weber's program lacked.

Schuetz agreed with Weber that the essential function of social sciences is to be "interpretive," that is, to understand the subjective meaning of social action:²

Never before had the project of reducing the "world of objective mind" to the behavior of individuals been so radically carried out as it was in Max Weber's initial statement of the goal of interpretive sociology. This science is to study social behavior by interpreting its subjective meaning as found in the intentions of individuals. The aim, then, is to interpret the actions of individuals in the social world

and the ways in which individuals give meaning to social phenomena (Schuetz, 1967: 6).

But Schuetz found that Weber had failed to clearly state the essential characteristics for the understanding of subjective meaning, or of action. He further contended that Weber's concept of "interpretive sociology" rested upon a series of tacit presuppositions which needed explicating (1967: 7). Taking his departure point from Weber's postulate of the subjective interpretation of "meaning," Schuetz was predominantly concerned with the understanding of social action as the meaning which the actor bestows upon his action. Since Schuetz agreed with Weber that action is defined through meaning, the first positive step in Schuetz's formulation was to reconsider the nature of the phenomenon of "meaning." According to Schuetz, most scholars had missed the point that the problem of meaning is a problem of historical time:

The latter is always a passage of time, filled, to be sure, with physical events yet having the nature of an "internal time consciousness," a consciousness of one's own duration. It is within this duration that the meaning of a person's experience is constituted for him as he lives through the experience. Here and here only, in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the phenomena of "meaning" (Sinn) and "understanding" (Verstehen) (1967: 12).

Thus, Schuetz's procedure was to track the concept of "meaning" to its point of origin in inner time-consciousness, that is, in the duration of the ego as it actually lives through its experience. According to Schuetz, "only after we have a firm grasp of the concept of meaning as such will we be able to analyze step by step the meaning-structure of the social world" (1967: 13). He found a solution to the riddles of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation³ in Bergson's philosophy

of duration⁴ and in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

From his inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon of meaning, Schuetz drew a number of conclusions. The most general result was a demonstration that Weber's concept of intended meaning (which the actor attaches to his action) is unclear and imprecise so long as the conception of action remains undefined (1967: 215). Thus Schuetz concluded that action is (1) a lived experience that is (2) guided by a plan or project arising from the subject's spontaneous activity and (3) distinguished from all other lived experiences by a peculiar Act of attention. As a consequence of this definition of action, Schuetz concluded that it is incorrect to regard meaning as if it were some kind of predicate which could be "attached" to an action. For that matter, Schuetz distinguished between action as experience in process and act as completed process. Thus Schuetz maintained that it is methodologically inadmissible to interpret a given series of acts objectively as a unified sequence without any reference to a project and then to ascribe to them a subjective meaning (1967: 216). From these investigations, Schuetz demarcated the limitations of Max Weber's position.

Weber's failure to clarify the philosophical presuppositions of his own primary concepts was the prime stimulus for Schuetz's critique of Weber's methodological program. First, Schuetz argued that Weber's primitive conceptions (e.g., the concept of the meaningful act of the individual) were not primitive enough (Schuetz, 1967: 7). Second, Weber made no distinction between "action" and "act." Third, Weber did not distinguish between the meaning of the producer of a cultural object and the meaning of the object produced. Fourth, Weber did not differentiate

between meaning of one's own action and the action of another person. Fifth, Weber never attempted to identify the unique and fundamental relation existing between the self and the other self, that relation whose clarification is essential to a precise understanding of what it is to know another person. In short, Weber naively took for granted the meaningful phenomena of the social world as a matter of intersubjective agreement (Schuetz, 1967: 9).

An understanding of the paramount reality of common-sense life is the clue to grasping the works of Alfred Schuetz. His main concern was to describe the "meaningful structure of the world of daily life." The world of daily life, or the everyday working world, establishes the limits within which our existence unfolds. For Schuetz, the most central feature of the everyday world is that it is taken-for-granted.

The taken-for-granted (das Fraglos-gegeben) is always that particular level of experience which presents itself as not in need of further analysis. Whether a level of experience is thus taken for granted depends on the pragmatic interest of the reflective glance which is directed upon it and thereby upon the particular Here and Now from which that glance is operating a change of attention can transform something that is taken for granted into something problematical (1967: 74).

Phenomenology has taught us the concept of phenomenological epoché, that is, the suspension of our belief in the reality of the world as a device to overcome the taken-for-grantedness of the natural attitude.⁵ Schuetz further contended that man within the natural attitude also employs an epoché. However, in this case, man suspends doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him (Natanson, 1962: xliii). This specific epoché Schuetz labelled the "epoché of the natural attitude."⁶

For Schuetz, the everyday world is the arena of social action where men try to relate to one another. Each individual locates himself in daily life in a particular manner, in light of what Schuetz has called one's "biographical situation." One's biographical situation defines the way in which one locates the arena of action, interprets its possibilities, and engages its challenges. The world becomes transposed into my world in accordance with the relevant elements of my biographical situation. Thus, the individual as an actor in the social world defines the reality he encounters. But, although an individual defines his world from his own perspective, he is nevertheless a social being rooted in an intersubjective reality. The world of daily life into which we are born is from the outset an intersubjective world. Thus the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity is the clue to social reality. Positing intersubjectivity as an ontological given, Schuetz then examined it by way of a descriptive analysis of typifications of the common-sense world. In brief, "typical" refers to open horizons of anticipated similar experiences (1962: 7).

Typification as a general feature of perceptual experience denotes a very important and fundamental problem of general phenomenology, for typification is certainly at the origin of conceptual consciousness, if it is not itself conceptualization in an incipient or at least germinal form (Gurwitsch, 1966: xlv). However, Schuetz does not study typification per se but rather the specification of typification. For instance, Schuetz noted that the pragmatic motive dominates our daily life in the everyday world. And as long as recipes permit us to obtain desired typical results, they are unquestioningly applied. It is now relevant to

examine Schuetz's methodology.

Schuetz sought to trace the origin of categories peculiar to the social sciences in the fundamental facts of the life of consciousness. According to Schuetz, all our knowledge of the world (common-sense as well as scientific) involves constructs:

Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected from a universal context by the activities of our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular setting (1962: 5).

The relevant implication is that all scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. This poses the most serious question for the methodology of the social sciences: "How is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning structures?" According to Schuetz, the answer is provided by the basic insight that the concepts formed by the social scientist are constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking by the actors on the social scene (1962: 62-63). And, furthermore, these "constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking" are objective ideal typical constructs. At this point, Schuetz acknowledges the relevance of Max Weber's formulation of the ideal-type method.

By this method of constructing and verifying ideal types, the meaning of particular social phenomena can be interpreted layer by layer as the subjectively intended meaning of human acts. In this way the structure of the social world can be disclosed as a structure of intelligible intentional meanings (1967: 7).

Thus, social sciences, by typifying experience, transform subjective meaning-contexts into objective meaning-contexts. Translating this

statement into Weber's terminology, one would say that the ideal types constructed by social science (in particular by interpretive sociology) must possess at the same time both causal adequacy and meaning-adequacy (Schuetz, 1967: 224). As far as the construction of the ideal type is concerned, the postulate of adequacy requires that it be probable that a real person would behave in the manner specified by the type.⁷ After examining the notions of causal adequacy and meaning-adequacy, Schuetz concluded that:

. . . so far as Max Weber is concerned, the two concepts of causal adequacy and meaning-adequacy are convertible. Any interpretation which is meaning-adequate must also be causally adequate, and vice versa. The two postulates really require that there be no contradiction to previous experience (1967: 235).

Schuetz answered the question of the relationship between the meaning-endowing acts of everyday life and their interpretation by the social sciences by saying that "all social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts" (1967: 241). Consequently, the primary task of interpretive sociology is to describe the processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as these are carried out by individuals living in the social world. This description can be empirical or eidetic;⁸ it can take as its subject matter the individual or the typical; it can be performed in concrete situations of everyday life or with a high degree of generality. But, over and above this, interpretive sociology approaches such cultural objects and seeks to understand their meaning by applying to them the interpretive schemes thus obtained (Schuetz, 1967: 248-49).

Before terminating our synopsis of Schuetz's standpoint, a few critical remarks are warranted. Since this inquiry contends that the phenomenological philosophy of Paul Ricoeur is an improvement upon some weaknesses in the Husserlian program, it is relevant to "read" Schuetz by way of Ricoeur. Both Schuetz and Ricoeur are in agreement that all knowledge of the social world and of man can only be obtained indirectly. Furthermore, both agree that the problem of conceptualization is critical in interpreting the behavior of man. In this regard, both Ricoeur and Schuetz recognized the relevance of Husserl's phenomenological method; however, they disagree with respect to the direction of that contribution.⁹ While Schuetz departs from the Lebenswelt Husserl, Ricoeur maintains that the Husserl of Ideas should not be played down in favor of the Lebenswelt Husserl, since the phenomenological reduction is the straight and narrow gate to phenomenology. For Schuetz, the central contribution of Husserlian method was the phenomenological epoché whose results are valid within the realm of the natural attitude as well as the phenomenologically reduced sphere. This marks the point where Ricoeur and Schuetz disagree on the issue of the relevance of Husserl's phenomenological method. While Schuetz vindicated the relevance of phenomenological method, Ricoeur maintains that a dangerous tendency toward dogmatism accompanies it. That is, the person in the phenomenologically reduced realm may find it even more difficult to break out of these bonds than had been the case in leaving the standpoint of the natural attitude. Consequently, Ricoeur proposes to radicalize all of phenomenology, which entails a shift from a perceptualist to linguistically based phenomenology. Although Schuetz recognized the importance of the

question of language, this variable never moved into the focal position which it occupies in Ricoeur's program.

Besides his orientation to Husserl, Schuetz also emphasized the relevance of Max Weber's ideal-typical method. Since the subsequent discussion "reads" Weber by way of Ricoeur, further insights (although indirect) are gained into the methodological weaknesses of Alfred Schuetz's position.

ASSESSMENT OF WEBER'S POSITION

Weber's basic methodological problem was that of conceptualization. In his attempt to defend the distinction between the logical character of the natural and social sciences, Weber was driven to a fictional view of the nature of general concepts. This fictional view is exemplified by his tendency to reify his ideal type conceptions. According to Parsons, the consequence was that Weber tended to obscure the role of the essentially non-fictional generalized system of theory (1968, II: 715-16).¹⁰ That is, Weber's ideal type theory, being largely oriented to the action level of behavior, is relevant in terms of "vertical integration" but is questionable in terms of "horizontal integration":

In other words, if we view social action in terms of systems, we would construct an integrated hierarchy consisting of system elements, sub-systems, and the total system as the ultimate configurational entity. Within this entity (the total system), each element is part of a sub-system of the first order (or level), which in turn is vertically integrated into a sub-system of the next order, and so on, until all sub-systems by successive integration become a part of the total system. In addition to the vertical integration, however, sub-systems (and elements) are also subject to horizontal integration. That is, since they are always a part of a higher level system, that higher level system requires

interaction among its subsidiary systems in order to operate (Rogers, 1969: 95-96).

Granting, then, that Weber's ideal type method is problematic, the task is to discern the extent to which the method is similar to and different from Ricoeur's phenomenological method.¹¹

Both Ricoeur and Weber sought conceptual clarification. Furthermore, both Ricoeur and Weber sought to elaborate concepts indirectly, since experience is not directly approachable. In addition, their methods both recommend themselves as means and not ends. That is, conceptual clarity can only be achieved through a series of successive approximations which asymptotically approach an upper ideality limit. The ideal type is an Utopia in the sense that in its conceptual purity this construct cannot be found anywhere in empirical reality. Similarly, Ricoeur's phenomenological method aims to uncover the intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions. In other words, both Ricoeur and Weber seek something which cannot be located directly in the empirical world.

Another common feature of the method proposed by Weber and Ricoeur is that both approaches reject the possibility of ever reaching a presuppositionless copy of objective facts.¹² In Ricoeur's program, the rejection of presuppositionlessness is signalled by the presence of the hermeneutic element. In Weber's program, this same rejection is signalled by the presence of the conception of Verstehen (interpretive understanding). The parallel between the conceptions of hermeneutics and Verstehen is aptly captured in these words:

Hermeneutics culminates in the Verstehen of the most deep-lying "final aims", of the great Weltanschauungen and works of art, and of cultures and epochs as wholes

According to E. Rothacker this type of *Verstehen* "has reunited *Begreifen* and explanation as the methodological correlates of truth and reality into a new methodological procedure". *Begreifen* (as a methodological tool of the just-mentioned *Verstehen* of final aims, and as a limiting case of *Verstehen*) refers to meaning-connections of universal (time-less) validity. It involves generalized Ratio (*Verstand*) rather than Reason (*Vernunft*). The paradigm case is that sort of understanding in which we understand a mathematical proof. A particularly important subtype of Rothacker's *Begreifen* is Max Weber's idealtype of *Zweckrationales Verstehen* (Radnitzky, 1970, II: 28).

A further resemblance is that Weber's and Ricoeur's approaches to both aspire to "open up" the possibility space. The ideal type serves to construct a hypothetical course of events where the causal explanation of an individual event requires an answer to the question of what would have happened under certain hypothetical, but possible, assumptions. Like the ideal typical method, the phenomenological method also seeks to open up the possibility space. In this instance, one transcends beyond the limitations and bondage of the natural attitude. And in Ricoeur's particular case, the transcending is carried one step further, since the transcendental realm, or reduced egological sphere, also contains a dogmatic naivety (which may be more difficult to overcome than the naivety of the natural attitude).

Turning to some points of difference between Ricoeur and Weber, the superiority of Ricoeur's method can be illustrated. While both Ricoeur and Weber sought to mediate objective and subjective elements, they differed in the manner in which their attempts were manifest. Weber confronted the alternatives of idealism and realism in an attempt to retain both a descriptive and explanatory function in social science investigation. However, Ricoeur's focus on the variable of language

shifted his attention toward reconciling the alternatives of romanticism and formalism.

Another difference is that Weber's ideal type method is static whereas Ricoeur's phenomenological method is dynamic. Although the ideal type contains no particular statements of fact, it does logically involve a fixed relation between the values of the various variable elements involved. That is, there is a relation between the empirical facts and the general frame of reference. The accusation of static arises in conjunction with the question as to the adequacy of the ideal type to operate as an analytical tool on the level of a total system.¹³ Rogers attempted to extend Weber's ideal type method to the level of a total system:

Weber was primarily concerned with analysis of behavior and change at the institutional level [sic]. The majority of his empirical studies reflect this orientation. On this level, the Ideal Type, in general, is useful as a method of analysis. By extending his theory to the next higher level; namely, the total social system, and especially the notion of systems' interaction, we are simply attempting to carry his basic "framework" to its logical conclusion (1969: 100).

From his attempt, Rogers concluded that Weber's ideal type method was static.¹⁴ Since social systems are dynamic by their very nature, the ideal type method is unsuitable for analysis at the level of a total system. On the other hand, the dialectical component in Ricoeur's phenomenological method makes it dynamic.

The dialectical component circumvents one-sided, static accentuations. For example, Weber formulated the ideal type as a rational type. Consequently, irrational behavior had to be defined as a deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action. The result was that Weber was forced into a static conception of polar types.

However, Ricoeur's method always resolves oppositions in a third term. But because this third term takes the form of a "postponed synthesis," the resolution is never final in any ultimate sense. Thus the dialectics insures that the method is dynamic.

ASSESSMENT OF PARETO'S POSITION¹⁵

At first glance, Pareto's methodology seems to have little in common with phenomenological method. Pareto advocated that sociology model the logico-experimental method of physical sciences, and that a discussion of value not be entertained. However, Pareto was by no means a radical empirical positivist and his view of science was much more modest.¹⁶

Pareto also had a clear recognition of the abstractness of the analytical concepts of science. In this respect, Pareto is said to have surpassed Weber:

It may be said, however, that Pareto had a clearer conception than Weber in the more general methodological context. He was thus also spared most of the difficulties growing out of a conscious or unconscious empiricism (Parsons, 1968, I: 294).

An important feature of Pareto's methodology was that he included the element of abstraction within his conception of fact itself. In other words, Pareto's concept of fact implicitly included the conception of "meaning":

It seems quite clear from Pareto's usage that the meaningful aspect of linguistic expressions is included in the status of experienced facts. At the very beginning of his discussion he refers to "propositions and theories" as experimental facts What is common to the two sets of data is not the "sense impressions" as such in any concrete sense, but the "meaning" of the symbols (Parsons, 1968, I: 182).

Even though Pareto's formulation of the conception of scientific fact made no commitments with respect to the question of the observability of the meanings of symbols, his empirical procedure was such as to imply it throughout. By according factual status not only to the physical properties but also to the meanings of symbols, the possibility was opened for interpreting such data as manifestations of the mind of the actor. The consequence was that Pareto recognized that social phenomena could be studied from two different points of view--objective and subjective.

The objective viewpoint was characterized by what the phenomena are "In reality." The subjective viewpoint refers to the way phenomena appear "In the mind of the actor." From a comparison of the results of objective and subjective viewpoints, Pareto differentiated criterion for logical and non-logical action. The objective end, which is always arrived at by a process of observation, delineates logical action. By definition, non-logical action emerged as a residual, being all action which is not logical. Thus, Pareto employed the standard of logico-experimental science as the criterion for the selection of his data. Only insofar as theories departed from this standard were they relevant to his analysis.

At this point, a discussion of the affinity between hermeneutics and Weber's methodology can be introduced. Pareto's analysis of non-logical action commenced with a distinction between two classes of concrete data--overt acts and linguistic expressions.¹⁷ By linguistic expressions, Pareto meant the residues and derivations as propositions. Derivations function to bring sentiments into the focus of consciousness. Thus derivations are linguistic expressions for underlying sentiments.¹⁸

Like hermeneutics, Pareto's methodology captures the underlying structures of experience only indirectly through expression.

The relation between hermeneutics and Pareto's methodology can be illustrated in a second way. According to Parsons, the norm involved in Pareto's logical action may be called that of "intrinsic rationality." However, the choice of means to an end may involve a selective standard defined in terms other than that of intrinsic appropriateness according to a logico-experimental standard:

The standard of selection may be that of symbolic appropriateness as an "expression," in that sense a manifestation, of the normative sentiments involved. This interpretation would meet the empirical criteria implicit in Pareto's treatment of ritual. For the relation between a symbol and its meaning is always, by definition "arbitrary" as seen from an intrinsic point of view (Parsons, 1968, I: 210-11).

In other words, the norms of ritual actions appear as systems of symbols. The relation of symbol and meaning, rather than that of cause and effect, becomes relevant. However, the meanings of symbols are never fully adequate expressions of the concrete phenomena to which they relate. Therefore, increased understanding can be achieved only through continuous interpretation. It is in this sense that Pareto's methodology has a hermeneutic function.

Another similarity between phenomenological method and Pareto's methodology is that both approaches are concerned with investigating possibility as well as actuality space. In Pareto's works, possibilities are represented by the notion of "imagination":

... while the objective end must be a "real" end, "falling within the domain of experience" this is not necessarily true of the subjective end, which may, on the contrary, be an "imaginary" end, falling outside that domain (Parsons, 1968, I: 204).

The implication drawn from this by Parsons is that it is quite possible to have a state of affairs where the actor's position cannot be declared empirically right or wrong. The actor's viewpoint may not be accessible to objective, scientific observation. In other words, even though a means-end relationship may be logical, its justification may not be possible by scientific or logico-experimental standards. Moreover, there is nothing in the concept of logical action to exclude the possibility that the ends of "logical acts" could be "manifestations of sentiments" rather than statements of facts (Parsons, 1968, 1: 206-07). This position emerges as an actuality in, rather than a possibility of, Pareto's methodology when one recalls that residues are held to constitute an important element in a concrete system of action.

Assuming that Parsons is justified in stating that "the ends of logical acts can be manifestations of sentiments," Pareto's methodology displays an affinity to intentional analysis in phenomenology. An intentional analysis aims to disclose the structures embodied in empirical descriptions of phenomena. Recall that Pareto's logical action reflected the standard of objective, logico-experimental method.¹⁹ The purpose of the standard for logical action was to serve as a criterion by which non-logical action could be distinguished as a residual. Within non-logical action one finds the residues and derivations (the relatively constant and variable elements, respectively). The residues are manifestations of the underlying sentiments. Furthermore, the derivations are manifestations of the residues. What Pareto ultimately sought to disclose was the sentiments (or central "instincts"). However, the route taken must necessarily be indirect. The derivations ultimately appear in

the form of linguistic expressions for the deep, underlying sentiments. According to Pareto, an analysis which is content to remain at the logico-experimental level will not pass beyond derivations. Thus an intentional analysis is similar to Pareto's methodology in that both methods seek to uncover structures beneath the more superficial empirical descriptions.

To conclude this assessment, a few remarks are warranted on the dialectical component of Ricoeur's phenomenological method. Like that of Weber, Pareto's methodology does not include a dialectical component. Pareto's methodology polarized logical action and non-logical action. Hence the approach is static in that Pareto was committed from the outset to this polarization. By abstracting logical action, Pareto ended up with non-logical action as a residue. This residue constituted the source of data for Pareto's analysis.

Pareto's admission of the legitimacy of the process of analytical abstraction in the social sciences moved him toward recognition of the interdependence of fact and value. Although Pareto initially refused to admit to the relevance of values, they remained an implicit part of his program from the beginning. Later in his career, Pareto saw that scientific facts are observations in terms of a conceptual scheme. Since it is not possible to know a concrete phenomenon in all its complexity, science must proceed by analyzing concrete phenomena and generating analytical theories to relate the facts found. Thus, through a continuous series of successive approximations, science can aspire toward one day reaching a complete, synthetic account of some sector of reality (Parsons, 1968, I: 183-84).

ASSESSMENT OF DURKHEIM'S POSITION

Durkheim's early methodological view (sociologistic positivism) displays no relation to phenomenological method.²⁰ However, during the course of development of Durkheim's methodological views, an implicit affinity to phenomenological philosophy emerges. Durkheim's later methodology (sociological epistemology), which arose in conjunction with his theory of religion, displays a correspondence to phenomenological method. The task in the following assessment is to show some implicit points of correspondence between Durkheim's methodology and Ricoeur's phenomenological method. Perhaps it is appropriate to characterize Durkheim's final methodological position as having an incipient and germinal relation to phenomenology. Then Durkheim could be considered a kind of "reluctant phenomenologist."

In his theory of religion, Durkheim acknowledged the relevance of ultimate value attitudes in religious ideas and in ritual. This entailed his recognition of the fundamental importance of symbolism and the symbolic means-end relationship. Thus Durkheim was led to see that not all knowledge could be measured by standards of intrinsic rationality. Moreover, the acquisition of knowledge did not guarantee that it would be automatically converted into action. According to Talcott Parsons, the direction of Durkheim's intellectual development was leading him toward an explicit recognition of the voluntary nature of action (1968, 1: 441). Yet, Durkheim stopped short of this explicit recognition. The relevant question is why?

The early methodological position never distinguished between the empirical reference of analytical categories and concretely existing entities. In his later methodological views, Durkheim granted that a priorists were correct in asserting that analytical categories are both essential and not empirically derivable. Yet, Durkheim maintained that by excluding the possibility of an empirical explanation for analytical categories the a priorists had no explanation at all. The alternative proposed by Durkheim sprang from his claim that the social factor had been overlooked by earlier epistemological positions. Accordingly, Durkheim's empirical explanation of analytical categories claimed that the source of the categories was in the social reality:

Then it is action which dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is society which is its source.

. . . . As we have progressed, we have established the fact that the fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of science, are of religious origin If religion has given birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the soul of religion (Durkheim, 1965: 466, emphasis added).

The relevance of this proposition is stated in these words:

As in the case of religion, the striking thing about Durkheim's position here is not his new view about the categories but about society. Society has become the thing the idealist philosophers are talking about. It consists as he says "exclusively of ideas and sentiments," and not, it may be further said, merely of "ideas" but of the Idea, for the categories are the very matrix out of which particular ideas are formed. It consists not merely of "representations" but of ideas in the technical philosophical sense. Society becomes not a part of nature at all, but, in Professor Whitehead's phrase, of the world of "eternal objects" (Parsons, 1968, I: 444).

Hence the categories originate in Society, or social reality. And the abstract form of the concept of society is the concept of totality,

that is, the whole which includes all things, the supreme class which embraces all other classes (Durkheim, 1965: 490). The unfortunate consequence of equating Society with the so-called "world of eternal objects" is that the creative element of action was eliminated. In other words, Durkheim has jumped from positivism into idealism.²¹ By adopting this extreme, the voluntaristic or willing character of the category of action is eliminated.²²

But the shift from positivism to idealism does signal a relation to the phenomenological conception of intentionality. Intentionality is the property of consciousness being consciousness of something. Intentionality has nothing to do with "real" objects, for it is essentially an act that gives meaning. In Durkheim's case, intentionality can be thought of as consciousness of "Society as part of the world of eternal objects." For Durkheim, Society is the Idea which gives meaning to all categories. The function of the categories is to dominate and envelop all other concepts. Furthermore, the concepts are collective representations:

They are not abstractions which have a reality only in particular consciousness, but they are as concrete concrete representations as an individual could form of his own personal environment: they correspond to the way in which this very special being, society, considers the things of its own proper experience (Durkheim, 1965: 483).

In Ricoeur's program, the method of diagnostics was used to uncover the intentional structures embodied in empirical descriptions. In Durkheim's case, the end result of such an intentional analysis would be to "see" Society as the underlying structure which is manifest through objective form. Concepts are an example of this manifestation.

A similarity to hermeneutics arises at several places in Durkheim's theory of religion. One was the point at which Durkheim recognized that positivists viewed religion as irrational because of their failure to distinguish intrinsic from symbolic means-end relationships. The essence of a symbol is that its meaning or value is not inherent in the intrinsic properties of the symbol itself. Thus the meaning of a symbol is arbitrary. These views led Durkheim close to recognizing that religious ideas are attempts by men at a cognitive apprehension of the non-empirical aspects of reality. However, the difficulty which arose was how to specify the symbolic reference or meaning of religious ideas. Rather than seeing the interpretive function in specifying the meaning of symbols, Durkheim reverted to a mode of thought which he had already superseded:

He tries to think of the religious symbol as capable of assimilation to the symbols involved in scientific propositions as constituting part of a fact the meaning of which is to be found in an observable feature of the empirical world. The result of this is to drive him back to what is in essence another version of the type of theories which he has already rejected. Religious ideas must, then, be distorted representations of an empirical reality which is capable of correct analysis by an empirical science, this time sociology (Parsons, 1968, I: 420).

A second illustration of Durkheim's implicit hermeneutics can be drawn from his theory of ritual. Here, his mode of analysis follows his general theory of religion which he views as an expression, in symbolic form, of social realities. Action which takes the form of ritual may be held to be an expression in symbolic form of ultimate values (Parsons, 1968, I: 467). However, ritual is more than just expression. The theory of ritual also introduced the element of will or effort. Far from being

automatic, the realization of ultimate values is a matter of active energy or willing. In addition, the function of ritual is as a stimulant to social solidarity. Because ritual can be considered an expression of common value attitudes, ritual serves to periodically reaffirm the collective sentiments on which social solidarity depends (Durkheim, 1965: 474-75). Consequently, ritual is an expression of the unity of society which is the social reality. Parallel to the theory of religion, Durkheim's views on ritual stopped short of fully recognizing their hermeneutic character. On the contrary, Durkheim terminated his inquiry by stressing the empirical relevance of the ritual act in its concrete context.

By comparison with Ricoeur's resolution of opposites in a "postponed synthesis," the use of dialectics in Durkheim can be characterized as little more than an abortive attempt. Rather than reconciling the contradiction between the view of society as an empirical reality and society as independent of nature, Durkheim's efforts tended to widen the gap between opposing views. This interpretation is supported by the contention that Durkheim's shift from positivism to idealism made it impossible for him to return to the empirical reality that had once preoccupied the focus of his attention. Moreover, Parsons maintains that Durkheim's failure to ride between the horns of the realist-idealist dilemma was a consequence of his failure to explicitly see the relevance of the voluntaristic element in the conception of action.

ASSESSMENT OF PARSONS' POSITION

The task of assessing whether or not Parsons' methodology is related to Ricoeur's phenomenological method is simplified since Parsons

explicitly mentions his affinity to phenomenology. However, Parsons does not elaborate or extensively discuss the relation between his methodology of analytical realms and phenomenology. Therefore, the aim of the subsequent discussion is to elucidate this relation.

The most conspicuous acknowledgment of the relevance of phenomenology occurs in Parsons' assertion that the action frame of reference has what might be called a "phenomenological status." That is, the action frame of reference is not a phenomenon in the empirical sense but, rather, is the indispensable logical framework for describing and thinking about the phenomena of action (1968, II: 733). The important point is that the action frame of reference, or action schema, is useful for observing and describing the facts of human life in society because it sets a standard for adequate observation. Every actually or hypothetically concrete entity described in terms of a frame of reference must have properties. This is an ultimate necessity of thinking about empirical reality or, in Parsons words, a "phenomenological fact" (1968, II: 749). Other references to phenomenology occur in the text of Parsons' inquiry; however, for present purposes, it is important simply to note that the Parsonian methodology seeks to strike a balance between realist and idealist epistemological tendencies. Parsons is very aware that the facts which are important in terms of a given frame of reference are by no means all the facts which can be known about a concrete phenomenon. A complete explanation of a concrete phenomenon would only be possible when the phenomenon has been adequately described in terms of all known frames of reference. Furthermore, all the data would have to be subsumed under analytical concepts of some system (1968, II: 755).²³

Within this context, a descriptive action schema and an analytical action schema would be bound together phenomenologically.

In The Structure of Social Action, the phenomenon studied is theories that other writers have formulated about other phenomena. Hence, Parsons deals with a class of facts which are linguistic expressions. Then the empirical observations of the phenomenon under investigation entails an interpretation of the meanings of the linguistic symbols employed in the theories of the writers examined.²⁴ Thus Parsons' examination of the facts required that he maintain a close interdependence between empirical observations and theoretical analysis. The hermeneutic function implicit in Parsons' approach should now be apparent. Notwithstanding this recognition, the following assertion makes it obvious:

Without a theory of interpretation many of the facts about these writers' theories on which the greatest stress has been laid would not have been important and, if they had been observed at all, would have led to no theoretical conclusions. But equally the theory would have remained sterile if it had not been continually verified by observation (Parsons, 1968, II: 698).

Granting that Parsons' program exhibits a general hermeneutic function, how does it relate in particular to Ricoeur's hermeneutics?

According to Ricoeur, hermeneutics presupposes that a text of an expression has something to say which in turn can be interpreted or resaid in another way. In other words, hermeneutics is a "reading" or a "listening" to what is said. The conclusions to Parsons' investigation reflect the demands and aim of Ricoeur's hermeneutics. In general, Parsons found that the seemingly disparate positions of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber all pointed toward the same system of generalized

social theory. The underlying structural feature common to all four writers was the element of voluntarism in the conception of action. Consequently, Parsons accounted for the apparent conceptual discrepancies among the four writers as partly a failure by secondary analysts to see past terminological differences. When concepts are placed within the context of different frames of reference, even seemingly opposing concepts can sometimes be found to display equivalent meanings. To elucidate this point, it is appropriate to quote at length from Parsons:

Theoretically important differences between these writers can be reduced to three circumstances: (a) Differences of terminology, different names for the same thing (for instance Pareto calls "logical" what Weber calls "rational"). (b) Differences in the point to which the structural analysis has been carried in order to arrive at the explicit distinction of all the major elements. In this respect Marshall represents hardly more than a beginning of the advance beyond the utilitarian position. But is a beginning at such a strategic point as to be of great interest here. (c) Differences in mode of statement due to the different empirical centers of attention and theoretical approaches of the different writers. Thus the moral element appeared for Pareto first as ultimate ends, one element of the residues; for Durkheim as institutional norms (1968, II: 720).

In brief, Parsons concluded that "reading" one writer by way of another often reveals that disparate concepts really mean the same thing.

Hermeneutics (as method) aims to achieve such conceptual clarity.

In conjunction with this hermeneutic function, Parsons' work also displays a relation to Ricoeur's diagnostics, or intentional analysis. The purpose of an intentional analysis is to uncover the structures underlying empirical descriptions. In Parsons' inquiry, the structure beneath the empirical investigations of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber was found to be the action frame of reference.

The ultimate unity which can be thought of as a sub-system of action is the "act." The "unit act" is irreducible, although it does contain four elements. Thus Parsons' "unit act" could be considered as the resultant of an intentional analysis. An intentional analysis of the subject's being-in-the-world reveals the ways in which the cogito becomes actual in the world. Although the unit act is the ultimate unit, from the point of view of the theory of action it is not an unanalyzable entity but rather very complex (Parsons, 1968, 11: 731). It is composed of a concrete end, concrete conditions, concrete means, and one or more norms governing the choice of means to the end. Hence the unit act is relevant to understanding action as the relation between actor and situation subject to specific constraints.

Parsons, like Ricoeur, has an interest in dialectics. For Parsons, the dialectical interplay of philosophy and science is relevant for clarifying the status of concepts in relation to reality. The generation of conceptual distinctions is his way of constituting the "oneness" or wholeness of the social world.²⁵ The prime importance of conceptualization is captured in these words which express the general ontological status of the theory of action:

The position is realistic, in the technical epistemological sense. It is a philosophical implication of the position taken here that there is an external world of so-called empirical reality which is not the creation of the individual human mind and is not reducible in terms of an ideal order, in the philosophical sense.

The systems of scientific theory under consideration are obviously not this external reality itself, nor are they a direct and literal representation of it, such that one and only one such representation is in any sense valid. They stand, rather, in a functional relation to it, such that for certain scientific purposes they are adequate representations of it (Parsons, 1968, 11: 753).

Nevertheless, Parsons impresses upon his readers that The Structure of Social Action is an empirical monograph, and that references to the metaphysical basis of value are minimal. Philosophical issues are introduced only insofar as they are important to immediate points of issue. Contrary to Parsons, Ricoeur's use of dialectics is a direct attempt to reconcile philosophical findings and scientific facts. Ricoeur seeks to be informed by the findings of objective studies, but never to succumb to its method. At the outset, Ricoeur is a phenomenological philosopher. Thus Parsons tends to circumvent philosophical dilemmas, whereas Ricoeur, confronts them directly.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7

¹The approach taken in the inquiry does not simply summarize and restate earlier positions, but rather seeks convergence through a critical re-examination of certain features of earlier positions. The evidence for convergence is a matter of fitting the facts (linguistic expressions) into a general pattern which makes sense. In this inquiry, the interpretation of Weber, Pareto, and Durkheim was flavored with Parsons' views in The Structure of Social Action. Although Parsons' interpretation was verified by using original sources to check and expand upon his views, a critical attitude is manifest more toward the direction taken by Parsons after the Structure. Even though Parsons (1970) maintains that the thread of continuity linking the Structure to his later works lies chiefly in the so-called "pattern-variable" scheme, it is undeniable that the phenomenological component was not developed in the later works.

²In this context, "social" is defined in terms of a relationship between the behavior of two or more people, and the concept of "action" is defined as behavior to which a subjective meaning is attached.

³Meaning-establishment refers to the Act whereby an individual gives meaning to a certain piece of behavior, a sign, or a cultural object. Meaning-interpretation refers to the comprehension of what is meant by the individual establishing such meaning.

⁴Briefly, Bergson has distinguished between living within the stream of experience and living within the world of space and time. Bergson contrasts the inner stream of duration, the durée--a continuous coming-to-be and passing-away of heterogeneous qualities--with homogeneous time, which has been spatialized, quantified, and rendered discontinuous. What Schuetz learned from Bergson's concept of durée was that the difference between the flowing experiences in pure duration and the discrete discontinuous images in the space-time world is a difference between two levels of consciousness (Schuetz, 1967: 46-47).

⁵For a more complete discussion of this notion, refer to Chapter 3, "The Phenomenological Method: Radicalization of Cartesian Doubting."

⁶According to Schuetz, Husserl's key contribution to empirical social sciences lay in his analyses of problems of the Lebenswelt. Husserl established the important principle that analyses made in the reduced sphere are valid for the realm of the natural attitude (Schuetz, 1962: 149).

⁷Weber distinguished between objective and subjective probability. The former consists in the fact that certain behavior can be conceived with both causal adequacy and adequacy on the level of meaning without regard to the subjective experiences of the actor. The latter looks forward into the future from the vantage point of the actor (Schuetz, 1967: 237).

⁸Both empirical and eidetic ideal types can be constructed. By empirical is meant "derived from the senses," and by eidetic is meant "derived from essential insight" (Schuetz, 1967: 244).

⁹In a recent article, Hindess (1972) has gone so far as to claim that Schuetz never legitimately represented Husserl's position:

"In fact Schutz's phenomenology involves a gross distortion of Husserl. Far from being phenomenologically founded, Schutz's sociology employs a phenomenological gloss to support its basic and unquestioned premise that 'the world of objective mind' can be reduced to the actions of individuals" (1972: 6).

In brief, Hindess concluded that Schuetz's humanism cost him the possibility of discovering social or historical laws.

¹⁰In more recent literature, attempts are being made to reinterpret the positions of the masters of sociological theory. For instance, Giddens (1971, 1972a, 1972b) re-examines the relations among Durkheim, Weber, and Karl Marx from a standpoint which is critical of the interpretation of Talcott Parsons and followers. According to Giddens, secondary writers have underplayed or missed the historical dimension in Weber and Durkheim. Emphasis has been upon the attempt to formulate a body of ahistorical "general theory," which directs attention away from the problems of social change or development (Giddens, 1971: 246). Although Giddens' interpretation of Weber and Durkheim varies from that of Parsons, this will not affect our inquiry in any significant way since Giddens' interpretation differs in a substantive rather than methodological way. Nevertheless, this reason is only suggestive, and further study is necessary before this reason can be forwarded as conclusive in any sense.

¹¹In Weber's terms, perhaps one could call Ricoeur's method the "ideal typical methodology."

¹²According to Weber, whoever accepts the proposition that the knowledge of historical reality can or should be a presuppositionless copy of objective facts will deny the value of the ideal type.

¹³In this discussion, ideal type refers to Generalized Ideal Type. The distinction among three ideal types made by von Shelling is not relevant for our present purposes (see discussion of Weber in Chapter 6).

¹⁴This is the same conclusion and main criticism that Talcott Parsons has levied against Weber's methodology.

¹⁵The following discussion rests heavily on Talcott Parsons' views on Pareto's methodology (see Parsons, 1968: Chapters 5 and 6).

¹⁶ According to Parsons (1968, 1: 293), Pareto approached the theory of action without any positivistic dogmas on a methodological level which would have committed him in advance to a positivistic system of theory. Thus Pareto avoided many of the difficulties that Durkheim was forced to confront.

¹⁷ Pareto was directly concerned only with linguistic expressions. The concrete systems of action were implicit in Pareto's work, but they only emerged later.

¹⁸ Pareto explicitly acknowledges the primacy of language in that he generated a class of derivations which he called "Verbal Proofs."

¹⁹ It is relevant to note that logical action is not an element in Pareto's theoretical system. On the contrary, it is employed for pragmatic purposes as an explanatory tool (Parsons, 1968, 1: 186).

²⁰ Of course, the validity of this statement is questionable if viewed from a phenomenological perspective. Recall Husserl's maxim that phenomenology aims to end where the mundane sciences begin. That is, phenomenology is complementary rather than antithetical to positive empirical sciences. By implication, even Durkheim's early positivist methodology would be related to phenomenology.

²¹ Anthony Giddens (1971: 106-07) fervently opposes the Parsonian view that Durkheim's emphasis on the specific character of symbols in The Elementary Forms signals a sudden capitulation to idealism. Moreover, Giddens suggests that the tendency to misunderstand Durkheim's equation between "society" and "the sacred" has supported the false notion that Durkheim ceded to idealism. Apart from other specific criticisms, Giddens challenges the basic Parsonian view that Durkheim was primarily concerned with the problem of order. Giddens maintains that:

"Durkheim always emphasized the crucial significance of the historical dimension in sociology, and I believe that an appreciation of this leads to quite a different assessment of Durkheim's thought from that which is ordinarily given. Durkheim was not primarily concerned with 'the problem of order', but with the problem of 'the changing nature of order' in the context of a definite conception of social development" (1971: ix).

²² Just as positivism eliminates the creative, voluntaristic character of action by dispensing with the analytical significance of values, and the other normative elements by making them epiphenomena, so idealism has the same effect for the opposite reason--idealism eliminates the reality of the obstacles to the realization of values (Parsons, 1968, 1: 446).

²³ In Parsons' view, the concept of system is vital to science. Besides empirical validity and conceptual precision, there are two other essential criteria of the scientific usefulness of sets of theoretical propositions, namely, their level of generality with reference to empirical phenomena and their logical integration with each other. The concept of system is essentially nothing but an application of one criterion of logical integration of generalized propositions.

²⁴ According to Parsons, this must be granted to be empirical observation, otherwise not only his investigation, but also the works of all the writers that he discusses, and all others which involve the subjective aspect of action, must be denied scientific status (Parsons, 1968, 11: 697).

²⁵ Alvin Gouldner (1970: 209) has an extremely critical view of the worth of Parsons' excessive conceptualization. In Gouldner's words: "Parsons' categories thus function as a symbolic representation and constitution of the social world's oneness. This oneness is expressed and communicated by the very weaknesses of his work; it is conceptually promoted by the promiscuous combining, blending, bleeding, leaking of his concepts, one into the other, by their fungus-like capacity to grow out in all directions from a single spore and to cover the entire territory in shingled layers."

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is an excellent thing to travel in many countries, but the traveler who refuses to take any cognizance of the local peculiarities and customs of the countries he visits is likely to get into trouble. Many a traveler has lost his life through sheer ignorance of these things.

--Talcott Parsons (1968, 11: 759)

The context of the previous remark was Parsons' sympathetic agreement with those scholars who have protested against attempts to establish rigid boundaries between disciplines. Nevertheless, his advocacy of "scientific wanderlust" is qualified with this caution: "It is a good thing to know what you are doing" (1968, II: 759). Since this dissertation has travelled through several domains of inquiry, it is relevant to open the concluding chapter with a brief summary of the general direction taken. This recapitulation of key points is a useful introduction to the presentation of the main conclusions of the study. Subsequently, implications relevant for future research are presented under the heading of "Contemporary Positions and General Implications"; and, finally, the eighth chapter terminates with a general discussion of the current rapprochement between science and philosophy.

GENERAL SUMMARY

The overall aim of this inquiry was to relate phenomenology to sociology. In particular, the study sought to correlate phenomenological method with the methodological approaches of selected social action theorists. The objective was to identify a point of convergence between phenomenology and the methodology of social action.

The historical point of origin for this study was the Methodenstreit and the subsequent crisis of European sciences. In response to the issues raised during the Crisis, a large number of intellectual traditions emerged, among them Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy.

Thus the historical review of the phenomenological movement commenced with a discussion and critical assessment of Husserl's perspective. During the course of his intellectual development, Husserl's program shifted from a "pure" to a more existentially inclined version of phenomenology. Similarly, this shift is reflected in the programs formulated by many post-Husserlian phenomenologists who sought to circumvent the idealistic tendencies and unfortunate solipsism accompanying Husserl's early works.

Objecting to Husserl's suspension of ontology, Heidegger transcended beyond the limits imposed by Husserl's phenomenological reduction. Later, Jean-Paul Sartre, who also disapproved of Husserl's exclusion of ontology, sought to "liberate" consciousness by radicalizing Husserl's phenomenological method. Not until Merleau-Ponty was the debt of the existential phenomenologists to Husserl explicitly acknowledged. The existential element had always been an integral (albeit dormant) feature of Husserlian phenomenological philosophy. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological reduction continually operated to unfold the complexity of the perceptual world. Finally, the survey of the phenomenological movement terminated with a discussion of Paul Ricoeur.

The importance of Ricoeur's position was his recognition of the primacy of the question of language and, consequently, his attempt to formulate phenomenology on a linguistic rather than perceptual basis. In addition, Ricoeur drew attention away from the later or so-called Lebenswelt Husserl and thus reintroduced the significance of Husserl of the Ideas. The study concluded that Ricoeur's program exhibited a refined and critically developed phenomenological method. While careful to

maintain ties with Husserl, Ricoeur also incorporated applicable modifications made by Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others. As a result of the historical survey of selected phenomenological perspectives, Ricoeur's method was adopted as the criterion for the assessment of the methodology of four social action theorists: Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons.

Prior to analyzing these positions, an overview of the perspective and particular methodology of each social action theorist was presented. Subsequently, each methodology was judged according to its affinity (similarities and differences) to three elements which comprise Ricoeur's methodic procedure--hermeneutics, dialectics, and diagnostics (intentional analysis). Based on the results of the analysis, it now remains to state what conclusions can be drawn from this inquiry. But, before making any definitive statements, it is relevant to briefly discuss in what fashion the analysis is suggestive of the convergence between phenomenology and social action methodologies.

It is incontestable that Ricoeur maintains that the prime focus for phenomenological philosophy is the question of language. The immediate question is to discern to what extent the social action theorists also recognize the primacy of language. Based on this analysis, the four social action theorists can be crudely ranked according to the degree of emphasis on the variable of language. From low to high, the ranking places Durkheim first, followed by Weber, Pareto, and Parsons. That is, Durkheim's emphasis on the variable of language is low. Even his methodological shift from sociologistic positivism to sociological epistemology still leaves the question of language in a germinal state.

On the other hand, Parsons' recognition is explicit and emphatic. For that matter, the class of facts with which Parsons deals are linguistic expressions.

The most significant conclusion of Parsons' The Structure of Social Action was that the works of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber all converge toward a voluntaristic theory of action. Moreover, the relevance of a voluntaristic theory of action, according to Parsons, was that it represented an attempt to mediate between positivistic and idealistic positions. Historically, both these positions have been antagonistic since they both have been imperialistic in the sense of attempting to make their own methodological principles cover the entire field of things knowable. However, this inquiry has contended that neither Weber, Pareto, Durkheim, nor Parsons has elaborated a precise and clear method for the conceptualization of social action. Phenomenology as method was postulated as relevant in this regard.

Of the methodological positions examined, that of Talcott Parsons seems most parallel to phenomenological method. Yet, Parsons was not immune to the problems of imprecise and unclear conceptualization. Indeed, this has always been a focal point for Parsonian critics. Although Parsons' recognition (though unelaborated) of the relevance of phenomenology in The Structure of Social Action suggested promise, none of the subsequent publications mentioned the phenomenological component. Even though Parsons parallels Ricoeur in that both are fully cognizant of the primacy of language, Parsons' failure to fully appreciate the merits of phenomenology have prevented him from attaining the means to conceptual clarity afforded by Ricoeur's approach.

Thus far, the discussion is only very suggestive of the convergence of phenomenology and social action methodology on the essential variable of language. Subsequently, supportive evidence is rallied to confirm suspicions about the direction and point of convergence between phenomenological and social action traditions.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

From the review of phenomenological programs, it was concluded that Ricoeur's position was applicable to the analysis of social action methodologies. The general results of this analysis are summarized in Table 2 below. Based on these results, a number of general findings are posited.

A significant finding is that all four social action methodologies are correlated with Ricoeur's phenomenological method; however, individual variations exist with respect to each of the three criteria of hermeneutics, diagnostics, and dialectics. First, the criterion of hermeneutics was manifest in all but Durkheim's work. Second, although diagnostics was present in all four methodologies, this criterion was manifest only in Weber and Pareto. Third, the dialectic was absent from all programs except that of Parsons where it appeared only in latent form.

The results also indicate that Parsonian methodology is most similar to Ricoeur's phenomenological method,¹ whereas Durkheim's method is least similar. Although the analysis specified that Weber is more similar to Ricoeur than is Pareto, this statement warrants qualification. In Chapter 7, it was maintained that Pareto had a better understanding than did Weber of the abstractness of analytical concepts in science.

Table 2

Summary of Analysis of Social Action Methodologies

Methodology Analyzed	Analytical Criteria		
	Hermeneutics	Diagnostics or Intentional Analysis	Dialectics
Weber	PM	PM	A
Pareto	PM	PL	A
Durkheim	PL	PL	A
Parsons	PM	PM	PL

Key: P = Presence of Criterion

A = Absence of Criterion

M = Criterion manifest, i.e., correspondence exhibited or distinct (even though terminology may differ)

L = Criterion latent, i.e., correspondence not readily apparent (tends to emerge as a result of analysis)

The discrepancy between this statement and the results of the analysis can be accounted for by noting that Pareto displayed a more explicit awareness than did Weber of the primacy of language. The analysis in this inquiry served to elucidate what may not have been that apparent to Weber himself.²

With reference to the question of the point of convergence between phenomenological philosophy and social action methodology, the results of the analysis are adequate to conclude that convergence occurs on the essential variable of language. The hermeneutic factor was present in all four methodological positions. And wherever the diagnostic

component was manifest, this factor tended to foster and support the hermeneutic function of interpreting the meaning of linguistic expressions.

A negative conclusion must be drawn from the results related to the dialectical criterion. Three out of four social action theorists did not incorporate dialectics; and, furthermore, the fourth program exhibited this component only in latent form. Consequently, Ricoeur's phenomenological method is superior to social action methodologies since dialectics implies a dynamic as opposed to static procedure.

The main tasks for this inquiry were: (1) to historically trace the phenomenological and social action traditions from their advent in the crisis of European sciences to a point of convergence; (2) to show that phenomenology has metatheoretical relevance for sociology; and (3) to illustrate that phenomenology is applicable as a method for conceptualization of social action. In the matter of convergence, then, this inquiry has offered two responses. On the one hand, convergence emerged by tracing the development of two intellectual traditions. On the other hand, convergence was detected through an analysis aimed specifically at revealing the affinity between phenomenological method and the methodologies of social action. Nevertheless, these results do not suggest themselves as an ultimate conclusion to the development of these two intellectual traditions. It is relevant to now turn to a discussion of some contemporary position which foster a continuation of the debate as to the role of phenomenology and hermeneutics in social science.

CONTEMPORARY POSITIONS AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

In addition to the possibility of conceptualizing social action phenomenologically, other approaches have been taken in analyzing social action. For instance, the logical analysis of mundane action has been undertaken by praxiology, which concerns itself with a general theory of efficient action. The objective of the praxiologist is the technique of good, efficient work as such, indications and warnings important for all work which is intended to achieve maximum effectiveness (Kotarbiński, 1965: 1). According to Kotarbiński, it is an extraordinary paradox that man has not succeeded in formulating a "grammar of action." Since man has already made large numbers of observations concerning the effectiveness of various forms of action, an important task for the theorist is to clarify and systematize these observations. Consequently, Kotarbiński states that his goal is to contribute in some measure to the implementation of those tasks of praxiology which consist in registering and ordering existing concepts (1965: 13).

The praxiologist is not concerned with explanation, but rather with a logical analysis of the structure of action. Taking conceptions such as intention, purpose, and means-end as given, the praxiologist operates without questioning these categories. Thus, the praxiologist focusses attention on the structure of action rather than on the structure of experience. While the praxiologist shares with the phenomenological and sociological approaches a concern with action, the praxiologist's narrow technical sense of action is phenomenologically and theoretically deficient. Since something more than a theory limited

to efficient action is desirable, other approaches must be explored.

An explicit relation between phenomenology and social action tradition emerges from more recent developments by Richard Jung (1965; 1971).³ Drawing on the classical tradition of action (particularly the Parsonian conception of action), Jung employs phenomenology as the method of conceptualization appropriate for the construction of a General Theory of Action. The General Theory of Action conceptualizes behavior of individuals in environments phenomenologically as actions constrained by systems of meanings; it constructs actors and situations as the sources of meanings; it explains action cybernetically as the mutual disturbance and regulation by an actor and a situation.

The General Theory of Action postulates that separate conceptualization and analysis of three special processes is necessary and sufficient for complete analysis of action. Each of the three processes expresses a different fundamental propensity of action. While embedded in the common conceptual and explanatory format of the General Theory, the analysis of each process also requires special concepts, mechanisms, and principles. Thus, the actual analysis of action is accomplished by three Special Theories of Action: (1) the Special Theory of Orientation, (2) the Special Theory of Motivation, and (3) the Special Theory of Decision.

Jung's formulations are especially relevant, since some of his views support the main contentions of our study. His approach shares with phenomenology the analysis of experience through reflection. To Jung, "experience" (like ontology or noumena) is inaccessible, thus it is

possible only to imagine that "experience" is there. To analyze "experience," one must proceed through a phenomenological analysis of discourse. In other words, "categories of experience" produce systems of discourse which can be phenomenologically analyzed. At this point, Jung's views depart from conventional phenomenological treatments of action. While phenomenology can provide different metaphysics of action, Jung contends that it cannot provide an explanation of action. There can be no phenomenological explanation, for even the phenomenological concept of "intention" is a category and not an explanation of experience. To explain social action, Jung employs a scientific mode of explanation which is based on the functional and cybernetic models.

The problematics of explanation are often circumvented by designating something as ontological, or else by accepting a category as having explained a phenomenon. In the former case, Jung argues that phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Ricoeur have attempted to avoid explanation by turning to ontology. For example, Jung would claim that Ricoeur has naively attempted to explain experience through the category of will.

Categories such as "experience" or "self" do not reside in action but reside in social existence which is prior to essence and experience. Knowledge is primarily socially transmitted, and meaning arises through one's being involved with the social. Action, as man's discourse with the world, stands out and can be analyzed, since meanings are coded in the action. Jung's position departs markedly from the Parsonian view of social action and Kotarbiński's praxiology by rejecting the means-end schema. In contra-distinction to Parsons, Jung makes action the focus of

analysis, rather than the actor and the situation. Meaning is reflected in actions and actions can be described phenomenologically.

Notwithstanding the many new avenues developed in Jung's formulations, his perspective does support the main conclusions of this inquiry. First, Jung's conception of action emerges as a refinement of the classical tradition of action; therefore, his program is logically consistent with the historical direction of my study. Second, by analyzing "experience" through a phenomenological analysis of discourse, Jung's views support my contention that the phenomenological and social action traditions converge at a point which explicitly acknowledges the primacy of the question of language. The question now arises as to what are the broader implications of this finding?

The relevance of the question of language arises in conjunction with attempts to explain and/or understand the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. It would be impossible to outline (let alone locate) all the attempts to solve this question. For illustration, a few comments are made on Husserl's position.

Husserl fervently believed that an attempt must be made (however preliminary) to unmask the intersubjectivity dilemma, since only by understanding transcendental intersubjectivity is it possible to account for the constitution of the real world as existing for everyone. Consequently, in his later works, Husserl speaks frequently of an intermonadic universe and thus obviously assumes a plurality of transcendental egos. However, it is one of the most difficult problems of phenomenology--perhaps an insoluble one--to reconcile the notion of the transcendental Ego as the source of the idea of a plurality of coexistent transcendental

subjects. Moreover, it is also doubtful whether or not such an attempt can succeed at all within the transcendental sphere. Like other approaches, Husserl's did not succeed, hence the question of intersubjectivity still remains a legitimate focus for inquiry.

In general terms, intersubjectivity refers to a plurality of subjectivities which share a common world. The "common world" can refer to anything, for example, knowledge, language, concepts, and so forth. From the intersubjective perspective, understanding arises in the course of an interaction. Yet, another position, transsubjectivity, maintains that understanding is possible only because language, which is internalized by the individual, is a precondition for sharing experiences with others. Even though the categories of experience may well be conditioned by social factors beyond the realm of the individual's own experience, it is also possible that this latter realm contributes to the generation of categories peculiar to describing unique sorts of experience. Many views have been advanced to account for the individual and/or social nature of language. A few positions are mentioned below.

Some recent remarks by Karl-Otto Apel (1972) raise the question of intersubjective communication within the broader context of the old, unresolved, and continuing debate as to the relation between science and the humanities. Because the neo-positivistic logic of unified science has failed to reflect upon the fact that all cognition of object presupposes "understanding" as a means of intersubjective communication, Apel (1972: 4) contends that the question remains as to whether the methodology in the humanities should not presuppose a relation to social praxis that is complementary to the ideal objectification of human behavior, namely,

unrestricted communication by way of intersubjective "understanding."

Beside explanation, understanding is necessary to provide an adequate basis for the methodology of the humanities. In Apel's view, neo-positivists have not comprehended the meta-scientific rationality of intersubjective discourse which is mediated by the explication of concepts and the interpretation of intentions. Thus, the hermeneutic preliminaries to meaning-conventions are conditions of the possibility and validity of scientific objectivity. For instance, the explication of conceptual meanings is a precondition for scientific objectivity. Hence, in the long run, the pragmatic criterion for the validity of conceptual meanings can be found in their contribution to the formation of meaning-conventions in the interpretation-community (Apel, 1972: 29). The broader implications of this stance emerge in Apel's vision of the methodological pattern for a critical social science. This vision entails the dialectical mediation of communicative understanding (especially human self-understanding) by the quasi-naturalistic objectification and explanation of human behavior and human history (Apel, 1972: 34). Moreover, the implication of relating such a critical social science to the efficient practice of life are to provoke public self-reflection, and the emancipation of men as subjects.

While Apel's remarks are a recent vindication of the transsubjective perspective, the importance of transsubjectivity has long been recognized. One noteworthy position is that of Emile Durkheim. Underlying Durkheim's work is the theme of an external order to which man is oriented. The primacy of the social factor is clearly expressed through Durkheim's criterion of "exteriority." For Durkheim, there are two related senses

in which social facts are "external" to the individual: (1) every man is born into an ongoing, structured society which conditions his personality; and (2) any one individual is only a single element within the totality of relationships which constitutes a society; therefore, these relationships are not the creation of any single individual, but rather are constituted by multiple interactions between individuals.⁴ The implication of Durkheim's position is that language is socially conditioned and socially transmitted; therefore, transsubjectivity accounts for a plurality of subjectivities.

Following the advent of ethnology and ethnography around the turn of the 20th century, later developments in cultural anthropology focussed attention on the question as to the relation between language and culture. Edward Sapir drew the attention of anthropologists to the correlation between language and culture and particularly the recognition that linguistic and cultural relativity co-vary. Following Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf continued to study this correlation, but with less emphasis on the predominance of language over culture. The well-known "Whorfian hypothesis" holds that language patterns and cultural norms have grown up together, constantly influencing one another. But, in this relation, the nature of language is the factor that limits free plasticity, thus rigidifying channels of development.

While the views of Whorf suggested that fixed, patterned relations could be found in language, his position did not indicate what the nature of those relations might be. The search for universal structures in language has been directly undertaken by such eminent scholars as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Noam Chomsky. Chomsky (1972) argues that the

general principles which determine the form of grammatical rules in particular languages are to a considerable extent common to all human languages. Furthermore, Chomsky claims that the principles underlying the structure of language are biologically determined; that is, the capacity for language has a genetic basis. If Chomsky's claim is legitimate, then his theory of transformational grammar provides an advanced, sophisticated description and explanation of the structure of human language.

Lévi-Strauss (1967b), in seeking to establish universal, a priori truths valid for all "human minds," examines the question of the relation between language and experience. In Lévi-Strauss' view, the "human mind" can be reached through the structural aspects of the unconscious; and the unconscious is to be approached through the study of symbolism. There is a basic contrast in the history of the human mind, between symbolism, which displays a character of discontinuity, and knowledge, which is marked by continuity. It is in this sense that the symbolic function is not an expression of society but its origin. Hence Lévi-Strauss is concerned with detecting the universal, a priori structure of language and myth.

The well-known position of Ferdinand de Saussure represents an attempt to account for both the individual and social character of language. Language is not a function of the speaker, it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. Language is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty (Saussure, 1966: 9). Language is never complete in any speaker,

existing perfectly only within a collectivity, for language embraces the sum total of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals. On the other hand, speaking is an individual act which is both willful and intellectual. Within the act of speaking, it is relevant to distinguish between the combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his thought and the psychophysical mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations. Speaking is always executed by the individual, for the individual is the master of speaking (Saussure, 1966: 13).

Quite recently, Jürgen Habermas (1970a, 1970b) has picked up the theme of the relevance of speech in communication. According to Habermas, communicative competence means the mastery of an ideal speech situation. The concept of the ideal speech situation consists of the supposition that the motivational base of all actions is organized linguistically, that is, within the structure of potential speech. This model of pure communicative action is relevant for the design of pure intersubjectivity. Habermas assumes that social action is not only controlled by motives which coincide with the intentions of the actor-speaker but also by motives excluded from public communication and fixed to pre-linguistic symbol organization. The greater the share of pre-linguistically fixed motivations which cannot be converted readily in public communication, the greater the deviance from the model of pure communicative action.

Without further elaboration, it can be stated that the primacy of the question of language provides a continual source of stimulation in the production of varying views as to the individual versus the social

nature of communication. Thus far, our inquiry has stressed the interrelation between sociology and phenomenological philosophy. This interrelation can be viewed in the context of a general rapprochement between philosophy and science, which is currently occurring.

GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN REVISITED

The interest in mediation of tradition, which, to begin with, was an external interest, that is, one originally emanating from a need of society at large, became an internal interest when the Geisteswissenschaften had reached a certain autonomy. According to Radnitzky (1970: 17-18), it appears that the disciplines of the Geisteswissenschaften have been too exclusively guided by internal interests, and that this has contributed to the fact that, in circles outside the community of cultural scientists, they have of late not been regarded as particularly useful. Thus, the theme of the "crisis of humanities" has become topical. Many new challenges are being expressed through a reconsideration of the general relation between philosophy and science.

One controversial and widely known position is that taken by Thomas S. Kuhn (1970). According to Kuhn, science has a dual nature because it is characterized by two developmental episodes: (1) normal or paradigm-based science, and (2) revolutionary science which begins with crisis in the paradigm theory followed by a proliferation of theories culminating in the rejection of the old paradigm theory and acceptance of a new paradigm.⁵ Furthermore, Kuhn contends that there is no neutral observation language. Every description of phenomena will be in the terminology of some theory, paradigm, metaphysic, or world view

implicit in ordinary language. For the purpose of science, it can be said that what is a scientific fact will be in an important sense determined by the dominant paradigm, for descriptions of some aspect of phenomena must be couched in the language of the current scientific theory. Should this not be possible, such an observation of phenomena will appear to be anomalous and will not be a fullfledged scientific fact until the anomaly is removed.

Paul K. Feyerabend (1962, 1965) has put forth another contemporary view of science which is somewhat related to that of Kuhn. Feyerabend's position is that the terms of any two successive theories within the same domain will have undergone a change in meaning (1962: 28-29). Such transformations in the meaning of scientific terms is the main reason why successive scientific theories are incompatible and incommensurable. On this point, Feyerabend's views are to some extent in agreement with those of Kuhn. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend claim that there is no pure observation language in terms of which we can arrive at a neutral and pre-theoretical description of nature. Thus, both Feyerabend and Kuhn hold that descriptions of facts are theory- or paradigm-laden (Lashchyk, 1969: 109). However, Kuhn and Feyerabend do differ in a number of ways, the most significant being Feyerabend's advocacy of the doctrines of theoretical pluralism. Feyerabend holds that the existence of partly overlapping, mutually inconsistent and yet empirically adequate theories is not only possible but also required (Feyerabend, 1965: 218).⁶

Yet another relevant viewpoint is found in Jürgen Habermas' (1971) case for a critical social science. Habermas has an image of man in which the idea of practical wisdom, or reason, is central (in the

Kantian sense). An image/ideal of society in which the idea of reasonable practice of life is central is based upon this image of man. Moreover, Habermas' image of man presupposes the emancipatory/hermeneutic interest, the striving after the emancipation of the individual. Following closely in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and Husserl, Habermas' vision is that of the "full transparency of man" and through it the rationalized practice of life. Like Popper's social philosophy, Habermas' social philosophy is "individualcentric"--but only in the sense that it is the identity and freedom of the individual which is the center of concern (Radnitzky, 1970: 149). Using this image of man as a base, Habermas proposes a galactic program for the social sciences which entails two complementary types of sociology: (1) an empirical sociology whose research-guiding interest is technical with the purposes of studying rational political action; and (2) a critical sociology whose research-guiding interest is the hermeneutic/emancipatory interest. The critical sociology provides the wider context within which the empirical sociology is couched. Furthermore, critical sociology provides the base for a gradual approximation to the ideal of self-transparency (at the individual level) and to the ideal of a fully open society (at the societal and institutional level).

The writings of Karl-Otto Apel are also relevant in the context of the discussion of contemporary positions which advocate the rapprochement of science and philosophy. According to Apel, the hermeneutic Geisteswissenschaften sought only to "understand" the meaning of actions. The new challenge is to "explain" as well as "understand" action (Apel, 1967: 20-21). Apel's image of the human sciences is based upon the model

of the development of knowledge in the psychoanalytic situation. The applicability of the said model of the development of knowledge to human sciences hinges upon the world-picture hypothesis (of philosophical anthropology) that human beings are not fully transparent-to-themselves as regards their own motivation nor with respect to the intention of the discourses they produce. This means that part of the intentions of the texts as well as part of the motivation is not amenable to any method of hermeneutic understanding alone but necessitates also causal analysis, the paradigm of which we find in the natural sciences (Apel, 1967: 25-27). This leads to Apel's main thesis which Radnitzky summarized as follows:

Natural sciences and human science--in the science of man--and quasi-naturalistic and hermeneutic approach--in human science--are mediating each other, so that in each the development of knowledge proceeds by a continuous tacking between the two approaches or levels (1970, II: 65).

In order to legitimate such a galactic program of human sciences, Apel spells out an ethical ground-plan which could bring about a unified philosophical mediation of theory and practice. In brief, an ethics that would point the way out of the dilemma of particularism versus collectivity is made in calling for the recognition that the emancipation of the individual is mediated through the emancipation of humanity and, vice versa, the emancipation of humanity is mediated through the individual.

Radnitzky (1970) has reviewed several major positions related to the criticist frame in an attempt to contribute to the possibility of its legitimation. In general, Radnitzky's position is compatible with the positions previously discussed. The only absolute commitment is to the criticist frame. However, Radnitzky suggests that justifying the criticist frame by a criticist social ethics must be complemented by an

existentialist ethics in the private domain of the individual (1970, II: 171-72). This concession arises in order to deal with the question of whether or not the criticist frame itself must be or not be subject to criticism.

Popper's answer to this question is that the adoption of the criticist frame is a moral decision, that is, the choice of a way of life. Habermas considers Popper's defense of the criticist frame unsatisfactory. To answer this question, Habermas turns to the level of philosophical anthropology (which Popper just touches) and globalizes the issue by tracing traits in this "faith" or way of life which reveal the basic unity of mankind. On the other hand, Radnitzky's answer is to make one concession to the existential skeptic:

When talking I am already within the criticist frame--this goes beyond Popper. But my keeping within it, or, if you wish, my adopting it for the future, contains an uneliminable a-rational element in the sense that I cannot be forced to do so in the name of Reason or of Talking or of Human Existence (existence as human being in the full sense) because there is always the possibility open to me to reject all: Reason, talk and life itself (be demonstrating rather than by arguing). This much, we think, must be conceded to the existential solipsist or existential sceptic (1970, II: 183).

Radnitzky believes that the two ideals, that of being transparent to oneself and that of the open society, are not Utopias, but rather ideals that may generate criteria which regulate the deepening and widening of the historical dialogue of humanity and guide the practice of life in an era where uncertainty is more acutely than ever before felt to be the basic ingredient of the human condition.

To summarize, all of these contemporary positions concur that the useful direction for future investigation follows the general

prescriptions of a critical social science. The bid for a critical social science is simultaneously a recognition and an admission that all knowledge and all understanding is only partial and, therefore, that an integrated perspective which permits both complementary and competing claims is most fruitful. While the view that philosophy and science are interdependent is not new, this view has experienced a resurgence in recent times.⁷ With some simplification, we might summarize this view as "an integrated image of science, stressing the human side of this thoroughly human enterprise" (Tennessen, 1973). The reason for a critical evaluation of philosophy by science, and of science by philosophy, is aptly expressed in these terms:

But this necessity of criticising philosophical positions from a scientific point of view is not the only important relation of the two sets of disciplines. Every system of scientific theory involves by implication philosophical consequences, both positive and negative. This is nothing more than a corollary of the rational unity of cognitive experience. Then it is also true that every system of scientific theory involves philosophical assumptions (Parsons, 1968; 22).

Yet, for writers such as Stephan Strasser, the rapprochement of empirical human sciences and philosophy also signals the emergence of a new phase in Western thought (1963: 207). Strasser maintains that the philosophy to be pursued will be primarily metaphysical since it is impossible to pursue empirical human science without a vision. This vision must be metaphysical because the task of the philosopher is to offer the empirical scientist an horizon of higher intelligibility, that is, a vision of the meaning of the facts of experience (Strasser, 1963: 237). However, no one vision is to be accepted as the "correct" vision, but rather alternative visions and thus varying world views are permissible.

Since no interpretation can claim to incorporate everything, the possibility of a pluralist metaphysics must be entertained, with opposing interpretations serving to critically examine and thus mediate one another.

The plausibility of varying world views arises in conjunction with the demands of a criticist frame of reference. A critical dialogue between the philosopher and the empirical human scientist serves to mediate the findings from both domains of inquiry. The criticist frame ensures that the debate continues, hence the possibility of new and varying interpretations is always present. And, furthermore, phenomenology and hermeneutics play a role in fostering a continuing critical debate between philosopher and empirical scientist. Phenomenology seeks to reveal more of the richness and complexity of man, his relation to other men, and to the world. In this vein, Merleau-Ponty (1962: xxi) has aptly stated that the task of phenomenology is by its very nature unending. In a complementary sense, the task of hermeneutics is to continually mediate interpretations of traditions and to expose dormant and concealed meanings.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8

¹A corollary to this conclusion is that Parsons' approximation to phenomenology may be the consequence of his synthesizing efforts in The Structure of Social Action. That is, the phenomenological tendencies inherent in Weber, Pareto, and Durkheim were cumulated and emerged through Parsons' efforts.

²This explanation is logically consistent with the fact that Ricoeur's program served as an upper ideality limit which Weber's methodology only approximates.

³There are a number of pragmatic reasons for omitting the discussion of Jung's program from the body of the dissertation. First, Jung's program is only partly codified and no major representative publication has appeared at this time. Second, the published materials thus far signify only a general referent to phenomenological philosophy. There is no specification of particular phenomenological philosophers; therefore, it would have been premature to have integrated Jung's views on phenomenology into the review of selected phenomenologists. Third, the very precise and interdependent conceptualization in Jung's program would have necessitated a very extensive and elaborate discussion in order to correctly convey the intended meanings of terms. Limitations of space favored discussing Jung's views in more general terms; therefore, it was decided that this could best be accommodated in the concluding section of the inquiry.

⁴It is relevant to note that Giddens (1971: 86-87) maintains that unwarranted confusion has been created by secondary interpreters in discussing Durkheim's famous criterion of "exteriority." In Durkheim's view, no theory of analysis which begins from the "individual," in either of the two senses mentioned above, can adequately grasp the specific properties of social phenomena. This is a conceptual point, and thus it should be apparent that "exteriority" is not an empirical criterion. On the other hand, Durkheim's second criterion--"constraint"--is empirical since Durkheim applied his conception of constraint in specifying the nature of social facts.

⁵In general terms, Kuhn's notion of "paradigm" can be taken to designate an accepted model or pattern (i.e., rules and standards) which most researchers committed to a given domain of inquiry adhere to at a given point in time (Kuhn, 1970: 17). However, Kuhn's definition and usage of "paradigm" itself is problematic. Lashchuk (1969: 9) indicates that he isolated five clusters of usage of "paradigm" by Kuhn. Also, Masterman (1970) counted twenty-one different usages of "paradigm" by Kuhn, which she categorized into three main groups: metaphysical, sociological, and construct paradigms. Much of the skepticism surrounding Kuhn's work, particularly from the logical positivist and logical empiricism schools, is couched in the multiple usage of the concept of "paradigm."

⁶ It is relevant to note that Karl Popper's position parallels that of Feyerabend in many respects. Since Popper's position was mentioned in Chapter 1, his views are not repeated here.

⁷ It is relevant to note that philosophy and science are independent as well as interdependent. Parsons (1968, 25, footnote 2) points out that it is a common but most serious fallacy to think that interdependence implies absence of independence. No two entities can be interdependent which are not at the same time independent in certain respects.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
ADDENDUM TO DISCUSSION
OF HERMENEUTICS

Two influences on the development of hermeneutics warrant mentioning here. Notwithstanding the lack of English translations of their works, it would not have been appropriate to have placed these writers into the main body of the text, since this would have disrupted the historical continuity which this study sought.

Wilhelm Dilthey, who was alluded to earlier in the inquiry, was a forerunner of hermeneutics. Furthermore, recent contributions by Hans-Georg Gadamer are important. Following Heidegger, Gadamer orients his thinking to the more philosophical question of what understanding itself is. While the tradition following Dilthey (particularly the works of Emilio Betti) aims to provide a general theory of how "objectivations" of human experience can be interpreted, Gadamer claims that to speak of "objectively valid interpretations" is naive, since to do so assumes that it is possible to understand from some standpoint outside of history (Palmer, 1969: 46). Gadamer maintains that understanding is an historical act and as such is always connected to the present.

The key distinction between Gadamer and the tradition following Dilthey is that Gadamer maintains that he is simply describing what is; that is, he is doing ontology and not methodology. In this respect, Gadamer's position is diametrically opposed to Ricoeur's position in which hermeneutics appears as one of three essential elements of phenomenological method. In order to explore this matter further, it is relevant to highlight both Dilthey's and Gadamer's positions.

Dilthey maintained that concrete, historical, lived experience and not speculation must be the only admissible starting point for

a theory of the Geisteswissenschaften. Life itself is that out of which we must develop our thinking and toward which we direct our questioning, since behind life itself our thinking cannot go (Mandelbaum, 1967: 60-61). The categories of life are not rooted in a transcendental reality but in the reality of lived experience. Like Hegel, Dilthey believed that life is an historical reality; however, Dilthey saw history not as an absolute goal or a manifestation of absolute spirit but as an expression of life. According to Dilthey, the keynote for the human studies was "understanding."¹ Explanation was for science, whereas the human studies understand expressions of life. This is the message of Dilthey's hermeneutical formula: Experience, Expression, Understanding.² For Dilthey, man's self-understanding is not direct but indirect; thus, it must take an hermeneutical detour through fixed expressions dating back over the past. Dependent on history, self-understanding is essentially and necessarily historical (Palmer, 1969: 116).

Dilthey's contribution was to broaden the horizon of hermeneutics by placing it in the context of interpretation in the human studies. His thinking on the hermeneutical problem started very much in the shadow of Schliermacher's psychologism, and only gradually did he conceive of interpretation as focussed on the expression of "lived experience" without reference to its author (Palmer, 1969: 121). Nevertheless, Dilthey's contributions do not exempt his program from criticism. First, he did not fully succeed in extricating himself from the scientism and objectivity of the historical school which he had undertaken to transcend (Mandelbaum, 1967: 66-67). Second, Dilthey's category of "life" is suspiciously close to Hegel's "objective Spirit," however much Dilthey protested against

absolute idealism and tried to ground hermeneutics in empirical facts free from all metaphysics. And, third, Dilthey (like Schliermacher) can be criticized for viewing understanding as re-experiencing and reconstruction of the author's experience and therefore analogous to the act of creation (Palmer, 1969: 123).

Neither Dilthey's own hermeneutics nor that of Heidegger or Gadamer is conceivable except in terms of historicity. Historicity, taking its decisive beginning in Dilthey, provides the theoretical foundations for modern hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969: 117-18). Yet, with Gadamer, the conception of hermeneutics as the methodological basis for the Geisteswissenschaften is left behind and the status of method itself is called into question. According to Gadamer, truth eludes the methodical man. For Gadamer, truth is not reached methodically but dialectically. The dialectical approach to truth is seen as the antithesis of method, indeed, as a means of overcoming the tendency of method to prestructure the individual's way of seeing. In method, the inquiring subject leads, controls, and manipulates; in dialectic, the matter encountered poses the question to which the subject responds (Palmer, 1969: 165). Understanding is not conceived as a subjective process of man over and against an object but the way of being of man himself. Gadamer is not concerned with practical problems of formulating right principles for interpretation; rather, he wants to bring the phenomenon of understanding itself to light.

The basic Heideggerian conceptions of thinking, language, history, and human experience are carried over into Gadamer. Both Gadamer and Heidegger would agree that language is the reservoir and communicating

medium of tradition. For Heidegger and Gadamer, language, history, and being are all not only interrelated but interfused so that the linguisticity of being is at the same time its ontology (its "coming into being") and the medium of its historicity (Palmer, 1969: 177). In Gadamer's opinion, Dilthey is a perfect example of the scientific compulsion to method-oriented thought effectively preventing a gifted and sincere searcher for historicity from finding it. Gadamer sees Dilthey as the archetype of our own present loss of authentic historicity, reflected in our tendency to employ inductive methods to obtain "objectively valid" knowledge in literature (Palmer, 1969: 178-79).

Gadamer begins his examination of the hermeneutical experience by criticizing the prevailing concept of experience which is oriented toward knowing as a perceptual act and knowledge as a body of conceptual data (Palmer, 1969: 194). Over against the myth of purely conceptual and verifiable knowing, Gadamer places his historical and dialectical concept of "experience," where knowing is not simply a stream of perceptions but a happening, an event, an encounter. Although he does not share Hegel's presuppositions and conclusions, Gadamer finds in Hegel's dialectical account of experience the starting point for his own dialectical hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969: 195). For Gadamer, "experience" does not mean some kind of informational knowledge preserved about this or that. Rather, experience (close to ordinary language usage) refers to a non-objectified, and largely non-objectifiable accumulation of "understanding" which is often called wisdom (Palmer, 1969: 195). It is the "experienced" man who knows the limits of all anticipation and the insecurity of all human plans. Thus, true experience is experience of one's own historicity.

The dialectical character of experience is reflected in the movement and encounter with negativity found in all true questioning. To question genuinely means to "place in the open" because the answer is not yet determined (Palmer, 1969: 198-99). The openness of questioning, however, is not absolute because a question always has a certain direction. Hence, the sense of the question already contains the direction in which the answer to that question must come (if it is to be meaningful and appropriate). Real questioning, then, presupposes openness and at the same time it necessarily specifies boundaries (Palmer, 1969: 199). That being the case, Gadamer maintains that the one way to find the right question is through immersion in the subject-matter itself. A true dialogue is the opposite of an argument, for an argument holds to its opening response to the question. In hermeneutical dialogue, both the interpreter and the text are immersed in the tradition. And, one's partner in the dialogue is the text. The encounter with the horizon of the transmitted text becomes a moment of ontological disclosure:

The disclosure, in other words, comes as the kind of event whose structure is the structure of experience and the structure of question and answer; it is a dialectical matter. And what is the medium in and through which this ontological disclosure can take place in the dialectical event of experience as questioning and answer? What is the medium that is of such a universality that horizons can interfuse? What is the medium in which the cumulative experience of a whole historical people is hidden and stored? What is the medium that is inseparable from experience itself, inseparable from being? The answer must be: language (Palmer, 1969: 201).

Fundamental to Gadamer's conception of language is the rejection of both sign and symbol theories of the nature of language. Gadamer contends that the transformation of word into sign lies at the base of science with its ideal of exact, unambiguous concepts (Palmer, 1969: 201).

On the contrary, he points to the character of "living language" and our participation in it. Words are not something that belong to man but to the situation. One searches for the words that belong to the situation. The formation of words is not a product of reflection but of experience. It is not an expression of spirit or mind but of situation and being, for language discloses our lifeworld, not our environmental scientific world (Palmer, 1969: 203). Linguisticity is something that permeates the way of being-in-the-world of historical man. The hermeneutical experience is an encounter between heritage in the form of a transmitted text and the horizon of the interpreter. Experience is not so much something that comes prior to language, but rather experience itself occurs in and through language (Palmer, 1969: 207). It is precisely this deeper ontological dimension, accessible through language, that gives the hermeneutical experience its significance for the present life of the interpreter.

In sum, Gadamer asserts that human understanding *per se* is historical, linguistic, and dialectical. In the development of a questioning position designed to move beyond the confines of the subject-object schema, Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests a new kind of objectivity grounded in the fact that what is disclosed constitutes not a projection of subjectivity but something which acts on our understanding in presenting itself (Palmer, 1969: 212). Gadamer does not fall into Hegelian metaphysics which takes language as the instrument of subjectivity. Since language is both historical and finite, it must lead one in understanding the text. The task of hermeneutics is to take seriously the linguisticity of language and experience and to develop a truly

historical hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969: 214).

In order not to leave the reader with the impression that Gadamer's views are preferred, some criticisms of Gadamer's works are mentioned. Two principal objections have been advanced by Emilio Betti: (1) that Gadamer's work does not serve as a methodology or aid to methodology for the humane studies, and (2) that Gadamer jeopardizes the legitimacy of referring to the objective status of objects of interpretation, thus rendering questionable the objectivity of the interpretation itself (Palmer, 1969: 54). According to Betti, Gadamer is lost in a standardless existential subjectivity. Following Dilthey's lead, Betti's quest is to look for what is practical and useful to the interpreter. Unlike Gadamer, Betti seeks to discern right from wrong interpretations and to distinguish one type of interpretation from another. Nevertheless, Gadamer's position should not be rejected simply because of its anti-objectivism. Gadamer does not deny the possibility of hermeneutics as method; rather, Gadamer is merely interested in the broader question of the nature of understanding *per se*.

Although this inquiry is somewhat sympathetic with Gadamer's views, it is contended that the failure to mediate the results of subjectively oriented investigation with the findings of objective inquiry unnecessarily promotes one-sided accentuations. The danger of solipsism arises in conjunction with such one-sided views. In this respect, Ricoeur's regulation of an upper ideality limit by mediating with a lower obscurity limit (and vice versa) provides a better alternative. Gadamer, like Heidegger and Husserl, is probably making correct assertions; however, he risks being engulfed in pure subjectivity. In other words,

Gadamer risks the possibility of being unable to locate appropriate linguistic expressions to convey the sense of what it is. And yet, the direction taken by the investigator is in itself a volitional act. For instance, those who subscribe to Heideggerian viewpoints should listen to the call of Being, even at the risk of having little or nothing to say in response to that call.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A

¹ Understanding is not a mere act of thought but a transposition and re-experiencing of the world as another person meets it in lived experience. It is not a conscious, reflexive act of comparison but an operation of silent thought which accomplishes a pre-reflexive transposition of oneself into the other person (Palmer, 1969: 114-15; Mandelbaum, 1967: 62-63).

² Experience is intrinsically temporal, that is, historical in the deepest sense of the term. Thus, we understand the present really only in the horizon of past and future (Palmer, 1969: 111). For Dilthey, expression is not an embodiment of one person's feelings but rather an "expression of life." An expression can refer to an idea, a law, language, a social form, or anything that reflects the imprint of the inner life on man (Palmer, 1969: 112). As discussed in Footnote 1 above, understanding is reserved to designate the operation in which the "mind" (Geist) grasps the "mind" of the other person.

APPENDIX B

THE METHODOLOGICAL RELEVANCE
OF "BOUNDARY CONDITIONS"

The "boundary conditions" concept is of utmost importance in theoretical physics, for instance in the deduction of physical laws from physical theories whose fundamental hypotheses are expressed in terms of differential equations (Lindsay and Margenau, 1957: 49). The solutions of such equations involve both arbitrary functions and arbitrary constants and hence are at first of little concrete physical value. They obtain concreteness only through the imposition of special conditions specifying the type of function of greatest utility and evaluating the arbitrary constants. These special conditions, or boundary conditions, in physical theories are denoted as specific and general. A specific boundary condition is simply a postulated event in space and time expressed by the statement that a symbol, representing a certain physical quantity, shall have a definite value or set of values throughout a specified interval of time (Lindsay and Margenau, 1957: 49). However, for purposes of this inquiry, the general conception of boundary condition is more relevant.

The significance of general boundary conditions is that they impose fundamental restrictions on the type of activity possible for the system considered (Lindsay and Margenau, 1957: 53). While the specific conditions show us how to use a law to predict physical events and ignorance of them forces us back on probability considerations, the general boundary conditions fix the possible types of laws or the possible kinds of functions which enter into them. Although the mind can conceive countless forms of differential laws, the general boundary conditions

serve to pick out the useful ones. For example, the law of the conservation of mechanical energy appearing as the first integral of the equations of motion of a conservative dynamical system is a boundary condition in the sense that it is the mathematical expression of the fact that the system under consideration is conservative. It thereby delimits or fixes a boundary for the class of systems considered and separates them from all others. This is important because many of the specific laws obeying this general condition are found to be satisfied approximately in the world of physical phenomena (Lindsay and Margenau, 1957: 55). Having noted the significance of the conception of "boundary conditions" in physical theories, what, then, is their relevance for non-physical theories? To begin this discussion, it is useful to distinguish two analogous yet different conceptions--boundary conditions and "boundary situations."

The conception of "boundary situations," common to existential philosophy, was coined by Karl Jaspers. Boundary situations refer to the inescapable conditions of human existence which limit us and about which nothing can be done (Wild, 1955: 80-81). Six main boundary situations are distinguished: (1) situationality, (2) chance and fortune, (3) suffering, (4) human struggle and conflict, (5) guilt, and (6) death. Since these boundary situations cannot be eliminated, they must be faced. There is an authentic and an inauthentic way of facing them, and the difference is sharp and clear (Wild, 1955: 139-40). Although these limits are inescapable, their negating effect may be reduced as a result of the theoretical knowledge acquired about their functioning. The idea that boundary situations are opaque to rational analysis must be categorically

rejected, for to set up a limit is already to transcend it theoretically (Wild, 1955: 215).

The physical conception of general boundary conditions is similar to the conception of boundary situations in that both impose restrictions or limitations. In investigating the inescapable conditions of human existence, every domain of inquiry necessarily has limiting or boundary conditions which restrict the validity of the evidences possible by that domain of inquiry. For instance, the study of man qua man can be pursued in two ways: (1) in the form of an empirical inquiry whose philosophical bearing is explicitly formulated, and (2) in the form of a philosophical inquiry which is empirically enlightened and enriched (Strasser, 1963: 292). Rather than speaking of a boundary line which separates philosophy from empirical human science, it is more accurate to speak of a boundary region between the two:


By using this term, we convey the idea that, on the one hand, some pursuers of the empirical sciences, reflecting on the contents of their experience with man, have arrived at insights of philosophical importance, and on the other hand, that there are philosophers who have thrown light on the concrete existence of man in a way that has proved illuminating for the man of empirical research. Despite Comte's prophecies, there has been an encounter in this realm between the philosopher-metaphysician and the man of positive research (Strasser, 1963: 293).

The philosopher wants to interpret the riddle of human existence, and the student of a human science wants to make a contribution to this interpretation. The primarily evident insights into the structures of experience would remain fruitless for the phenomenological philosopher if he were not able to apply it to the data of history, sociology, or anthropology (Strasser, 1963: 279). If the phenomenologist is entitled to introduce

the results of scientific experience into his considerations, this right will have far-reaching consequences for his discourse. On the one hand, his descriptions will become richer, more differentiated, better attuned to concrete reality, and closer to life. On the other hand, the entire theory of primary evidences will need to be complemented with evidences that possess only a more restricted validity (Strasser, 1963: 289-90). The phenomenologist will endeavor philosophically to interpret all human forms of existence (including that of pursuing science) on the basis of man's being-in-the-world. What, then, is the relevance of the conceptions of boundary conditions and boundary region for the present inquiry?

In Figure 2 below, the boundary conditions and boundary regions of four domains of inquiry are schematically depicted. The four domains of inquiry include ontology, phenomenology, empirical human science, and the everyday world. Between these four domains, there are three overlapping areas, or boundary regions. The boundary conditions of each domain of inquiry are not to be construed as discrete and easily identifiable. To the contrary, the boundary conditions are obscure, diffuse, and difficult to locate. Yet, the more difficult task is that of identifying a boundary region, that is, the point of overlap between two or more domains of inquiry. It is postulated that this difficulty is augmented by the fact that the logic peculiar to any one domain does not take precedence over the logic of another domain within a boundary region. For example, within the boundary region where ontology overlaps with phenomenology, the logic relevant to ontology is no more applicable than the logic relevant to phenomenology. To map a course through the boundary region entails considerable risk of losing sight of both shores.

Figure 2
Diagrammatic Depiction of Relations
Among Four Domains of Inquiry



*In Ricoeur's terms, metaphysics refers to an upper ideality limit.

**In Ricoeur's terms, raw elemental experience refers to a lower obscurity limit.

The relevance of these remarks can be illustrated (with particular respect to this inquiry) by referring to Max Weber's ideal-typical methodology. Having concluded that Weber's method of conceptualization only approximated Ricoeur's phenomenological method, it can be argued that Weber's methodology is less adequate than Ricoeur's method for demarcating the boundary region between empirical human science and phenomenology. In brief, Weber's reluctance to abstract prevented him from clearly recognizing the limits to the boundary region where the results of phenomenological description and scientific explanation come into play, mediate, and thus clarify one another. In this respect, Talcott Parsons claimed that his methodology was more advanced than that of Weber, Pareto, or Durkheim.

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED PHENOMENOLOGICAL
AND RELATED TERMS

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED PHENOMENOLOGICAL
AND RELATED TERMS*

Apodictic (apodictic evidence): synonym for necessary, indubitable. Knowledge of what must occur, as opposed to knowledge of what might occur. Applicable not only to knowledge but also to objects known and to methods.

Bracketing: see Reduction, phenomenological.

Cogito: in broadest sense includes all experiences. In narrow sense, refers to Cartesian "I think" which functions in Husserl's phenomenology as the conscious acts of the ego which remain unaffected by the phenomenological reduction.

Constitution, phenomenological: in broad sense, the act by which an object is built up in consciousness. In narrow sense, the structure of intentionality in its character as productive of valid objects and correct, justified habits.

Dasein: being there; in Heidegger, refers to man as the being which comprehends Being.

Daseinanalytics: analysis of man's being-in-the-world, with special reference to Heidegger's ontological analytics of Dasein.

Doubting (Cartesian): provisional doubt is the rule proposed by the Cartesian method of voluntary suspension of judgment in order to reach a more dependable conclusion.

Ego (pure or transcendental): as free essential Being living in its acts; the ego which remains as an irreducible residue after having been subjected to the phenomenological reduction.

Egology: in Husserl, the study of the transcendental ego and its role in transcendental constitution.

Eidetic reduction: see Reduction.

*The compilation of this glossary of terms relies heavily on three sources: (1) Husserl (1931: 429-65), Analytical Index to Ideas; (2) Herbert Spiegelberg (1971a: 709-28), glossary of terms; and (3) Runes (1962), Dictionary of Philosophy.

Epoché: suspension of beliefs, in Husserl both suspension of beliefs and transcendental-phenomenological-reduction.

Essence: the nature of a thing considered independently of its existence; the whatness of things, as opposed to their thatness.

Facticity: in Heidegger and Sartre, refers to the factual being of Dasein.

Geist: means "soul" or "spirit," especially in the Hegelian sense.

Idealism, phenomenological: the world viewed as intrinsic correlate of absolute consciousness; all "reality" as constituted in consciousness.

Intentionality: the property of consciousness whereby it refers to or intends an object. The intentional object is not necessarily a real or existent thing but is merely that which the mental act is about.

- (a) Brentano: the property of all psychical phenomena to contain an object as inexistent, combined with the property of referring to an object.
- (b) Husserl: the property of consciousness of being consciousness of something.
- (c) Sartre: the property of consciousness to be directed toward being which is more than merely phenomenal, i.e., transphenomenal.

Lebenswelt (life-world): the encompassing world of our immediate experience which can be recovered from the world as given to scientific interpretation by a special type of reduction.

Natural attitude: everyday unreflective attitude of naive belief in the existence of the world.

Natural standpoint, thesis of: all doubting and rejecting of the data of the spatio-temporal fact-world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. The goal of the sciences of the natural standpoint is to know the fact-world more comprehensively and trustworthily than the naive lore of experience can provide.

Noema: in Husserl, the object-referent of a noetic act. That is, the objective sense of a noesis, together with the character of the sense as posited in a certain manner, as given or empty intended in a certain manner.

Noesis: in Husserl, any act directed to an intentional object. That current in the stream of consciousness which is intrinsically intentional in that it points to an object as beyond itself.

Noumenon: in Kant, an object or power transcending experience whose existence is theoretically problematic but must be postulated by practical reason.

Ontology, ontological: the theory of being qua being.

(a) Husserl: formal ontology as general theory of objects and their properties as a part of pure logic; regional ontology as groundwork of the sciences of facts.

(b) Heidegger: the study of Being.

(c) Sartre: the study of Being and Nothingness in all their aspects.

Originary: synonym primordial; term designating the world of the first order, e.g., originary experience.

Phenomenology: for Husserl, a descriptive theory of the essence of transcendental pure consciousness.

Phenomenon, pure: in Husserl, that which having been subjected to the phenomenological reduction is purified from the reality attributed to it by naive consciousness.

Primordial world: see Originary.

Realism, phenomenological: doctrine that the realm of essences, or possible universals, is as "real" as (if not more real than) the realm of existence, or actuality.

Reduction:

(a) eidetic: the act which leads from particulars to universal "pure" essences.

(b) transcendental and/or phenomenological: the act by which the general thesis of belief in factual existence characteristic of the natural attitude is inhibited, suspended, bracketed, and which uncovers in transcendental subjectivity, the acts of which constitute pure phenomena.

Reflection, reflexion: broadly, the knowledge which the mind has of itself and its operations. In Husserl, phenomenological reflection refers to consciousness' own method for the knowledge of consciousness generally.

Suspension: synonym for bracketing; see Reduction.

Telos: the end term of a process; the view that mind is guided or governed by purposes and values, as well as by factual and objective evidence.

Transcendent: absolute being. In Husserl, status of an intentional object constituted by intentional acts and lying beyond their immanent constituents.

Transcendental: term designating the sphere of consciousness which is not affected by the phenomenological (or transcendental) reduction; the transcendent is constituted by transcendental consciousness.

Transcendental (or phenomenological) reduction: see Reduction.

Weltanschauung: term meaning world-view, perspective of life, conception of things.

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